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The thesis explores why post-authoritarian transitional justice (TJ) is implemented and why 
not and which factors influence governments’ decisions on initiating TJ after transitions. It 
examines post-2012 Georgia and post-2018 Armenia as small-n case studies and compares the 
extent of TJ implementation based on a combination of Vello and Eva-Clarita Pettai’s 
transitional justice matrix and Dustin Sharp’s economic violence approach. This framework 
enables the illustration of different patterns of TJ implementation in four dimensions – legal-
judicial, political-administrative, socio-economic and symbolic-representative – which 
combine 16 indicators to form the explanandum (dependent variable). Based on the author’s 
theoretical three-factor model of TJ implementation, the thesis presents evidence that the 
phenomenon can be understood as the result of governmental responsiveness to civil society 
activism, the TJ pressure of external elites and the ideological and structural prevalence of an 
authoritarian legacy (independent variables). Within the time periods under analysis (2012 to 
2015 in Georgia and 2018 to 2020 in Armenia), it was found that the Georgian government 
was comparatively less active in initiating TJ measures than the Armenian government, 
particularly with regard to the symbolic-representative and socio-economic dimensions. The 
thesis frames Georgia’s TJ patterns as a consequence of the continuation of an authoritarian 
legacy, a lack of external TJ pressure and conflicting relationships with civil society. By 
comparison, Armenia’s broader level of TJ implementation can be understood as a result of 
resistance to an authoritarian legacy, an initially higher level of external TJ leverage and the 
government’s cooperation with civil society. 
Keywords: Human rights, post-authoritarian transitional justice, Georgia, Armenia, 





Chapter 1: Introduction    
1.1 Picking up the pieces of an authoritarian past  
When the philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) wrote what would later become his 
famous Prison Notebooks (1926), he probably would not have expected one particular 
sentence to be repeatedly quoted, which summarizes all too well the topic of this thesis: “The 
crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born […]” 
(Gramsci 1926 [1971]: 276). Systemic transitions after phases of an authoritarian, violent past 
always seem to be crises, regardless of which part of the world they occur in. They indicate 
that dominating practices within a society have (at least temporarily) become contested, no 
longer accepted, and no longer normatively acceptable and that something new should take 
their place. When two neighboring countries in the South Caucasus, Georgia and Armenia, 
were driven by public outcries to end long periods of systemic political and economic 
injustice to initiate transitions in 2012 and 2018, respectively, civilians hoped that the new 
political elites would start enforcing normative changes and finally guarantee very basic 
human rights. Both Bidzina Ivanishvili (2012–2013) – Georgia’s richest man, then soon-to-be 
new prime minister (PM) and founder of Georgian Dream (GD), a political party, which has 
stayed in power until today – and Nikol Pashinyan – Armenia’s leader of the non-violent 
Velvet Revolution in 2018, which was driven by “[…] widespread disillusionment with 
socioeconomic decline, persistent insecurity and authoritarian encroachment” (Broers 2020: 
1) – assured that they would pick up the pieces of an authoritarian past. After videotapes that 
exposed the torture of inmates at the notorious Gldani Prison No. 8 were broadcast on 
Georgian public television (Euronews 2012), Ivanishvili declared that he would restore justice 
(Austin 2018). He proclaimed an end to the grave human rights violations conducted by the 
administration of the ruthless neoliberal reformer and the West’s former darling, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, whose legacy remains contested in Georgian society. Ivanishvili promised to 
hold accountable those who broke civilians’ rights and guaranteed human dignity to those 
who had been deprived of it during a violent 10-year phase of ‘zero tolerance for petty crime’ 
– an authoritarian mission to modernize the state by enforcing capitalism.  
In August 2018, 100 days after Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, which wiped away the political 
foundations of an oligarchic network of endemic corruption that included Serzh Sargsyan, the 
country’s leader, former head of state and head of the Republican Party (HHK), Pashinyan – 
who had become the face of the revolution – announced the creation of ‘transitional justice 




from the establishment of ‘extraordinary courts’, which is unconstitutional in Armenia 
(Article 163, Constitution of the Republic of Armenia 2015). Today, more than eight years 
after Georgia’s transition, activists and politicians in Georgia agree that the idea of 
transitional justice (TJ) has failed. In Armenia, talks on post-authoritarian (not post-conflict) 
TJ have grown quiet in the wake of the horrendous second Nagorno-Karabakh war (2020). 
How did we arrive at these points and, more importantly, why? 
1.2 Chapter guide  
The present thesis aims to answer these two main questions. It intends to trace a logical line 
between the context of the chosen TJ trajectories and the patterns of TJ implementation in 
post-2012 Georgia and post-2018 Armenia. Whilst Chapter 1 draws on the relevance and the 
limits of analysis and provides an overview of the literature, Chapter 2 outlines the thesis’ 
theoretical backbone. It uses Vello and Eva-Clarita Pettai’s three-dimensional approach to 
operationalize TJ in legal-judicial, political-administrative and symbolic-representative 
dimensions in the framework of accountability and reconciliation and adds in correspondence 
to its critical approach the dimension socio-economic, re-distributive justice, based on Dustin 
Sharp’s thinking. Furthermore, the thesis developed a three-factor theoretical model of TJ 
implementation as an attempt to understand the analysed TJ patterns. Explanatory variables 
include authoritarian legacy, the influence of civil society and the impact of external elites. 
Then, Chapter 3 provides an overview of methodology by introducing the usefulness of the 
Most-Similar-Different-Outcome (MSDO) research design for the thesis’ outcome-oriented 
approach, which forms the basis of a controlled case comparison and by presenting the 
methods used in data collection and evaluation. Next, Chapter 4 describes the TJ measures 
implemented by the post-transitory governments in Georgia and Armenia, as well as the ones 
that they did not implement. Chapter 5 analyses how the mentioned three factors influenced 
the scale of the governments’ implementation of TJ. Finally, Chapter 6 sums up the thesis’s 
most important results and answers the research question. 
1.3 Research gaps, relevance and aims 
The academic and social relevance of this thesis, as related to identified research gaps, is 
based on five central factors. Firstly, unlike post-conflict transitional justice (e.g., Broers 
2019, Frichova 2009), post-authoritarian TJ in Georgia after 2012 (Appendix IV, Dolidze 
2020, p. 118) and in Armenia after 2018 is under-researched and under-analysed within a 




2015), de Waal (2012) and, most notably, Varney (2017) have provided more holistic 
analyses of TJ perspectives in Georgia from 2012 to 2017. To date, there have not been any 
analyses that evaluated the scope of post-Saakashvili TJ or posed the question of why TJ as a 
political project failed in post-2012 Georgia. Single academic publications, such as those by 
Austin (2018) and Stan (2009: 238-239), have generated fragmented descriptive knowledge 
on the flaws of TJ in Georgia since its independence in 1991. However, due to their under-
theorized approach, they did not assess the reasons for the implemented measures nor for 
proposed and/or failed TJ measures. In the case of Armenia, policy experts and consultants 
have similarly analysed TJ perspectives (Carranza 2018, 2019, Kopalyan 2018, 2019, 2020a) 
and the political significance of single TJ measures in the TJ process (Vasilyan 2019). Theory 
applying post-2018 analyses, which could measure the scale of TJ implementation, have, 
certainly also due to the ongoing process of TJ implementation, not yet been finalized. The 
academic literature on post-authoritarian TJ in Armenia before 2018 is rare and has focused 
on the lack of its post-Soviet lustration and post-conflict memorialization (Stan 2009: 240-
241, Suciu 2018). Thus, one of the present thesis’ goals is to close the empirical gap, which 
applies to both countries. Secondly, the lack of country-focused empirical analyses logically 
implies an absence of comparative studies on the topic, which further underlines the relevance 
of this research project. Whilst civil society and lawyers (e.g., Chanturia 2020, Heinrich Boell 
Foundation South Caucasus 2018, Kirakosyan 2020, Sakunts 2020, Zadoyan, in: Armenian 
Lawyers Association 2019a) have stressed the usefulness of a comparative approach in order 
to learn from mistakes made in the Georgian context, systemic comparative analyses have not 
yet been conducted. Nerses Kopalyan has briefly drawn on lessons learnt from Georgia and 
concluded that its TJ mechanism was perceived as a failure for four central reasons: (1) a lack 
of independent observatory bodies, which would have overseen investigatory and 
prosecutorial units after 2012; (2) political prosecutions due to selective justice; (3) “various 
reform structures and bodies’, which were seen as artificial and finally (4) a “relatively 
underdeveloped civil society” (Kopalyan 2018). These are relevant observations that must be 
further verified and contextualized, both to illustrate Georgia’s TJ trajectory and to compare 
the scale of its implemented measures with those of Armenia. Thirdly, TJ analyses have so far 
mostly excluded to examine the ethos or dominant ideological narrative behind the 
implemented measures, which includes an analysis on the forms of human rights violations, 
which were addressed as part of the TJ trajectory. Since one of the thesis’s main observations 
concerns the absence of answers to economic violence as part of TJ, a critical approach is 




contribute to the theorization of TJ as a structural concept. Whilst the field of TJ has produced 
a vast number of empirical analyses, it lacks contributions that illustrate the validity of 
intermediate-range theories. Research on causes for the success or failure of TJ remains rare 
(Duthie 2017: 9-11). In their 2010 paper, Olsen et al. concluded that “if transitional justice 
does achieve its goals, neither scholars nor policy-makers clarify when, why, or how it might 
do so” (Olsen et al. 2010: 981). The present study aims to critically assess whether reasons for 
the (lack of) TJ can be found in the pre- or post-transition structure. Finally, the thesis hopes 
to contribute to practical debates surrounding TJ in both Georgia and Armenia. During the 
research process, which ended before the 2020 elections in Georgia and the second Nagorno-
Karabakh war, it became evident that human rights activists, scholars and analysts encouraged 
TJ implementation. However, during the time of data collection, there has been societal 
disillusionment in the Georgian case and a certain resignation due to incoherent governmental 
communication regarding the design of TJ implementation in the Armenian case. A critical 
issue that has been frequently raised concerns the general usage of TJ as a very academic and 
elitist term, which is mostly unrelated to forms of “soft authoritarianism” (Mazmanyan 2020). 
Whilst the present research doesn’t claim to be a policy guide, it aims to at least illustrate and 
understand TJ implementation patterns to provide impetus for further discussions. 
1.4 Research question, sub-question and definition of variables  
The thesis has developed one main research question, which is related to a sub-question, 
which has to be answered first in order to resolve the research puzzle.  
Although the political systems of Georgia (2003–2012) and Armenia (2008–2018) appear to 
be quite similar at first, the following analysis demonstrates that the implementation of TJ 
measures differed after the countries’ respective transitions. Consequently, the thesis aims to 
identify factors that can explain the introduction of TJ in post-authoritarian contexts. The 
main research question is, ‘Under which conditions is post-authoritarian transitional justice 
implemented by governments?’ Consequently, the reasons are treated as the independent 
variable (IV, explanans).  
In order to answer this question, a second sub-question was posed. It aims to illustrate the 
landscape of TJ implementation and reads as follows: ‘Which measures of post-authoritarian 
transitional justice have been implemented by governments in Georgia since 2012 and in 





1.5 Limitations of analysis  
The analysis has five main limitations and was thus unable to obtain certain results. First, the 
thesis focuses only on post-authoritarian responses to a post-Soviet predecessor government 
in each country. Thus, it considers neither the lack of post-Soviet TJ nor the full path 
dependency and development of human rights after 1991. The former excludes an analysis of 
TJ measures as answers to human rights violations that occurred in Soviet times. The latter 
issue may be especially disadvantageous in Armenia’s case, since the Armenian government’s 
TJ strategy (The Government of the Republic of Armenia 2019) addresses rights violations 
committed under not only Sargsayan, but also the country’s first post-independence president, 
Levan Ter-Petrosyan (1991–1998), and second president, Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008). 
Similarly, a thorough analysis of human rights violations under Georgian presidents Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia (1991–1992) and Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003) was not part of the study. 
However, various interlocutors (e.g., Ramishvili) have underlined that this would contribute 
to a better understanding of the politics of truth and justice in post-Soviet Georgia. Such an 
undertaking could help to decode a “long-term culture of impunity, which persists in 
Georgian society [and] has […] perverted [its] social fabric […]” (Chanturia 2020). Because 
of its chosen approach, which focuses on TJ answers to the respective immediate pre-
transitory governments, the research project does not include analyses of the abovementioned 
post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. Being aware that this limitation narrows the research 
results, it states that clear categories and the inclusion of distal factors in the IV (comp. 
subsection 2.3.1) help to illustrate the political reality of the chosen timeframe. The second 
limitation, which relates to the framework of the analysis, is the lack of examination of rights 
violations amongst different social groups and identities (e.g., gender, citizenship or health 
conditions). Whilst much more sociological research should be conducted on the topic and 
sociological analyses are needed in order to understand the full scale of rights violations, the 
present research focuses on analysing governmental responses as TJ measure types. Thirdly, 
the study is limited by the type of rights violations that it considers. Within the framework of 
economic and social rights, it focuses on the right to work and social security in relation to 
employment. The thesis neither assesses violations of the right to health, education, water, 
sanitation and housing nor examines cultural rights violations and their relation to 
authoritarianism and TJ. Certainly, analyses of these rights categories could be conducted in 
the future. The fourth and most important limitation of the study concerns my entire lack of 
Georgian and Armenian language skills. In order to ensure adequate coverage of Georgian- 




assistants who identified local-language sources, made transcripts and conducted translations. 
This additional help substantively expanded the data. 
Chapter 2: Key concepts and theoretical framework for an 
analysis of post-authoritarian transitional justice  
First, Chapter 2 presents the definition of TJ used in this thesis and distinguishes it from 
related terms that are within the same semantic field. The section also underlines the necessity 
of giving equal consideration to the severity of political and economic violence. Secondly, an 
own conceptualization is developed, which represents a combination of Vello and Eva-Clarita 
Pettai’s (2015) three-dimensional approach (legal-judicial, political-administrative and 
symbolic-representative) and Dustin Sharp’s (2014) paradigm of economic violence; this 
enables the addition of a fourth socio-economic dimension. Thirdly, the chapter presents the 
theoretical foundation for the research by illustrating determinants that have been considered 
to be beneficial for the implementation of TJ in the literature. Fourthly, an own model of TJ 
implementation is then constructed.  
2.1 Re-thinking transitional justice as a human rights concept  
‘Transitional justice’ as a term was coined by Neil J. Kritz, a senior scholar at the United 
States Institute of Peace, in his three-volume monograph from 1995 (Kritz 1995). Since then, 
a vast body of theoretical scholarship (most notably Elster 2004, Franzki/Olarte 2014, 
Grodsky 2011, Pettai/Pettai 2015, Sharp 2013, 2014, 2018, 2019, Teitel 2000, 2003) has 
developed. Transitional justice has become established as a discipline. Intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions (European Union External Service 2015, United Nations 2010, even 
the World Bank 2011) and governments (Davis 2014, Sancho 2014) have included it as a 
normative goal of liberal democratization. In 2011, the position of a United Nations (UN) 
Special Rapporteur on TJ (‘Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation 
and Guarantees of Non-recurrence’) was established. Since 2000, international and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) have offered consultancy on TJ formation and implementation to governments and 
civil society worldwide. Transitional justice has become internationalized as a global project 
(Nagy 2008).  
In this thesis, transitional justice is defined as “the judicial and non-judicial processes 




repression, and[/or] armed conflict” (Dancy et al. 2019: 1). Thus, TJ as a concept seeks for an 
extension of purely legal measures but aims to achieve societal transformation (Murphy 
2017). By rectifying with the past, TJ aims for accountability from groups and individuals 
who have previously committed human rights violations and reconciliation for collectives and 
individuals whose human rights were violated (ICTJ 2020b, Pettai/Pettai 2015: 15). Its 
ultimate – and, indeed, utopian – goal (which is reflected in the thesis’ conceptualization of 
TJ) is not the establishment of liberal democracy, as is often uncritically assumed, which 
moves elements of economic violence to the periphery (Sharp 2014: 25), but rather an end to 
previous structural political and economic violence. Whilst non-governmental and non-state 
actors, which frequently influence and play leading roles in TJ processes, offer alternative 
spaces and forms of TJ (Kurze/Lamont 2019), the thesis focuses on measures initiated by 
governments and state organs.  
Transitional justice can be implemented after periods of authoritarianism (‘post-authoritarian 
TJ’, in which ‘post-communist TJ’ represents a specific type of TJ in countries from the 
former Soviet Union) and conflict (‘post-conflict TJ’). There can be a simultaneous need to 
implement both types of TJ (e.g., post-1992 Georgia, post-1994 Armenia, post-2010 
Kyrgyzstan and post-2013 Ukraine, amongst others). Thus, the distinction between post-
conflict TJ and post-authoritarian TJ is purely analytical. Post-conflict TJ is a response to 
periods of structural violence, which include large-scale physical violence committed in an 
armed conflict between two or more states, different state and non-state actors or in the 
context of contested statehood. Post-authoritarian TJ, which is the focus of this research, is a 
response to systemic violations of principles of democracy – namely, civil, political, social 
and economic rights. Both post-conflict and post-authoritarian TJ should be regarded as sub-
groups of TJ, since they aim to achieve the same ends: the restoration of rights that were 
violated due to practices, structures and systems of rights abuse. The two arms of the 
International Bill of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Political and Civil 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESC), legally codified all types of human rights (United Nations Human Rights Officer of 
the High Commissioner 1966a, b). First presented in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948, human rights are indivisible and interdependent, as stated 
particularly in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (UNOHCHR 1993). 
Political and civil rights ensure the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3 of the 
UDHR) and not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 




everyone has the right to an effective remedy “by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law” (Article 8 of the 
UDHR) and is “entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him” (Article 9 of the UDHR). They further include the right to vote freely 
(Article 21 of the UDHR) and to peaceful assembly (Article 20 of the UDHR). Violations of 
political and civil rights caused by murder, rape, torture and other forms of physical violence 
are subsumed under political violence. Economic and social rights reflected in Articles 17 and 
22 to 27 of the UDHR include, amongst other rights, the right to property (Article 17 of the 
UDHR), social security (Article 22 of the UDHR) and work
1
 (Article 23 of the UDHR). 
Violations of economic and social rights (ESR) resulting from corruption, economic crimes 
and political policies that reproduce pervasive structural economic inequality and deliberately 
violate social and economic rights are subsumed under “economic violence” (Sharp 2014: 2). 
Due to size limitations, the thesis operates on a narrow definition of corruption that focuses on 
the appropriation of property and financial assets. 
An authoritarian system is defined as a political system in which political and economic 
violence occur. This conceptualization prevents the term ‘democracy’ from being reduced to 
minimalist procedural and liberal (not critical) definitions (as e.g., Levitsky/Way 2010, 
O’Donnell/Schmitter 1986). According to the logic of the thesis, any post-authoritarian TJ 
approach must include responses to violations of both rights groups. Ismael Muvingi (2009) 
calls this an attempt to overcome the ‘bias of the parent discipline of human rights’, which has 
narrowly focused on the violation of political and civil rights. 
Over the past ten years in particular, there has been increased disagreement within the 
academic community about whether or not to include social and economic rights as part of TJ 
(Carranza 2008, Hecht/Michalowski 2012, Ochoa-Sánchez 2018). Some scholars have loudly 
opposed the idea by underlining that (1) TJ is conceptually over-stretched (Waldorf 2012); (2) 
TJ measures are not suitable for responding to economic violence due to their alleged 
“legalistic and corrective” (ibid.: 179) nature; (3) TJ is limited in terms of time, capacity and 
skills (Mani 2008); and (4) socio-economic violations would concern sectors of governance 
and pose difficult budgetary questions (McAuliffe 2014: 277). However, these arguments are 
                                                          
1
 Other social and economic rights, which are not covered in this thesis, include the right to an adequate standard 
of living, the right of family to protection and assistance, the right to the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health, the right to education and the right to cultural life and benefits of scientific progress (United 
Nations 1948). The realization of these rights has not necessarily been achieved in political systems defined as 




considered to be unconvincing, tentative and incoherent within the present thesis. 
Counterarguments to the abovementioned four aspects can be provided as follows. First, 
ceteris paribus, there is nothing wrong with developing broad concepts. It is indeed necessary 
to exhaustively define terms in order to enable the holistic description of phenomena (Bell, 
Campbell and Ní Aoláin 2007). Second, because of their corrective nature, TJ measures 
should equally encompass all rights violations (Arbour 2006) and not repeat the ideologically 
driven competition between political and civil rights (PCR) and ESR (see e.g., Carranza 
2008). This thesis argues that it is only possible to speak of attempts to create more just 
societies if measures substantially address political and economic violence (Muvingi 2009); 
thus, stressing the apparent limits of TJ because of its ‘legalistic’ nature, as Waldorf states, is 
counter-productive and contradicts the ICESC. Third, ‘pragmatic’ arguments that refer to 
technical questions of limited time and skills are then especially unconvincing, given that 
governments are tasked with achieving societal change rather than accomplishing a political 
project (Anonymous A1 2020). Fourth, questions of good governance are an essential part of 
TJ (Kirakosyan 2020). Consequently, excluding ESC (1) contradicts the understanding of TJ 
as a human rights concept (Muvingi 2009, Sharp 2014), (2) prevents the acknowledgement of 
groups and individuals whose social and economic rights were violated and (3) reinforces the 
continuation of a state’s authoritarian political economy, which is mostly excluded from the 
TJ discourse (Carranza 2008, Franzki/Olarte 2014: 208).  
Finally, TJ should be regarded as distinctive from other terms that lie within its semantic field 
(a similar set of meaning) but are analytically different and often confused for it. Transitional 
justice is not the same as retrospective or post-transitional justice. The terms ‘retrospective 
justice’ and ‘post-transitional justice’ differ from TJ in terms of temporality. Whilst 
retrospective justice addresses human rights violations that occurred before the transition 
under analysis (in this case, violations that occurred before 2003 in Georgia and before 2008 
in Armenia), post-transitional justice refers to measures of accountability and reconciliation 
implemented long after the end of as transition (Pettai/Pettai 2015: 30).
2
 Furthermore, TJ is 
distinct from but contains elements of retributive, restorative and distributive justice, which 
are reflected in the different dimensions of the TJ matrix (see Chapter 2.2). Retributive 
justice, which “takes its start from the foundational underpinnings of the criminal justice 
system in many Western countries” (Mohamed 2016: 4), aims to hold perpetrators 
accountable and punish them; thus, it is a part of TJ but does not include the victim 
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 In practice, this would refer to Georgia since the 2020 elections and in Armenia to the period after the next 




dimension. Restorative justice is “fundamentally non-retributive” (ibid.: 5) and aims to bring 
victims and perpetrators of crimes back into harmony with the community (Quinn 2009: 333). 
Accordingly, measures include rehabilitation, particularly in the form of truth commissions 
and compensation (Grodsky 2011: 14). Redistributive justice, which is often excluded from 
liberal discourses on TJ, aims to the return of rewards and a new redistribution of social and 
economic goods.  
2.2 Conceptualizing a matrix of transitional justice implementation 
The following model, which served as the measurement tool for the depth of TJ, combines 
Pettai and Pettai’s model with Sharp’s (2014, 2018, 2019) critical approach reflecting a 
certain utopianism of critical theory. Vello and Eva-Clarita Pettai (2015: 32) developed a 12-
field matrix that enables the measurement of three dimensions of post-communist TJ: the 
criminal-judicial, political-administrative and symbolic-representational dimensions. The 
dimensions measure, as introduced by Jon Elster, in the ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ side (Elster 
2004). This translates to the categories ‘accountability’ towards perpetrators and 
‘reconciliation’ towards victims. This dichotomy has been criticized by some researchers, 
who have argued that (1) perpetrators can simultaneously be victims, and vice versa (Borer 
2003), and that (2) this binary thinking reinforces unequal power structures through 
victimization (Franzki/Olarte 2014). This thesis agrees with that criticism and does not ignore 
that the two sides are ideal types but underlines that governments, political leaders and the 
close associates of elites remain the reference point in post-authoritarian states, since they 
exercised authoritarian practices (acts of political and economic violence) that made them 
responsible for the diagnosed human rights violations. Furthermore, the intention is not to 
reduce victims of human rights violations to passive objects of compensation, which would 
uphold unjust structures; rather, the thesis underlines that ‘victim’ is defined as an individual 
or a collective that was a deliberate target of rights violations. For the purposes of the present 
research, a victim is not solely understood as an individual whose political and civil rights 
were violated but also an individual, group or society whose social and economic rights were 
broken (Sharp 2014: 12). Thus, TJ can, contrary to Meister’s statements, become a 
revolutionary project (Meister 2011: 21). However, this requires that ESR are included as a 
serious category of TJ measures, as Sharp (2014) has frequently argued. Consequently, the 
matrix contains a fourth dimension – the socio-economic dimension – to address a state’s 
political economy and to illustrate redistributive measures that either tackle former violations 




2.2.1 Legal-judicial dimension  
The legal-judicial dimension (boxes 1a and 1b, p. 14) encompasses TJ measures from the so-
called ‘first generation’ of TJ, which focused on criminal punishment and individual 
accountability (Teitel 2003) – namely, retribution and legal rehabilitation. Instruments in the 
perpetrator dimension consist of investigations and legal prosecutions. Prosecutions have been 
used as a response to violations of international and humanitarian law (political violence), but 
they have been used far less as a response to economic crimes. An example for the latter is the 
prosecution and criminal charges against former Liberian president Charles Taylor for war 
crimes related to his direct involvement in controlling diamond mines in Sierra Leone (Duthie 
2014: 186). The scale of investigations can vary from the opening of cases to a lack of 
convictions and actual criminal charges (Pettai/Pettai 2015: 35). One main challenge in all 
investigations and prosecutions concerns how to deal with the old legal system, which served 
as a basis for legitimizing decisions made by elites that caused and reinforced political and 
economic violence. After transitions, the judiciary often becomes a target for political 
contestation and may be in complete disarray (Hayner 2011: 9). In terms of reconciliation, the 
thesis echoes Pettai and Pettai in viewing the release of political prisoners and the legal 
rehabilitation of former victims as crucial TJ measures. The recognition of an individual as a 
victim means that they can either obtain a legal status of former repression or access judicial 
remedies based on special laws that outline legal procedures for individuals that the new 
government views as formerly oppressed. Pettai and Pettai (2015: 27) have underlined that the 
“righting of […] [political prisoners] criminal record […] [carries] greater import, since other 
legal restrictions may continue to apply to them as long as these prior convictions remain on 
the books”. Thus, the release of political prisoners is considered to be a central TJ measure in 
the victim dimension. 
2.2.2 Political-administrative dimension  
The political-administrative dimension (boxes 2a and 2b, p. 14) encompasses instruments that 
lead to changes in the architecture of the political system. Instruments in the perpetrator 
dimension comprise purges, office bans and vetting. Purges can be equated with the term 
lustration, which means the direct deprivation “[…] of a livelihood in positions of public 
trust” (Pettai/Pettai 2015: 36) for those who have committed human rights violations. Vetting 
is a specific mechanism that aims to assess “[…] the integrity of individuals - including 
adherence to relevant human rights standards - to determine their suitability for public 




questionnaires to controlling financial assets. Another mechanism related to legal 
rehabilitation is the introduction of reparation programmes or the possibility of being awarded 
monetary benefits or advantages within the new political system to balance the injustice 
inflicted by the previous regime. As a form of restorative justice, reparations can be realized 
through administrative programmes (e.g., in post-1985 Brazil, where workers obtained 
payments as a form of compensation for political persecution resulting from their labour 
activism), be apart from monetary also non-financial and be individual or collective in nature 
(Magarell 2007). Examples of non-financial reparations include social forms of rehabilitation 
(e.g., individual or collective therapy), whilst collective reparations include the provision of 
infrastructures, such as community centres, roads or school buildings (Roht-Arriaza 2014: 
119). However, they are often “the last-implemented and least-funded measure of transitional 
justice” (ICTJ 2020c). This form of compensation differs from mechanisms that impact a 
state’s political economy, as “the main goal of a reparations program is not to resolve poverty 
and inequality” (Duthie 2014: 194).  
2.2.3 Socio-economic dimension  
The socio-economic dimension (boxes 3a and 3b, p. 14) encompasses instruments and 
measures that aim to control states’ social and economic equality and, if implemented, lead to 
changes in the political economy (Franzki/Olarte 2014: 202, Sharp 2014, 2017, 2018). Within 
the perpetrator dimension, the act of returning illegally confiscated property and financial 
assets – which are both forms of redistributive justice – is conceptualized (Carranza 2008: 
318). This is based on the idea that the right to property is itself a socio-economic right and 
related to a state’s economic system. As for the victim dimension, the socio-economic 
dimension encompasses a mechanism of property restitution along with re-obtaining basic 
social security in order to eliminate most pervasive forms of economic violence, which 
manifest as systemic social inequality and/or endemic corruption. This normatively aligns 
with the UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states that any 
failure to guarantee “a minimum core obligation to ensure the […] minimum level of each of 
the rights […]” (ICESC) constitutes a prima facie violation (Albin-Lackey 2014: 145). As 
stated by Roht-Arriaza, “[…] social protection programs […] become part of transitional 
planning, not something to be put off until normality has returned” (Roht-Arriaza 2014: 138). 
Economic violence can’t easily be overcome by legal-judicial or political-administrative 




the justice principle of equality. Miller describes this process as making the “invisibility of the 
economic” visible (Miller 2008). As De Greiff underlined, 
“[…] transitional justice is interested not merely in correcting isolated, “token” abuses, but […] in 
correcting systematic violations, which […] requires systemic reform, development should not be 
thought to be interested merely in distributing already existing material goods and possibilities, but 
must take seriously how existing goods and possibilities came about. […] [T]he “distribution” of life 
chances must heed not just end points but starting points as well” (2009: 63).  
Duthie has argued for an approach that focuses “on only the most serious and widespread   
crimes, which are likely to have the greatest negative impact on economic and social rights” 
(Duthie 2014). It is challenging to define a threshold for the most profound impact on social 
and economic rights without being arbitrary. Since the thesis centres on distributive justice, it 
focuses on means to achieve or maintain basic economic value – namely, labour. 
Consequently, a minimum threshold would consist of the protection of labour rights, which 
relate to the right to physical security and the right to work. For those individuals in society 
who cannot work, the state’s protection of their social security status is considered. 
2.2.4 Symbolic-representative dimension  
The symbolic-representative dimension (boxes 4a and 4b, p. 14) refers to measures, which do 
not change the political or economic structure of a system but symbolically and rhetorically 
address the nature of the ancien régime. Their aim is to achieve a normative shift and a non-
material turning point away from previously violent practices. Instruments on the perpetrator 
side include rhetorical condemnation by new members of the government and non-judicial 
investigations that reveal the nature of old abuses (Pettai/Pettai 2015). Non-judicial 
mechanisms can include reports or commissions. A truth commissions is a “temporary body 
established with an official mandate to investigate past human rights violations, identify the 
patterns and causes of violence and publish a final report through a political autonomous 
procedure” (Bakiner 2016: 24). Truth commissions are different from criminal proceedings, 
as they usually do not have the power to make criminal judgments. Truth commissions are 
also different from investigations, as they are bound by a timeframe and a mandate (ibid.). 
They have been used to address political violence. For example, the 1990 Chad truth 
commission identified the financial operations and bank accounts of former president Hissène 
Habré and his associates (Carranza 2008: 321), the 2003 National Reconciliation Commission 
in Ghana examined property and labour rights violations (Sharp 2014: 94) and the 2011–2012 
Truth and Dignity Commission in Tunisia analysed political repression resulting from 








names of perpetrators, symbolic-representative mechanisms are also about societal healing. 
Consequently, the implementation of related measures must be contextualized and evaluated 
in relation to normative criteria, which ensure the protection of the human rights of those who 
committed human rights violations in the ancien régime. Societal healing for victims of 
human rights abuses can be achieved through individual or collective apologies, stated by new 
governmental officials for old abuses and through public remembrance. Apologies are “[…] a 
formal, solemn, and in most cases public acknowledgement that human rights violations were 
committed in the past, that they caused serious and often irreparable harm to victims, and that 
the state, group, or individual apologizing is accepting some or all of the responsibility for 
what happened” (Carranza/Correa/Naughton 2015: 1). Public remembrance includes 
commemorations, for example in public events, often related to initiating commemoration 
days, monuments, public practices such as reading out or publishing victims’ names, 
commemoration meetings between governmental officials and victims’ successors or the 
establishment of museums and educational activities. All of these practices play a role in the 
myth-building of states, which however won’t be analysed in this thesis.  
The conceptual framework can be summarized in the following table: 
 Accountability  Reconciliation  
Legal-judicial -(Criminal) investigations 
-Prosecution of perpetrators   
 
-Legal rehabilitation of victims 
-Release of political prisoners 
Political-administrative -Purges, office bans and vetting of 
former regime officials  
-Political rehabilitation of victims 
through awarding of special 
compensation 
Socio-economic  -Return of illegally obtained 
property   
-Return of corrupted financial 
assets 
-Restitution of property  
-Obtention of basic social security 
Symbolic-representative -Rhetorical condemnation of 
former authoritarian regime by 
new governmental officials 
-Non-judicial investigations 
revealing mechanisms of abuse 
-Public remembrance  
-Official apology towards subjects 
whose human rights were violated 





2.3 Developing a model to understand transitional justice implementation 
The current section develops a theoretical framework for the implementation of TJ as a 
consequence of three factors: authoritarian legacy, the influence of civil society and 
international external elites. It critically reflects on other scholars’ ideas and provides the 
conceptual basis for understanding patterns of implemented TJ measures, which are 
conceptualized in Section 2.2 and later empirically identified in the thesis. Three hypotheses 
were developed, which were later not strictly tested but served as exploratory tools.  
To date, the literature on TJ and the few attempts at a complex theorization of TJ 
implementation (most notably Grodsky 2011, Hansen 2013) have revealed little on how 
broader structures, both domestic and international, affect TJ implementation. Initially, the 
literature on TJ was significantly influenced by intuitively appealing balance of power 
approaches from the 1990s, which have become increasingly contested in recent years and 
rightly criticized for their enforced binary thinking (Hansen 2013). Representatives of the 
balance of power theory (e.g., Huntington 1991) have underlined that TJ, in particular 
criminal prosecution, is a “function of the decision-making process of the new [domestic] 
elites” (Kim 2012: 307). The actor-focused balance of power approach centres on an 
assessment of relative ‘power’ (seen as military and economic resources) of the ruler (often 
simplified as ‘good incoming elites’) and the opposition (‘bad outgoing elites’; Grodsky 2011: 
20). It is assumed that the relative weakness of the old elites would increase the likelihood of 
TJ implementation. However, this black-and-white actor-centred approach can’t withstand 
four main points of criticism and thus, has to be incorporated in more structural approaches. 
First, whilst the thesis aligns with the idea that the post-transition government is the most 
central actor in the TJ implementation process, it underlines that the influence of civil society 
is crucial in government decisions. Second, elites are neither coherent groups nor black boxes 
with constant convictions and codes of behaviour. Consequently, the almost artificial 
distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ elites with regard to the temporal point of the transition 
fails to account for empirical complexity. Moreover, new elites can still rely on political and 
economic violence after the transition and/or make conscious decisions to avoid TJ measures 
(e.g., post-Franco Spain). Third, TJ as a process has, as previously mentioned, become 
increasingly internationalized and is now often co-designed and implemented or prevented by 
external actors. Balance of power approaches can’t precisely reflect these dynamics. Finally, 
balance of power approaches underestimate historical authoritarian legacy in institutions and 




factors, a TJ system that serves as a starting point to understand the analysed TJ patterns was 
developed. 
2.3.1 Approaching the authoritarian legacy 
Any new post-transitory government that rises to power does not encounter a tabula rasa but 
“inherit[s] an economy, a system of property rights, a class of wealth holders, and a range of 
pre-existing organizations and institutions – not the least of which are constitutions, 
legislatures, political parties, oppositional political movements, trade unions [and] police 
forces […]” (Haber 2006: 696) – in other words, the legacy of an authoritarian past. The latter 
manifests as (a) a set of beliefs, values and attitudes; (b) agencies and institutions; and (c) the 
behaviour comes from (a) and (b) Morlino 2010: 508). Morlino concluded that “the greater 
the number of dimensions that persist, the stronger will be their legacy and the slower and 
more difficult their passing” (ibid.). Furthermore, Hite and Morlino (2004) have argued that 
the institutional innovative legacy of regimes critically influences TJ implementation. 
Innovation, which is neither a ‘positive’ nor a ‘negative’ term, is understood as the degree of 
institutionalisation of authoritarian rules, patterns and norms symbolized in a constitution, the 
creation of new institutions and the degree to which identities and interests are strengthened 
or weakened (Morlino 2010: 512). According to this logic, authoritarian regimes that have 
modernized state institutions and societies would cause stronger constraints on new 
governments than authoritarian regimes that have not introduced such substantial 
transformative projects. To date, this hypothesis has only been examined in a few case 
studies, and the exact causal inference requires further analysis. In her analysis of Peru’s TJ 
trajectory, Ulfe (2015) demonstrated that neoliberal economic models in pre-war Peru 
contributed to hardening the implementation of post-war recovery programmes, since 
ideological practices related to the improvement of macroeconomic structures prevented 
economic redistribution. In a more general analysis on the influence of the economies of 
authoritarian systems on TJ, Addison (2009: 116) concluded that authoritarian legacies related 
to political economy, in particular high economic inequality, constrained the ability of new 
governments to implement TJ. Thus, a first hypothesis based on the factor of authoritarian 
legacy was developed:  
H1: The more prevalent the legacy of the authoritarian ancien régime, the less likely it is that 





2.3.2 Making civil society’s influence visible 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, when TJ’s statist bias was admitted, ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches
3
 have gained more attention in mainstream TJ analyses. These approaches 
underlined the idea that governments, particularly the executive branch, would not be the only 
instance of TJ implementation (Hansen 2013). For the purpose of the study, civil society is 
defined as “a set of organisations and institutions […], which mediate between the individual 
and the state” (Gready/Robins 2017: 3). Whilst the thesis acknowledges that a more nuanced 
definition would enable more complex civil society actions to be illustrated, it relies on the 
definition of ‘old’ civil society, which excludes ‘uncivil’ and illiberal actors
4
 and focuses on 
NGOs rather than social movements. Gready and Robins identified different modes of civil 
society interaction in TJ processes, which range from advocacy/persuasion to technical, 
logistical to financial support for the government and substitution/independent action/spaces 
for alternative modelling (ibid.: 5). There are examples of countries in which single TJ 
measures were implemented by civil society groups (e.g., in Kyrgyzstan, South Africa and 
Indonesia) due to government inactivity, but their actions didn’t impact the government’s 
general strategy because of a lack of political will (Appendix III, van Vuuren 2019, p. 112). 
Hayer stated, “The strength of civil society in any country - how many and how well 
organized the non-governmental advocacy, community‐based, research, and other such 
organisations are, will partly determine the success of any transitional justice initiative” 
(Hayer, in Duthie 2009: 11). Thus, it is assumed in the thesis that governmental approaches to 
implementing TJ are influenced by civil society actions targeted at the government. Civil 
society actions that are not directly aimed at the government or less well-organized are 
expected to be less influential for TJ implementation. Consequently, a second hypothesis was 
formulated:  
H2: The more directly civil society is involved in governments’ TJ process, the more likely it 
is that TJ will be implemented.  
 
                                                          
3
 The division between top-down and bottom-up as well as endogenous and exogenous frameworks is an ideal 
type, since this categorization doesn’t fully hold true from an empirical perspective due to, for example, the 
influence of international actors on domestic actors and vice versa. However, it helps to illustrate the different 
approaches to exchange and policy development within a political system. For criticism on Elster’s endogenous 
exogenous typology (2004), see Dolidze (2015).     
4
 The narrow definition of civil society logically impacts the empirical analysis. For an example of a 
theoretically fruitful and empirically interesting analysis of ‘uncivil’ civil society, see Wallis (2019) on 




2.3.3 Thinking about the impact of external elites  
Within the last ten years, the role of external actors on governments’ TJ implementation has 
received greater attention, particularly international organizations. However, causal 
interference on TJ implementation has remained significantly under-analysed. Grodsky refers 
to both international organizations and other states “international elites” (Grodsky 2011: 27), 
which is also the terminology used in this thesis. He elaborated: “States [and] 
intergovernmental organizations […] in the past decades have openly expressed preferences 
for particular types of justice and provided tangible and nontangible pressures to pursue these 
ends” (ibid.). Examples are international resolutions
5
 or governmental strategy papers such as 
the German government’s 2019 Interministerial Strategy to Support “Dealing with the Past 
and Reconciliation (Transitional Justice)” (The Federal Government 2019). Whilst external 
actors can foster and support governments’ domestic TJ processes, they can also actively 
contribute to or prevent them (Reiter 2015: 35). Whether governments accept or resist 
external influences is a policy decision that can be approached through different schools of 
thought. Constructivists, who underline the effects of immaterial norm diffusion, view foreign 
mechanisms of influencing TJ implementation as an enforcement of external values. 
Empirical examples show the limits of these approaches; thus, they are excluded in this 
research. For example, procedural democratic governments, such as the United States in Iraq, 
have tried to prevent external investigations as TJ tools (Amnesty International US 2011) by 
using material leverage. Similarly, authoritarian regimes such as Russian one, have tried to 
prevent prosecutions abroad (e.g., in South Africa, where Russian and South African officials 
during the Jacob Zuma administration were closely connected; Appendix III, van Vuuren 
2019). Levitsky and Way (2006), who recognized the limits and inconsistency of 
constructivist explanations, developed the linkage versus leverage approach to deliver an 
alternative explanation for external democratization. They defined leverage as a post-
transitory government’s vulnerability to external pressure for democratization, which can be 
exercised through positive conditionality (e.g., memberships in international organizations 
such as the European Union (EU)), punitive sanctions (e.g., withdrawn aid or trade sanctions) 
or military force. Linkage is seen as the density of ties and cross-border flows between 
countries, which include geographic proximity, social ties, communication and transnational 
civil society linkages. Whilst Levitsky and Way formulated the concept of democratization in 
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 One example is the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
which legally codifies states’ obligations to guarantee victims the right to prompt, adequate and effective 




a broader sense, the present thesis posits that the factors linkage and leverage can be 
specifically related to TJ and seen as pressure to implement TJ. Consequently, linkage and 
leverage that contribute to TJ implementation are called ‘pro-TJ pressure and mechanisms’; 
conversely, linkage and leverage that seek to undermine it are called ‘anti-TJ pressure’.  
The third hypothesis was formulated as follows:  
H3/1: The higher the external pro-TJ pressure on a transitory government, the more likely it 
is that TJ will be implemented. 
H3/2: The higher the external anti-TJ pressure on a transitory government, the less likely it is 
that TJ will be implemented. 
All three hypotheses can be summed up in a simple model that enables an understanding of 






Graphic 2: Model for an understanding of post-authoritarian transitional justice (Source: own image).  
Chapter 3: Methodology  
3.1 Research design  
This thesis’s scientific pursuit, or the path to how we came to know something, is embedded 
in an epistemological perspective of post-positivism. Post-positivists have moved beyond 
debates on interpretive versus causal approaches to state that all theory is fallible. As Trochim 
(2020) wrote: “[T]he goal of science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting it right about 
reality, even though we can never achieve that goal”. Post-positivists are convinced that 
ultimate objectivity can never be achieved, only approached; thus, hypotheses can neither be 
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Because of this general assumption, it is necessary to establish theoretical models (as in 
Chapter 2) that can serve as flexible research tools.  
The thesis focuses on two cases; thus, it is a small-n analysis. This approach is based on two 
main reasons: First, the study aims to collect new data by studying two cases in order to 
contribute to widening the scholarship on TJ in the South Caucasus. Thus, its research design 
corresponds with the research gaps identified in Section 1.2. Secondly, it wants to compare 
the TJ trajectories of two governments with relatively similar pre-conditions. Reconstructing 
exact TJ trajectories through a comparative, then single-case approach simultaneously 
contributes to demonstrate the theoretical model’s exploratory potential. The time period it 
compares is 1 October 2012 to 28 February 2015 in Georgia and 17 May 2018 to 27 
September 2020 in Armenia. The latter date marks the beginning of the second Nagorno-
Karabakh War, which represents a break in the temporal coverage. Furthermore, the thesis 




Figure 3: A comparison of timelines for the analysis of measures of post-authoritarian TJ (Source: own image).   
The study’s research design is based on Mill’s logic of Most-Similar-System with Most-
Different-Outcome (MSDO), which implies that the characteristics of authoritarianism in 
Georgia and Armenia are more similar than different; thus, their outcome and the dependent 
variable (i.e., patterns of TJ implementation) are simultaneously more different than similar. 
As the research will show, Armenia demonstrates a relatively ‘higher’ scale of TJ 
implementation than Georgia. By following a “theory confirming” (Lijphart 1971: 683) 
variable-oriented approach, the research aims to illustrate the logic of the governments’ 
chosen TJ trajectories. Its final goal is to understand differences in patterns of TJ 
implementation. Thus, the study is outcome-oriented, since it assumes that “insight into causal 
mechanisms is more important than insight into causal effects” (Robert 1994: 352). Unlike a 
factor-oriented study, it doesn’t assume that factor X causes factor Y but that patterns can be 
traced to a combination of variables.  
 
 
October 2012 February 2015 September 2020 
May 2018 September 2020 





3.2 Case selection  
The cases of Georgia and Armenia were selected based on four mains aspects: (1) similar 
character of pre-transitory governments’ authoritarianism; (2) similar types and scale of 
diagnosed rights violations; (3) mutual promises to introduce ‘transitional justice’ and (4) 





 governments completely differed from the most prominent 
examples of TJ implementation (e.g., post-1945 Germany; apartheid South Africa; Chile, 
Brazil and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s; and post-communist countries in the 1990s), in 
which dictatorships committed mass murders and crimes against humanity. Viewed through 
the lens of post-authoritarian TJ, neither 2003–2012 Georgia nor 2008–2018 Armenia were 
examples of countries where mass atrocities had taken place
8
. This is related to the 
authoritarian nature of their political systems. First, the quality of authoritarianism was 
considered to be “soft” (Iskandaryan 2020) or “semi-authoritarian” (Avedissian 2020, also 
Mazmanyan 2020), with tendencies of hardening authoritarianism during the second half of 
the regimes: after 2008 in Georgia (Anonymous G2, Khoshtaria 2020) and after 2014 in 
Armenia (Khachatryan 2020). In his description of the Sargsyan regime, Liakhov (2020) 
elaborated that there were “violations of society”; although large in quantity, they did not 
translate to the same quality, “they were not incredibly intense” (ibid.).
9
 The same holds true 
for Georgia under Saakashvili. Authoritarianism in both countries was softer than that in 
Azerbaijan, which features a consolidated authoritarian regime (Denis 2020). The factor of 
soft authoritarianism explains the exclusion of hard authoritarian post-Soviet Russia, Belarus 
and four of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan) and the democratic Baltic States. Another reason why the cases of Georgia and 
Armenia were selected is the similarity between the promises of the heads of state to 
introduce TJ measures after the countries’ respective transitions (Armenpress 2018). This 
explains why Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, which are more similar in terms of authoritarianism 
than the other mentioned post-Soviet states, were not chosen as case comparisons. 
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 After Saakashvili’s party United National Movement (UNM) lost the 2012 parliamentary elections, Saakashvili 
stayed in power as president for one more year until November 2013.  
7
 From 2008 to 2018, Sargsyan was president and had a “short cameo appearance as […] [PM] [in 2018]” 
(Kopalyan 2020a), which catalysed the beginning of the 2018 Velvet Revolution. 
8
 Large scale atrocities did place during the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2016 four-day war in Nagorno-
Karabakh. Here post-conflict TJ, which is not part of the analysis, should have been implemented. 
9
 Liakhov (2020) elaborated: “[W]hat I think […] matters with regards to transitional justice is that when you 
have a regime, let’s say apartheid South Africa, or any of these right-wing dictatorships in Latin America, we 
have endemic mass torture. In Armenia, you don’t have that […] it’s just not at the same quality, but certainly, 




The political systems in Georgia under Saakashvili and Armenia under Sargsyan are similar in 
terms of their authoritarian nature, despite the leaders’ very different roles in modernization 
and state-building processes. Both governments committed political and economic violence; 
Saakashvili and Sargsyan formed de facto super-presidential systems with exceeding 
executives whose anti-pluralistic drive to maintain elite power undermined the independence 
of the legislative and the impartiality of the judiciary (Anonymous G1, G2 2020, Imnadze G. 
2020). The absence of legally enforced, equal and democratic rules benefited those close to 
the elites. “The judiciary [in Georgia] was nothing but the rubber stamp of the government” 
(Gvilava 2020); the same was true in Armenia (Karapetyan 2020, Kirakosyan 2020). 
Investigatory and prosecutorial agencies were subordinated to the elites’ wishes or at least had 
no will to properly examine political and economic crimes (Anonymous G4).
10
 Perhaps the 
best-known examples in Georgia are the unresolved death cases of Amiran (Buta) Robakidze, 
who was shot by the patrol police in 2005, and that of Aleksandre (Sandro) Girgvliani, a 28-
year-old bank clerk who in 2006 was “tortured and killed by police officers after an 
altercation witnessed by senior officials in the Interior Ministry” (Dolidze/de Waal 2012). In 
Armenia, there were dozens of cases of property rights violations, most notably on Yerevan’s 
Northern Avenue and in Firdusi District, and the mysterious non-combatant deaths in the 
Armenian Army (Safe Soldiers 2020); the lack of investigations imposed psychological 
violence upon victims’ successors. Saakashvili’s zero tolerance policy– an authoritarian 
mission of violently cracking down on petty corruption – led to an acquittal rate of 
approximately 0.1% (Anonymous G2); in other words, anyone accused of a crime would be 
punished with nearly 100% certainty (Chanturia 2020). In Armenia, arrest rates were around 
90% (Karapetyan 2020). The police, which served as the main arm of both governments, 
relied heavily on violence against its own people, in particular in prisons, pre-detention and 
anti-government protests, but also in everyday situations that often directly involved officials 
(e.g., the case of Valery Gelashvili in Georgia).
11
 So-called ‘law enforcement’ agencies 
brutally dissolved anti-government protests in 2007,
12
 2009 and 2011
13
 in Tbilisi and illegally 
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 One interlocutor who remained anonymous explained: “During the old ten years of power [in Armenia], […] 
nobody and no crime was ever [properly] heard or examined and there was never a complete sense that there is 
anyhow a fair and impartial judiciary in the country” (Anonymous A1 2020).  
11
 In 2005, former Member of Parliament (MP) Gelashvili published an article in which he expressed 
dissatisfaction towards Saakashvili, because he had been deprived of his property. In the same article, he 
attacked Saakashvili's personal life. After the publication of the article, Saakashvili ordered Gelashvili to be 
physically punished, which was carried out by members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA; Georgian 
Journal 2014). 
12
 Anti-governments protests in 2007 were triggered by the dismissal and arrest of then minister of defence Irakli 
Okruashvili (2004–2006) at the end of September of the same year. On 2 November 2007, at the peak of the 
protests, as many as 100,000 protestors demanded the resignation of Saakashvili. Arkadi (Badri) Patarkatsishvili 




arrested and sentenced protestors (Anonymous G2). Armenians vividly remember the 
traumatic events of 1 March 2008
14
 on Yerevan’s Republic Square, in which eight civilians 
and two police officers were killed after protests started because of electoral falsifications 
(Avedissian 2020).
15
 In Armenia, electoral fraud was symptomatic until 2018 (OSCE/ODIHR 
2012, 2015, 2017) and also in Georgia, irregularities were - less severe in quality and quantity 
- frequently noticed between 2003 and 2008 (OSCE/ODIHR 2004 a, b, 2008 a, b). Police 
violence and torture became a state policy in Georgia’s prisons (Varney 2017) and were also 
used in Armenia to press confessions in criminal cases (Simonyan 2020). In Georgia, there is 
evidence to suggest that officials themselves directly coerced civilians. In 2006, Bachana 
(Bacho) Akhalaia, the former head of the Ministry of Justice’s Penitentiary Department 
(2005–2008), cracked down on prisoners in an uprising, where seven inmates were killed. In 
2011, B. Akhalaia, who by then was Georgia’s defence minister, and Alexandre Mukhadze, 
the former head of the Military Police Department and the director of No. 8 Correction 
Facility, tortured Reserve Lieutenant Sergo Tetradze, Lieutenant-Colonel Davit Londaridze 
and citizens Sergey Chapligin and Giorgi Gorelashvili in order to oppress confessions on 
spying (Agenda.ge 2014a). Tetradze died as a result of the torture and sexual abuse. Whilst 
such cases have not surfaced in Armenia, Sargsyan’s government failed to harmonize its 
definition of torture in the Criminal Code until 2015, when it finally joined the UN 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in 1993 (Simonyan 2020). “Before 2015, the ECHR [European Court of Human 
Rights] case log against Armenia showed that the main problem was […] the [lack of] 
effective investigation of torture and ill-treatment cases, and also their deaths in custody” 
(ibid.).  
The violence that both societies encountered was not only political in nature but also 
economic. In fact, economic violence has been a driving factor in authoritarianism. Whilst 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
announced that he would finance the protests. On 7 November, “a special-purpose detachment from the […] 
[MoIA]”, led by Merabishvili, broke into Imedi TV’s headquarters “without any legal warrant” (ibid.); the 
invaders damaged equipment, shut off the broadcast and expelled employees from the building by physically 
assaulting them […]” (Transparency International (TI) Georgia 2017). 
13
 During new anti-government protests, which were co-organized by the Democratic Movement-United Georgia 
party and led by former Saakashvili ally and ex-parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze, protesters demanded 
Saakashvili’s resignation. On 26 May 2011, the protests were brutally dissolved by Davit Akhalaia and other 
members of the MoIA, which left 250 injured and two dead. A 2016 video shows Akhalaia telling his staff from 
the Department of Constitutional Security of the Republic of Georgia (CSD) to arrest as many protestors as 
possible and promising them monetary rewards (Agenda.ge 2016a). 
14
 During and in the aftermath of 1 March 2008, hundreds of people were arrested. Some were released, but 
others remained political prisoners until 2011 (Zolyan 2020). 
15
 Avedissian (2020) stated: “March 1 was such a big trauma, it was very traumatic. Civil society activity 




political elites easily obtained access to wealth and businesses, which they often owned 
(Rimple 2012), resources were distributed in an extremely unequal manner in society. 
Saakashvili’s political embrace of radical neoliberalism, which was initiated to modernize the 
endemically corrupt state inherited from former president Eduard Shevardnadze (1997–2003), 
led to massive violations of social and economic rights. Whilst Saakashvili’s administration 
contributed to the drastic decrease of petty corruption and embezzlement, it also consolidated 
corruption amongst elites by guaranteeing political advantages to businesses and individuals 
close to UNM (Kupatadze 2013). Deeply hostile to trade unions and their leaders, all labour 
administration systems and even basic labour regulations were completely abolished 
(Ghvinianidze 2020). Statistics from Georgia’s Ministry for Interior and the Georgian Trade 
Union Confederation (GTUC) reveal 305 deaths of workers between 2003 and 2012; the 
number of causalities significantly increased after 2006, when labour inspection was 
abolished (Tchanturidze 2018). Consequently, Saakashvili’s labour code became one of the 
most deregulated in the world (Jobelius 2011). The government's informal practices of newly 
invented capitalism and privatization interfered with property rights (Anonymous G3). 
Human rights NGOs documented waves of governmental property rights violations directly 
committed by the Ministry of Economic Development, particularly between 2006 and 2007 
(TI Georgia 2007). Massive amounts of money, real estate and gifts, which had a total value 
of around 100 million GEL, made their way to the government through different companies 
and individuals (ibid.). Restaurant and small shop owners were particularly affected (ibid.). 
“Only those who obeyed or had close connections to the government were able to maintain 
their property and therefore corruption developed on mass scale” (Mshvenieradze 2020). The 
intended trickle-down effect of market liberalization, which is often cited today as a 
normative justification for UNM’s violent policies, has not become a reality (Gabitshinashvili 
2019). Social security – and thus the right to work and basic social welfare – was not 
achieved.  
In Armenia, Sargsyan’s economic policy, whilst less aggressive than Saakashvili’s, was 
aimed at protecting the business interests of oligarchs (Anonymous A2 2020). Endemic 
corruption, a legacy of former Armenian president Robert Kocharyan’s (2000–2008) 
governance, was perpetrated by oligarchs and the “socio-economic elite” (Kopalyan 2020a) 
and preserved at all levels in society (Karapetyan 2020). Patronage networks distributed 
resources to politicians and their clientele (Iskandaryan/Mikaelian/Minasyan 2016), not to 
society. Oligarchs such as Gagik Tsarukyan, who “embodies the epitome of the oligarchic 




and “penetrated into government structures in order to maintain their power” (Petrosyan 2013: 
11). The right to social security was absent. The Armenian legislature didn’t provide 
opportunities to investigate labour rights violations (Sakunts 2020), and labour rights 
protection was practically non-existent (Anonymous A2 2020). Civil servants and members of 
the government couldn’t have collective agreements with their employer and were often 
“obliged to refuse to join trade unions” (ibid.). The Armenian government did not adopt 
legislation regarding the formation of independent unions that could operate outside of the 
leading HHK party (Sakunts 2020). Similar to Georgia, there was no functioning labour 
inspection system. The “protection of labour rights would [have] entailed freedoms, which 
would be against the oligarchs who formed the fundament of their power” (ibid.). Workers 
could easily get fired if they supported the ‘wrong’ candidate during elections (Anonymous 
A1 2020). Despite Article 37 of the 2005 Armenian constitution guaranteeing social security 
in case of unemployment (later changed to Article 83 on social security and Article 84 on 
well-being and minimum wage), concrete measures were not introduced. Thus, there was no 
minimum wage or protection against unemployment. Unemployment allowance was 
abolished completely under Sargsyan. “People […] [were] dying because of the political 
system, and the way it […] [was] treating its citizens […]” (Avedissian 2020). Despite these 
similarities, the post-transitory governments in Georgia and Armenia implemented TJ on 
different scales, which completes the research puzzle and provides the basis for examining the 
reasons (Chapter 5) that underlie the identified TJ patterns in Chapter 4. The similarities in the 
countries’ authoritarianism and level of rights violations are illustrated in Table 4.  
Name of the human right Examples of violations in 
Georgia (2003–2012) 
Examples of violations in 
Armenia (2008–2018)  
Right to life, liberty and 
security of person (Article 
3 of the UDHR)   
  
Police murder of Buta Robakidze 
(2004), governmental murder of 
Sandro Girgvliani (2006)  
Deaths of eight civilians and two 
policemen on 1 March 2008, at 
least 298 cases of non-combatant 
deaths in the Armenian Army 
(Safe Soldiers 2020) 
Right not to be subjected 
to torture and other 
inhuman treatment (Article 
5 of the UDHR) 
Government attack on Valery 
Gelashvili (2005), torture as a 
state policy under Saakashvili 
(Chanturia 2020), torture case of 
Sergo Tetradze and subsequent 
death (2011) 
Ill treatment in custody and pre-
detention, lack of ratification of 
UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 




Right to effective remedy 
(Article 8 of the UDHR)
  
Acquittal rate of over 99% 
(Chanturia 2020), illegal arrests 
during protests    
Arrest rate of over 90% 
(Karapetyan 2020), illegal arrests 
during protests 
Right to free vote (Article 
21 of the UDHR) 
Major electoral rights violations 
in 2003 and 2008  
All elections falsified  
Right to peaceful assembly 
(Article 20 of the UDHR) 
Violent dispersal of mass protests 
in 2007, 2009 and 2011 
Violent dispersal of protests in 
2008, 2011 and 2015  
Right to property (Article 
17 of the UDHR) 
Deprivation of property on a 
massive scale (TI Georgia 2007)  
Lack of investigations of property 
rights violations  
Right to social security 
(Article 22 of the UDHR) 
Complete lack of social security 
for civilians 
Complete lack of social security 
for civilians 
Right to work, favourable 
conditions at work and 
protection against 
unemployment (Article 23 
of the UDHR) 
Complete absence of legal and 
political protection of labour 
rights (Ghvinianidze 2020), 305 
deadly fatalities at workplaces 
(Tchanturidze 2018) 
Complete absence of legal and 
political protection of labour 
rights, number of deadly fatalities 
at workplaces unknown  
Table 4: Comparative overview of examples of human rights violations in Georgia (2003–2012) and Armenia 
(2008–2018) (Source: own image).  
3.3 Operationalization  
Operationalization refers to how a concept can be made measurable. The operationalization 
used in this thesis is based on two mechanisms that refer to the DV and the IVs. The DV was 
measured according to each of the 16 indicators in the four respective theoretical dimensions. 
Similar to Pettai and Pettai’s analysis, one measurement focuses on the criterion of 
‘governmental activity’. Thus, the overall quantity of measures and their defining 
characteristics in Georgia and Armenia are compared. Consequently, the question ‘(How) is 
the measure (complete and exhaustive)?’ defines the core measurement criterion for each of 
the indicators. However, it is impossible to precisely assess the relative ‘success’ of each 
measure, since I can’t evaluate the absolute number of ‘necessary’ investigations, 
prosecutions or purges (amongst other TJ mechanisms) to assess whether a measure was fully 
implemented. Instead, the assessment of each category was developed in an abductive and 
comparative manner. This demands a reflection on the initiated measures to ‘make the data 




quantity of measures doesn’t translate into quality of measures. For instance, it could be the 
case that governments conduct a very high number of prosecutions but frequently disregard 
the right to a fair trial and thus continue to commit human rights violations. Because of these 
many, not determinable challenges any government faces after transitions, a catalogue of 
quality criteria, which could condition the scale of TJ implementation wasn’t be pre-
developed. Instead, repeated patterns, mentioned by interviewees and found in the literature, 
were documented. Furthermore, the IVs are operationalized. All of them are traced in 
politicians’ speeches, governmental strategies, policy analyses, news articles, laws and 
interviews. Unlike the DV, the IVs were only loosely operationalized and centred on the 
categories of civil society-government relations, the influence of external elites and 
authoritarian legacy in order to collect narratives.  
3.4 Data collection  
Data was collected between December 2018 and September 2020. Excessive literature review 
between in the first year helped to construct an overview of the TJ situation in both countries. 
Text and other non-reactionary sources included governmental strategies, laws, videos, policy 
analyses and online articles on TJ details and interviews. These sources contained elements 
that were relevant to the theoretical conceptualization of the IVs and the DV. By September 
2020, 209 sources were collected, five were translated from Georgian into English, and six 
were translated from Armenian into English (see Bibliography, p. 75-100). Additional data 
were gathered during a two-day field trip to Yerevan with Ruben Carranza in 2020 and from 
two online debates; all events were documented as memos and analysed. 




Videos 1 2 
Online news articles  70 68 
Policy analyses  12 16 
Total 105 104 
Table 5: Comparative overview of the number and type of sources in analysed (Source: own image).  
Between March 2019 and October 2020, I interviewed 19 individuals on post-authoritarian TJ 
in Georgia and 15 individuals on post-authoritarian TJ in Armenia. Twenty out of the 34 total 






 Two interviewees answered the questions in written form. The 
selection of respondents was based on four main criteria: (1) the respondent was committed to 
the protection of human rights, (2) the respondent was a practicing expert (e.g., consultant, 
lawyer, politician, human rights activist or member of the state apparatus), researcher, analyst 
or commentator on TJ or a long-term observer of the human rights situation in Georgia or 
Armenia, (3) the respondent didn’t belong to a group or a collective whose human rights were 
(to the researcher’s knowledge) violated during the ancien regime
17
 and (4) the respondent did 
not belong to the ancien régime. Not including members of the ancien régime was a 
conscious decision that I took after some reflection. Whilst I originally planned to interview 
members of UNM and HHK in order to ensure balance between the political views of various 
interlocutors, I later decided (after collecting most of the data) that the research question did 
not require the inclusion of individuals whose policies I consider as unethical. There is no 
justification for researchers to give voice to individuals or groups who have committed or 
were involved in human rights violations, unless the research specifically strives to answer 
related questions related to such topics. Almost all of the interviews, both physical and online, 
were audio recorded on a phone; only one participant did not consent to being recorded. In 
total, the recorded material amounted to 38 hours; due to a phone malfunction, 30 minutes of 
one interview were lost. However, I noticed the loss immediately after the interview and put 
together a memo; due to its incompleteness, it wasn’t included in the content analysis. All 
interviews, except for one, were conducted in English; this interview was conducted using 
Armenian-English simultaneous interpretation and later translated by Meline Margaryan into 
English.  
3.5 Methods of analysis  
Post-positivists believe that the triangulation of methods can increase the likelihood of 
achieving research validity (Denzin 2010). Thus, the thesis combined four different methods 
of analysis during the research process in order to answer the central research question and the 
sub-question:  
(1) Process tracing  
(2) Content analysis  
(3) Semi structured interviews  
(4) Semi-participant observations  
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 On 14 March 2020, the Georgian-Armenian border was closed due to COVID-19. I had planned to move to 
Armenia on 16 March, which was no longer possible as a consequence.  
17
 The exclusion of victims was agreed upon with the ethics commission of the University of Glasgow before the 




Based on the concept’s theory, operationalization and research aim, the thesis considered 
qualitative methods of analysis first and foremost. All methods of analyses relate to the 
theoretical matrix and model developed in Chapter 2. The 16 TJ categories and the three-
factor model provide the organizational framework for the data collection and evaluation.  
The first method used for the thesis was process tracing, which is “an analytical tool for 
drawing descriptive and causal interferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often 
understood as temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011: 824). Whilst it is 
impossible to really get into the TJ actors’ minds, the thesis has tried to approach them as 
closely as possible by tracing their actions “unfolding over time” (ibid.) through official 
documents and information provided by interlocutors, some of whom were in close proximity 
to the government. Process tracing was invaluable for the evaluation of 64 criminal 
prosecutions of former officials in Armenia and Georgia. The categories developed in the 
conceptual framework enabled me to “gather recurring empirical evidence” (ibid.) and to 
illustrate different patterns of TJ implementation. Causal interference was achieved by 
evaluating the two countries’ TJ patterns and analysing empirical details in the theoretical 
model. 
The second method used for the research was content analysis, which was applied to both 
reactionary and non-reactionary data. The goal was not to evaluate participants’ opinions; 
thus, interviewees were not regarded as objects of the research. Rather, the aim was to answer 
a theoretically guided research question by combing through and evaluating data as 
exhaustively as possible. Thus, interviews as a method of analysis were necessary, but they 
were not the sole point of analysis, representing only one out of four important methods. The 
16 theoretical categories and the three IVs served as a framework for analysing the written 
content. The results of the content analysis for the interviews can be found in Appendix I-II.  
The questionnaires for the semi-structured interviews were, apart from the first two 
interviews, which were, unlike the other interviews, not oriented on the defined categories, 
designed accordingly, and theoretically separated in two blocks: (1) analysis of TJ measures 
(Section 2.2) and (2) analysis of reasons for implementation depth (Section 2.3). The 
interviews were conducted in three waves, and the questionnaires were gradually refined. The 
first wave took place during the initial phase of the field research (October 2019 to May 
2020), the second wave took place in the middle phase of the field research (June to July 
2020), and the third wave, which was very short, took place towards the end of the field 




The last three interviews focused on the situation in Armenia, where the TJ process has been 
ongoing and the domestic situation has been very volatile. This approach aimed to trace and 
‘verify’ the logic developed for the thesis and uncover potential analytical contradictions. The 
questionnaires aimed for personal and in a later stage for comparative assessment of the 
respective categories. In many cases, the interviews had traits of discussions, during which I 
tried to verify and test the narratives, which were created during the research process. A list of 
all interlocutors can be found in Appendix VI (p. 122). 
The semi-participant observations included a field trip to Yerevan from 28 to 30 October 
2019, in which I accompanied Ruben Carranza, ICTJ’s senior associate and the Armenian 
government’s consultant on the TJ process. Accordingly, the field trip enabled me to combine 
theory and practice. The events that I attended focused on civil society exchange and on 
assessing victims’ needs (ICTJ Internal Document 2019). They included a public discussion 
called ‘Transitional justice, corruption and state capture: Lessons for Armenia’ organized by 
Open Society Foundation (OSF) Armenia and the ICTJ (OSF Armenia 2019) and a meeting 
with victims of human rights violations (mothers whose sons were killed in non-combatant 
situations and individuals who were illegally deprived of their property). Whilst the latter 
event wasn’t documented due to mentioned restrictions, the discussion contributed to 
expanding data on the IV civil society, which subsequently became part of the empirical 
evaluation (see Appendix III, p. 112). Furthermore, data were collected from two online 
debates on TJ: one about the necessity of vetting in the Armenian judiciary, which was jointly 
organized by the Armenian Media Center and ICTJ on 8 May 2020, and one called 
‘Transitional Justice in Central Asia and Georgia’ hosted by the Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights on 14 July 2020. None of the semi-
participant observations were audio recorded due to data protection considerations and the 
sensitivity of the content; instead, I wrote memos to reflect key points (see Appendices III–
V). 
Chapter 4: Transitional justice measures in post-2012 Georgia 
and in post-2018 Armenia 
This chapter presents the analysed patterns of TJ measures in Georgia from October 2012 to 
spring 2015 and in Armenia from May 2018 to September 2020. It will also elaborate on the 




comparison. The analysis of the five years since 2015 will provide a useful basis to later 
demonstrate the explanatory viability of the IVs (Chapter 5). 
4.1 Legal-judicial dimension: From procedural rights violations during prosecutions to 
lack of victims’ legal rehabilitation 
The empirical results concerning investigations and criminal justice (box 1a) have differed in 
four qualitative aspects. First, investigations and prosecutions in Georgia were mostly directed 
toward high-ranking UNM officials for political crimes, while a very low number were 
directed toward law enforcement staff (mostly relating to single cases of torture and police ill-
treatment). In Armenia, investigations have addressed former high-ranking HHK officials, 
related oligarchs and members of law enforcement for political and economic crimes 
(Appendices I and II). Second, in Georgia, prosecutions led to several acquittals in 2012 and 
2013, which were followed by quick trials and lengthy prison penalties for former high-
ranking political officials. Prosecutions of former officials are still ongoing. In Armenia, 
many investigations and prosecutions have shown frequent dissonance between prosecutorial 
units and courts and have so far remained without any criminal sentences in all high-level 
cases. Third, while this thesis does not have sufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the 
influence of executives on the prosecutions in Armenia after 2018, there has been evidence 
that the prosecutions’ results in Georgia were in a series of cases accompanied by new human 
rights violations, which illustrated political pressure on the prosecuted (Georgia Democracy 
Initiative 2015, TI Georgia 2017). This suggests that TJ in the legal-judicial dimension was 
more ‘retributive’ in post-2012 Georgia than in Armenia. Under both governments, 
investigations have not revealed the full scale of torture and ill-treatment in prison and 
detention (Chanturia 2020, Simonyan 2020). Nor have they revealed the extent of social and 
economic rights violations (especially labour rights violations) committed under the previous 
regimes (Anonymous A2 2020, Ghvinianidze 2020). Fourthly, none of the post-transitory 
governments has set up independent investigatory mechanisms; each has mostly preserved 
and reformed the investigatory and prosecutorial institutions inherited from the past regimes. 
There are two central results for the victim side (box 1b). First, victims of human rights 
violations have had little opportunity to access legal rehabilitation since neither government 
has set up legal guidelines on the definition of victim status. Second, political prisoners in 
both countries were released after the transitions. In Georgia, this process caused legal 
incoherence. These observations will now be more analysed in detail. 




Because of distrust towards the investigatory and prosecution units (rooted in the post-
transitory government’s rightful estimation that they directly contributed to criminal impunity 
and political crimes under Saakashvili) some parliamentary members of the newly elected 
majority party Georgian Dream proposed the creation of large-scale investigative mechanisms 
(Kurashvili 2012) as a pre-condition to later formulate criminal charges against individuals 
who committed human rights violations between 2003 and 2012. It was only in the 2014–
2016 Human Rights Action Plan, two years after the transition, that the Georgian government 
announced “the creation of a professional, independent, powerful and trustworthy mechanism 
to deal with cases of offences committed by public prosecutors, police officers” (The 
Government of Georgia 2014). Draft legislation in 2015 proposed a commission to investigate 
human rights violations committed by “law enforcement agencies, including police, security 
forces, prosecutors, and prison officials” (Varney 2017: 24; see also OSF Georgia 2015) and 
prosecute those found guilty; however, this legislation has never been adopted by the 
Georgian parliament. On 1 November 2019, more than seven years after the transition, a so-
called independent investigative agency, known as the State Inspector Service was set up 
(Legislative Herald of Georgia 2018a). Its mandate only covers criminal investigations from 
the date of its inception (Anonymous G3), which makes it impossible to investigate crimes of 
the previous regime. This removes any element of transitional justice accountability.
18
 The 
State Inspector Service is part of the Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(OSF Georgia 2019). According to some interviewees, this undermines its independence 
(Chanturia 2020, Imnadze G. 2020). Consequently, it does not have authority “[…] to 
investigate crimes committed by the Minister of Internal Affairs and by the Head of State 
Security Service” (Imnadze N. 2020).  
As in Georgia, investigations in Armenia have been carried out without establishing specific 
and independent investigative TJ units. In Armenia, crucial institutions for investigations, 





 Armenia’s “biggest investigative body” (Investigative 
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 A row of interviewees mentioned it was notable that the SIS’s mandate excludes human rights violations 
between 2012 until 2019 (e.g. Chanturia, Imnadze 2020). Consequently, violations during the Gavrilov’s Night 
(20 June 2019), when thousands protested the visit of the Russian MP Sergey Gavrilov in the Georgian 
parliament, which was met with massive police violence, which left 240 individuals injured with two losing their 
eyesight, didn’t become part of SIS’s mandate (OC Media 2020c).  
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 The SIS’s task is to investigate corruption, organized and official crimes; torture and crimes against person; 
crimes of general character, to collect evidence, arrest accused and then transfer the case to the prosecutorial 
units (Kopalyan 2018, SIS 2020a). 
20
 The IC consists, among other units, such as the regional investigative departments, of the general military 
investigative department, which is supposed to investigate the cases of non-combatant deaths (Investigative 




Committee of the Republic of Armenia 2020a) and the National Security Service (NSS), 
which is the successor of the former Committee for State Security (KGB). None of these units 
are observed by separate bodies; such observation may have helped “[…] to alleviate 
accusations of politicization […]” (Kopalyan 2018). There is no evidence that the Armenian 
government intends to establish such units. 
Incoherent prosecutions in Georgia vs. “soft” prosecutions in Armenia 
After the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia, the Prosecutor’s Office initiated numerous 
investigations and prosecutions focusing on political crimes of former office-holders of the 
UNM administration, among them Saakashvili himself (Popjanevski 2015). At least 11 out of 
the 32 individuals prosecuted (almost 35%) have fled Georgia to avoid criminal 
responsibility. Appendix II (p. 106) shows that five prosecutions (Dzimtseishvili 2013, 
Kezerashvili 2014, Ninua 2014, Ugulava 2015, and Saakashvili 2014) focused on 
embezzlement and one focused on property rights violations (Adeishvili 2016) as forms of 
economic violence. Between 2012 and 2013, shortly after the transition, several prosecutions 
ended not in immediate criminal charges but in court acquittals (Tsikarishvili 2020). One 
illustrative case is the prosecution of former defence minister (2009–2012) and head of the 
Military Police Department (2005–2008) Bacho Akhalaia (Popjanevski 2015: 28). He was 
arrested in November 2012 and accused by the Prosecutor’s Office for the torture of prisoners 
in 2006 and sexual violence against four individuals in 2011 (among them Reserve Lieutenant 
Sergo Tetradze, who died as a consequence of this incident). After a five-month trial, 
Akhalaia was acquitted of all charges in August 2013 by the Tbilisi Court; however, he 
remained in detention. Then President Saakashvili called the acquittal a “restoration of 
justice” (Human Rights House Foundation 2013) and pardoned Akhalaia, (along with former 
Minister of Justice Zurab Adeishvili) shortly before the end of his term in November 2013. 
Only after Saakashvili left office in 2013 was Adeishvili sentenced to two years in prison 
(later increased to five years) for the 2007 raid on ImediTV, the closure of IberiaTV and the 
illegal confiscation of property (Appendix II). Shortly after Saakashvili left his position, and 
after the Prosecutor’s Office appealed the court’s decision in January 2014, Akhalaia was 
charged and sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in October 2014 together with 
employees from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
21
 In July 2019, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia upheld his 2018 sentence of nine years in prison (The Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia 
2019). Other illustrative cases of TJ approach adopted by the post–2012 government are those 
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 Other convicts were Levan Kardava and Giorgi Mazmishvili (11 years of prison sentences for murder) and 




of two former close Saakashvili allies; the former mayor of Tbilisi, Giorgi Ugulava, and the 
former Minister of Internal Affairs, Vano Merabishvili. They were charged with criminal 
offences after Saakashvili’s departure as president and have now been prosecuted. While their 
initial prosecutions immediately after the transition were justified based on overwhelming 
evidence of grave human rights violations, they correlated with a row of procedural rights 
violations in pre-detention (TI 2017). This led to the assumption that the prosecutions were 
“[…] often motivated by one aim only – to achieve the use of imprisonment as a measure of 
restraint […]” (Georgia Democracy Initiative 2015). Ugulava’s pre-detention lasted one and a 
half years; since the Georgian Constitution proscribes a maximum of nine months, this was 
unconstitutional (Art. 18, Legislative Herald of Georgia 2018b). He was sentenced to four and 
a half years in autumn 2015 and was released in 2017. At the beginning of 2020, Ugulava 
(who now leads the party European Georgia) was again sentenced to three years and two 
months for embezzling around 15 million USD as part of the Tbilisi Development Fund; 
however, he had been found guilty of this crime before (Stöber 2020: 78). He was pardoned 
by Georgian president Salome Zourabishvili in May 2020. 
Similarly, the prosecution of Merabishvili has shown legal irregularities. In February 2014, he 
was sentenced to six years and nine months in prison for the brutal dispersal of the 2011 
protests, the murder of Sandro Girgvliani and the physical attack on former MP Gelashvili. 
He was released in 2020. In 2016 and 2017, the ECHR ruled that his lawful pre-trial 
detention, during which he was pressured to deliver details on other UNM members 
(European Human Rights Advocacy Center 2016), “lacked reasonableness”, constituting a 
“particularly broad restriction of [his] rights” (European Court of Human Rights 2016). 
Criminal proceedings against Saakashvili himself were launched shortly after the end of his 
term in October 2013.22 He was prosecuted for involvement in the cases of Girgvliani and 
Gelashvili, the 2007 crackdown on Imedi TV, and other incidents. In 2018, he was sentenced 
to three years of prison in absentia for illegally pardoning Bacho Akhalaia in Girgvliani’s 
murder case. Later in the same year he was sentenced to six years in prison in absentia for 
ordering the attack on Gelashvili (OC Media 2018b). Saakashvili, who has announced his 
return to Georgia multiple times, has remained on Georgia’s national wanted list (along with 
at least 11 other high-ranking officials) and would face immediate detention if he entered 
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 Saakashvili left Georgia after the end of his presidency in November 2013, first went to the United States of 
America, and then to Ukraine. He accepted Ukrainian citizenship in 2015 and took the post of Odessa’s governor 
until he resigned in November 2016, which led to a political conflict with then Ukrainian president Petro 
Poroshenko. Afterwards, he was stripped off his Ukrainian citizenship, became stateless and moved to the 
Netherlands. In 2019, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-today) restored his citizenship. 




Georgia (Appendix II, p. 106). While prominent UNM representatives were detained shortly 
after 2012, prosecutions of senior officials and of police and prison guards took place 
selectively and on a smaller scale (Imnadze G. 2020, Popjanevksi 2015: 28, Ramishvili 2020). 
Chanturia confirmed that not all those officials who were involved in torture or detention 
were brought to justice; “some of the former perpetrators operate in law enforcement agencies 
until today” (Chanturia 2020). The 2017 ICTJ report concluded that “[d]espite numerous 
complaints of torture and mistreatment, only four prison officials were convicted of 
mistreatment in 2015” (Varney 2017). Research into the empirical details (Appendix II) 
shows that these included three officials (who were involved in the torture of Sergo Tetradze) 
and the notorious former head of the penitentiary department, Davit Chakua. In 2014, Chakua 
was charged with torture and involvement in the 2006 uprising in the Ortachala prison near 
Tbilisi, during which seven inmates died; he was extradited to Georgia in 2020 (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch 2020). While prosecutions of political crimes have been ongoing since 2012, 
prosecutions of economic crimes played a very marginal role in the TJ process and the 
structures of economic crimes were not examined. Although a small unit to investigate 
property rights violations was established in 2015 in the Prosecutor’s Office (Anonymous G3, 
4), the scale of property rights violations across Georgia remained unexamined (Gvilava 
2020). Rights violations and workplace fatalities between 2003 and 2012 (numbering at least 
305 cases) have not been re-investigated after 2012, nor has anyone been prosecuted for them. 
In post-2018 Armenia, as in post-2012 Georgia, prosecutions have become one of the most 
central TJ tools. Unlike in Georgia, where many prosecutions ended in trials and prison 
sentences, prosecutions in Armenia have been rather “soft” (Soghomonyan 2020). Since May 
2018, they have mostly concerned former high-ranking HHK officials, among them two 
former heads of state, related family members,
23
 former influential oligarchs and 
representatives of law enforcement. Out of 32 analysed cases, only four (Serzh and Narek 
Sargsyan, Kocharyan and Khachaturov) have so far led to criminal trials without final 
convictions; all other prosecutions remain in limbo (CivilNet 2020, Appendix I, p. 101). In his 
August 2018 speech, Pashinyan highlighted two aspects of the prosecutions: the events of 1
 
March 2008 and the schemes of corruption (Armenpress 2018). 
The analysed cases demonstrate that most prosecutions (24 out of 32) are based on the 
grounds of embezzlement, large schemes of corruption and unfair competition such as vote 
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 This concerns first and foremost family members of the Sargsyan ‘clan’ (Kopalyan 2020a). Eight of 
Sargsyan’s family members and direct relatives have been prosecuted for various political and economic crimes 




buying (all of which constitute economic crime). Eight prosecutions have been related to 
political crimes (Appendix I, p. 101). So far, no single official has been put on trial in relation 
to the hundreds of non-combatant fatalities (Khachatryan 2020). Several former governmental 
officials related to the violence of 1
 
March 2008 have been prosecuted for overthrow of 
constitutional order. Among them are Robert Kocharyan, Armenia’s second president (1998–
2008); former Chief of Defence Staff Seyran Ohanyan (2008–2018); former Chief of the 
General Staff of Armenian Armed Forces and former Head of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) Yuri Khachaturov (2017–2018); former Secretary of the Security 
Council (2007–2008) and Deputy Prime Minister (2018) Armen Gevorgyan and former 
Prosecutor General Gevorg Kostanyan (2013-2016). None of these individuals have received 
legal sanctions at the time of writing.
24
 Kocharyan’s prosecution has been ongoing since his 
first arrest in July 2018. It clearly shows the dissonance between the prosecutorial units 
(which have demanded his arrest) and the courts (which have released him twice, the last time 
in July 2020 based on a bail of around four million USD).
25
 Dissonances between the 
prosecutorial units and the courts have also become evident in the case of Serzh Sargsyan, 
Armenia’s third president. In December 2019, the SIS charged him with organising a scheme 
for a private company “to supply diesel fuel for the government’s agricultural assistance 
programme at a deliberately inflated price [in 2013 during his presidency]” (Euractiv 2020). 
The scheme was worth around one million USD. His trial is ongoing and has been postponed 
because of COVID-19; he has not been criminally charged. In addition to the two heads of 
state, several related families and individuals have been prosecuted for economic crimes. 
These prosecutions have uncovered the tight intertwining between state structures and 
business interests.  
Some individuals remained untouched during the first year of the post-revolutionary transition 
(e.g., Sargsyan’s son-in-law, Mikayel Minasyan; the former mayor of Yerevan). However, in 
2020, more networks of economic crimes were examined. Most notable are the cases of the 
Khachataryan family, one of the former most influential families in Armenia. They own 
Armenia’s largest Internet and cable TV provider (Ucom). Another notable case is that of 
business tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan and his aide Sedrak Arustamyan. In August 2020, Gagik 
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 Others are former defence minister (2007-2008) and former Chief Military Inspector of the Republic of 
Armenia (2008-2018) Mikayel Harutyunyan. Reportedly, Harutyunyan and Gevorg Kostanyan are currently both 
in Russia, but remain wanted in Armenia. Russia has refused to extradite Harutyunyan. Kostanyan, who has been 
teaching at Russia’s State Prosecutor Academy, announced his to return to Armenia, and however has not come 
back as of September 2020 (Armenpress 2019c).  
25
 On 29 September 2020, it was reported that Kocharyan’s, Ohanyan’s, Khachaturov’s and Gevorgyan’s trials, 
which were planned for the end of September 2020, would be postponed since Ohanyan went to Nagorno-




Khachataryan was arrested because of multiple crimes committed during his position as head 
of the State Revenue Committee (SRC, 2008–2014) and minister of finance (2014–2016), 
which range from abuse of state power to tax evasions and “illicit structuring of monopolies” 
(Kopalyan 2020a). He has remained in detention since 27 August 2020. Khachataryan’s son 
Gurgen, who also held a post in the SRC, has been prosecuted for accepting a bribe of 22.4 
million USD from Sedrak Arustamyan, the CEO of the Multi Group Company. This company 
is owned by Armenia’s wealthiest man and head of the oppositional party Prosperous 
Armenia, Gagik Tsarukyan,
26
 who has attempted to avoid prosecution by initially allying with 
the post-2018 Armenian government. He has been accused of illegal economic activities 
including allegations of voter fraud in the 2017 parliamentary elections, involvement in land 
allocation and illegal commercial activities through his gambling firms (Kopalyan 2020b). 
After being deprived of his parliamentary immunity by a vote in the Armenian National 
Assembly in June 2020, Tsarukyan was detained from September to November 2020.  
Lack of access to legal rehabilitation and unclear release of political prisoners 
Individuals and collectives who stated that their rights were broken under the governance of 
Saakashvili or Sargsyan could directly address the prosecutorial units to request investigation 
into their cases. However, they had little chance to obtain legal rehabilitation. Since the 
transitions in both countries, governments have not implemented legislation that would define 
criteria for victim status and allow access to legal recognition. Therefore, there has not been 
any assessment of how and to what extent the previous governments violated peoples’ rights. 
In October 2012 the new Prosecutor General Archil Kbilashvili called “upon any person 
considering him/herself a victim of a crime committed prior to the Parliamentary elections 
[…] to submit a complaint to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office” (European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2012: 7). Within 
two weeks of this announcement, citizens reported approximately 20,000 cases to the 
Prosecutor’s Office (Chugoshvili 2020, Anonymous G4 2020). The cases largely related to 
police ill-treatment, torture and illegal confiscation of property (Anonymous G4 2020). A 
series of interviews underlined that both case selection and investigations appeared to be 
selective (e.g., Khoshtaria 2020, Mshvenieradze 2020). The lack of investigations and the lack 
of legal rehabilitation were of particular concern in relation to ill-treatment and torture in 
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 While Tsarukyan has, similar as Khachataryan or Minasyan painted himself as a victim of the Pashinyan 
administration (Elliot 2020), investigations had started before Tsarukyan entered in open conflict with Pashinyan 




prison. Tsira Chanturia (2020), the director of Prison Reform International for the South 
Caucasus, commented that 
“[…] there was a complainant that he or she was subjected to torture, but the Prosecutor’s Office 
would not start a case, or they would stop or abandon this case shortly after because they said there 
was lack of evidence. So, one of the problems […] during this impunity period, during Saakashvili’s 
term, but also afterwards was that the Prosecutor’s Office or other investigative bodies didn’t take 
enough care to gather evidence, because for any crime, they need evidence to prosecute the 
perpetrator. But it wasn’t done, it wasn’t done timely, and as you of course know, torture 
documentation needs to be done immediately or shortly after, in order for the signs of torture to be still 
visible […].” 
In 2014, the Public Defender reported that several cases concerning grave violations, which 
he had forwarded to the Public Defender, remained uninvestigated (Public Defender 
(Ombudsman) 2014).
27
 Due to the limited activity of law enforcement, victims’ access to 
legal rehabilitation further decreased. Furthermore, legal victim status was solely given to 
former political prisoners and to those individuals who were recognised as victims of property 
rights violations (Chanturia 2020, Muskhelishvili 2020). 
The release of political prisoners was one of the earliest TJ measures; it was implemented by 
GD shortly after the elections. The process was rushed and led to legal inconsistencies 
(Gvilava 2020, Nanuashvili 2020). On 21 December 2012, the Georgian parliament adopted a 
draft law on the release of political prisoners, which was vetoed by President Saakashvili. 
However, this veto was overridden by parliament on 28 December 2012. When Saakashvili 
refused to sign the bill on political prisoners into law, it was passed by the Chair of the 
parliament, Davit Usupashvili. On 13 January 2013, 190 “persons incarcerated on political 
grounds” and four “persons persecuted on political grounds” (Venice Commission 2013a) 
were released. The law was based on flawed and non-transparent criteria that did not include a 
legal definition of ‘political prisoner’ (Venice Commission 2013a).
28
 In spring 2013, the 
Venice Commission criticised the law on amnesty in relation to several aspects. First, the 
judiciary did not elaborate on a legal abstract definition for ‘political prisoner’; instead, 
parliament “took the place of the [j]udiciary which should, in principle, have been entrusted 
by decision of [p]arliament to decide whether individuals were fulfilling the criteria 
[p]arliament would have determined” (ibid.). Consequently, challenging parliament’s decision 
was “extremely difficult” or “perhaps not possible” (ibid.). This was particularly relevant for 
individuals who were not released from prison despite claiming to have been imprisoned on 
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 The report doesn’t mention the extent and unfortunately, based on the data, a more precise assessment, isn’t 
possible.  
28
 The issue of legal terminology of political prisoner in Georgia has been well assessed by OSF and Human 




political grounds. Finally, the way in which the list was put together was not based on 
transparent criteria and therefore seemed “arbitrary” (ibid.). Overall, the Venice Commission 
concluded that the “[…] measure was taken irrespective of the rule of [l]aw […]” (ibid.). An 
in-depth legal analysis of the list has so far not taken place.
29
 This was also not possible as 
part of this current study. In summer 2020, the Georgian parliament no longer had the case 
files of those individuals who were listed as political prisoners (Tsikarishvili 2020).  
The Armenian government has also not yet developed any legal framework for how victims 
of past human rights violations might access justice. There has been no systematic legal 
assessment on which forms of human rights violations define victim status. So far, ten 
individuals killed on 1
 
March 2008, 63 individuals who were injured during these events and a 
few individuals who qualify as political prisoners have been legally recognised as victims 
(Caucasian Knot 2019b, Soghomonyan 2020). Investigations concerning violations of social 
and economic rights, including the right to social security and labour rights, have not been 
initiated (Anonymous A2 2020). Victims’ successors of non-combatant fatalities have not 
received legal rehabilitation. In February 2019, the IC established a public working group,
30
 
which consisted of IC staff, eight Armenian NGOs and one foundation.
31
 The group promised 
to reopen investigations of suspended proceedings involving cases of non-combatant 
fatalities. The unit’s task is to “reveal possible omissions during preliminary investigation of 
separate criminal cases initiated on servicemen’s death during military service, to disperse 
public interest on disputable circumstances, as well as to exclude various comments on those 
circumstances” (Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia 2020c). However, in 
June 2019, it became public that the IC staff did not consider materials and documents sent by 
NGOs that revealed irregularities and crimes during investigations before 2018. This actively 
hindered the reopening of cases (Khachatryan 2020). 
“Some of the criminal cases launched, […] have been dropped or suspended during the judicial 
process. Meanwhile, some are still in the preliminary stages of investigation. Victims’ successors 
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 A legal analysis has also not been carried out by the Venice Commission: In its 2013 opinion, it stated that it 
“[…] does  not  intend  to  take  a  stand  on  whether  or  not  the  people included in the list set by the 
Parliament of Georgia are political prisoners, whether on the basis of the  works  of  the  Parliament  of  Georgia  
or  on  the  basis  of  the  definition  given  by  the Parliamentary Assembly in its Resolution 1900 (2012)” 
(Venice Commission 2013a).  
30
 The working group is called: Public  monitoring  group  for  revealing  the  faults  in  the  preliminary  
investigation  of  certain  criminal cases initiated on fatalities during  military  service  and  assisting  to  the  
proper  examination  of  the  aforementioned cases.  
31
 Originally, members of the working group were the following: For Rights NGO, Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly 
Vanadzor Office, Sexual Assault Crisis Center NGO, “Fides” Human Rights Protection NGO, Soldiers’ Defense 
Committee NGO, Law Development and Protection Foundation, Foundation against the Violation of Law NGO, 




cannot find out the real causes of their relatives’ death, and it has become common practice that those 
responsible for these criminal acts go unidentified and are not punished” (Peace Dialogue 2019b).  
As in post-2012 Georgia, the release of political prisoners was one of the earliest promises 
made by the Armenian government. On 26 April 2018, before he became prime minister and 
shortly after Sargsyan stepped down, Pashinyan announced that the release of all Armenian 
political prisoners would be one of his most important immediate political reactions 
(Azatutyun 2018). Unlike in Georgia, where a list elaborated by parliament led to the release 
of around 200 individuals after the transition, the process in Armenia was led by the executive 
and referred to individual cases, which were widely known in public and related to individuals 
recognised as political prisoners by local human rights NGOs (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 
Vanadzor 2018). Releases in May and June 2018 included members of the political party 
Founding Parliament,
32
 their leader and Karabakh war hero Jirayr Sefilyan and six individuals 




4.2 Political-administrative dimension: From personal continuities in law enforcement, 
absence of vetting to lack of compensations  
In order to ameliorate the violent structure of the old authoritarian political system, TJ 
includes dismissals, office bans and vetting of former officials (box 2a) who worked under 
these systems. The empirical data showed four main results. First, the post-2012 Georgian 
government’s political and administrative approach has been more retributive, while the 
Armenia government has so far widely kept the same structure and has retained most 
members of law enforcement agencies. Second, after 2012, GD did not formulate any 
cohesive strategy on dismissals or office bans; both measures were implemented on an ad hoc 
basis. In Armenia, dismissals were also carried out on an ad hoc basis and without a visible 
strategy, and office bans have not been initiated. Third, general vetting has not been 
conducted in Georgia. In Armenia, vetting among judges has been introduced in a “soft” 
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 Founding Parliament was formed in 2012 by a group of Karabakh veterans and “civil activists, artists, lawyers, 
journalists”. They demanded a radical transformation of Armenia’s political system because of “a moral, 
psychological, social, economic, demographic and administrative crisis in the country which threaten[ed] the 
Armenian state” (Lragir 2012). The group refused to run for elections because of violence and non-transparence 
in the electoral systems. Among Sefilyan, the members Garegin Chugaszyan, Garo Yegnukian and Gevorg 
Safaryan were released.  
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 On 17 July 2016, a group of armed men, calling themselves Sasna Tsrer (‘Daredevils of Sassoun’) stormed the 
Erebuni police station in Yerevan and demand the release of Sefilyan and the resignation of president Sargsyan. 
They took nine people as hostages, killed one policeman and injured at least two; one died later in a hospital. 




(Soghomonyan 2020) format. Lastly, financial and social compensation of victims (box 2b) as 
a form of political recognition has not yet been a priority for any government. 
Dismissals in the ministries and personal continuities in the judiciary 
The majority electoral wins by GD led to major personal changes in political institutions. This 
was especially the case in the former power ministries and in the Prosecutor General’s office. 
Former officials were either dismissed, became subjects of criminal prosecutions or fled the 
country. The key ministries in Georgia under Saakashvili were the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Marat 2013), the CSD Georgia (Corso 2013) and the Ministry of Justice (Tsikarishvili 2020). 
After the 2012 parliamentary elections, the Special Operations Department and Constitutional 
Security Department (CSD), the “two most powerful police agencies” were closed down and 
their power transferred to the Anti-Corruption Agency, the State Security Agency and the 
Criminal Police special investigations unit (Corso 2013). The new PM Ivansivhili appointed 
Irakli Garibashvili, who had previously run Ivansivhili’s Cartu foundation and managed a 
record label for his son to Minister of Internal Affairs (2012-2013). Between October 2012 
and March 2013, 897 civil servants in the Ministry of Internal Affairs were dismissed. Of 
these, 302 are alleged to have resigned voluntarily and 1,012 were later newly hired (TI 
Georgia 2013: 5-8). It has not been possible to find out whether the newly hired individuals 
had previously worked in the ministry.
34
 TI Georgia stated that the majority were hired “on 
the basis of kinship, friendship, party-specific or discriminatory grounds” (ibid.: 6). On 
October 15 2012, Ivanishvili appointed Tea Tsulukiani as the new minister of justice. This 
occurred after the former Minister of Justice Adeishvili was dismissed and fled Georgia 
before his criminal prosecution started. In the Ministry of Justice, 99 employees were 
dismissed; 467 were appointed to positions within the Ministry of Justice (ibid.: 9). Again, it 
cannot be stated whether they were rehired or not. Further purges in Georgia took place in the 
Prosecutor’s Office within the first year of transition (TI Georgia 2013). Immediately after the 
2012 elections, Ivanishvili appointed Archil Kbilashvili, who had before worked as 
Ivanishvili’s former lawyer, as new Prosecutor General. He was followed by Irakli Shotadze 
(2013–2014, 2015–2018, 2020–present), who had worked in the Prosecutor’s Office under 
Saakashvili (Reuters 2013) and by Shalva Tadumadze (2018–2019), who was Ivanishvili’s 
personal lawyer. Kbilashvili initiated significant changes of staff. Out of 333 prosecutors and 
43 investigators of the Prosecutor’s Office, 50 prosecutors and six investigators were 
dismissed (Anonymous G4). Simultaneously, 148 new prosecutors and 48 new investigators 
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 I e-mailed the Georgian MoIA and asked for more precise details. It responded it couldn’t provide them. I was 




were appointed. This included all deputies of chief prosecutors, heads of all departments in 
the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and their deputies, all regional prosecutors and the Tbilisi city 
prosecutor and his deputies. This process led to a 33% renewal of the prosecutorial staff 
(ibid.). All chief prosecutors have been criticised by local human rights NGOs for lack of 
integrity (Georgia Today 2019) or for their direct relationships with Ivanishvili (Human 
Rights Center 2020, Kapanadze 2020). 
In terms of office bans, the Georgian government has never outlined a strategy nor elaborated 
guidelines that could define related criteria. Specific office bans have been implemented 
against leading former officials during prosecutions, most notably against Saakashvili in 2018 
for two years and three months (OC Media 2018b), Merabishvili in 2014 for one year and six 
months (Agenda.ge 2014d) and Adeishvili in 2019 for two years and three months (Report.ge 
2019) and in 2020 for another two years (Agenda.ge 2020a). 
Dismissal and vetting processes were not conducted within important area of law 
enforcement, such as the police (Imnadze G. 2020), prison guards,
35
 and the judiciary. In the 
2014-2020 National Strategy for the Protection of Human Rights, the Georgian government 
outlined its strategic plan for human rights, which included the “complete overhaul of the 
judiciary”, which would “ensur[e] the independence of judges and the development of an  
effective system for conducting genuine investigations and proceedings” (The Government of 
Georgia 2014). Several interviewees confirmed that it failed to do so (Chugoshvili 2020, 
Elbakidze 2020, Khoshtaria 2020). There were two main reasons for this failure. Firstly, GD 
did not conduct a thorough process to check the integrity of judges and law enforcement staff 
(Chanturia 2020, Elbakidze 2020). Secondly, separation of powers was deliberately not 
achieved; the new executive has continued to influence the judiciary (Gvilava 2020, Imnadze 
G. 2020). One interviewee and long-term observer of the Georgian judiciary, who has been 
made anonymous in this research, elaborated as follows: 
“[…] [O]ne of the main demand[s] […] [towards] 2012 for Georgia Dream [GD] was to start the 
prosecution of all former officials who committed some of the crimes at that time and these judges, 
[…] when they started acquittal, they started to show them [GD] their power. And of course, GD […] 
became more and more frightened, because if they would have all former officials acquitted, this will 
be absolutely damaging for their political agenda. And by that time, they started to negotiate with 
these influential judicial groups. And after the negotiation, they managed to [settle] quite well […] 
with [them]. […] There is no accountability as such. […] [There are] clear sign[s] that they negotiate 
with the government and they have some agreements on some of the topics and […] [that] is a real 
threat” (Anonymous G1 2020). 
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Despite the fact that four waves of judicial reform were officially implemented, influential 
judges (who were already appointed under Saakashvili and heavily criticised for miscarriage 
of justice) stayed in the post-2012 judicial system and even got empowered (Chanturia 2020, 
Ramishvili 2020), Tsikharishvili 2020). As Elbakidze (2020) explained, 
“No one touched the court system, I mean […], no one touched the judges. […] The judges stayed 
there and they continued to work. Even the judges […] against whom was […] a [decision by the] 
European Court [of Human Rights]. […] When the court mentioned that there is [a human rights] 
violation […] these judges [continued] working in the court system and no one touched them, [...] and 
it’s not easy to talk about because when you are touching the justice system […], you are crossing the 
lines. And it was the reason why […] [the Georgian government] decide[d] to leave them alone, leave 
them in the system, and they are still working there.” 
In Armenia, as in Georgia, all high-ranking political HHK officials in the ministries were 
replaced with members of the new governing party after the 2018 December elections. Unlike 
in Georgia, office bans have not been introduced against former political officials 
(Soghomonyan 2020, e-mail correspondence). Pashinyan’s statement that “[…] We will not 
have a “personnel massacre” during this process, the ministries will be consolidated with their 
positions” (Pashinyan, in: Avetisyan 2019a) overlaps with the empirical evidence collected. 
While the heads of the key ministries in the police (the former Ministry of Internal Affairs 
until its abolishment in 2003
36
) and the Ministry of Justice were changed,
37
 civil servants were 
retained. The structure and staff of the prosecutorial service and investigative units has, unlike 
that of post-2012 Georgia, remained mostly unchanged (Kirakosyan 2020, Sakunts 2020). 
While the heads of investigatory services were replaced (e.g., the head of the NSS Georgy 
Kutoyan was fired and the former IC chair Avghan Hovsepyan
38
 resigned in June 2018), they 
were replaced by individuals who had served under Sargsyan (Khachatryan 2020, Sakunts 
2020). Furthermore, most of the prosecutors were appointed under Sargsyan (The Prosecutor 
General’s Office of the Republic of Armenia 2020a, b, c) and have continued to work under 
the new government (Khachatryan 2020, Sakunts 2020). This lack of reform and of political 
and administrative changes has created a feeling of continued impunity. Edgar Khachatryan 
(2020), a lawyer who represents victims’ successors of non-combatant fatalities and heads the 
NGO Peace Dialogue, stated 
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 Pashinyan announced that a Ministry of Internal Affairs (abolished in 2003) would be re-established, which 
would lead to a separation between the police and the respective ministry (Armenpress 2020a). 
37
 The former head of the police, Vladimir Gasparyan, who held the position since 2011, was dismissed in May 
2018 based on a presidential decree and replaced with Vahe Ghazaryan, who had worked in the Department of 
the Tavush Marz of the RA Police.  
38




“It is kind of, how to say, a corruption pyramid, you know, where all the old representatives of the old 
system, in that sphere, in investigations sphere, are still there. That means that they are still trying to 
cover and support each other in order to keep the status quo” (Khachatryan 2020) 
The main difference between Georgia and Armenia in the political and administrative 
dimension has been in terms of vetting, in particular among the judiciary. In May 2019, 
shortly after Kocharyan was released from custody, which Pashinyan associated with the 
assumption that the courts were dominated by old elites, he called on the population to block 
the court entrances (Caucasian Knot 2019a) and officially announced the need for vetting 
among the judiciary. This proposed vetting would encompass measures for revealing judges’ 
political connections, property status and qualifications (The Prime Minister of the Republic 
of Armenia 2019). Judges would then either resign or be removed from their positions. So far, 
the Armenian government’s efforts in reference to political and administrative changes among 
the judiciary have mainly focused on the Constitutional Court (CC) and on the dismissal of 
judges in the CC who were appointed by Sargsyan. The government planned to hold a 
referendum on 5 April 2020 enabling Armenia’s citizens to vote on the removal of these 
judges. The referendum was seen as a crucial tool to increase legitimacy for TJ (Liakhov 
2020). However, the referendum was cancelled indefinitely on 18 May 2020 due to the state 
of emergency surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, the government enacted a law in 
June 2020, which changed the 2015 constitutional amendments through a “grandfather 
clause”. Judges who had served over 12 years were dismissed and could serve only up to a 
maximum age of 70 years (OC Media 2020a). As a consequence, three judges (who were 
among the nine leading judges in the CC) had to leave their posts. In addition, Hrayr 
Tovmasyan, former Minister of Justice (2010–2013) and head of the CC (appointed in May 
2018 under Sargsyan) was removed from this position and now serves as a CC member.
39
 In 
September 2020, the National Assembly voted three new judges in to the posts in the CC; 
against one of those judges at least 13 cases were handled in the ECHR and all of them were 
ruled against Armenia.  
The actual implementation of vetting has focused on declarations of income, property and 
good conduct (which includes educational background and relationships with criminal 
subculture). A specific commission, the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, which 
is independent from the executive and the judiciary and had been planned before the 2018 
revolution, has been tasked with examining judges’ profiles. Vetting has faced resistance 
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among large sectors of the Armenian judiciary. Indicative of this were elaborations by Grigor 
Bekmezyan’s, one of the Supreme Judicial Council’s members, who stated that vetting would 
be a heavy blow to all judges in Armenia since checking their integrity could lead to a 30–
40% loss of judges (Appendix V, p. 119). The de facto process refers only to declarations on 
or after 1 July 2017 and excludes acting and CC judges, prosecutors and investigators. 
Vetting, which solely refers to new judges, has remained very “soft” (Soghomonyan 2020). 
According to TI Armenia (2020), it was “[…] for the future but not for the past […]”, 
formalistic and selective. Consequently, judges who were for instance responsible for 
concealing the 2008 crimes or the 2016 hostage crisis won’t be involved in the integrity 
check. Furthermore, the approach does not overlap with the official TJ strategy, which 
focuses on human rights violations since 1991. “Here we register a step back from the 
principles provided by the program” (Sakunts 2020).  
Coming to political-administrative answers to those, whose human rights were violated (box 
2b), it has to be concluded that both governments have so far done very little to compensate 
victims. In Georgia, no systematic form of compensation has taken place since 2012 
(Chugoshvili 2020, Khoshtaria 2020). This correlates with the absent framework for legal 
rehabilitation and is, according to some interviewees, an indirect consequence of the rejection 
of establishing non-judicial tools. These include the planned Commission on the Miscarriage 
of Justice (Chanturia 2020, Tsikarishvili 2020), which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
4.4. Chanturia (2020) stated that many victims of gross violations were not recognised as such 
(and thus compensation was not achieved). This point was reiterated by Jishkariani (2020), 
who underlined that the Georgian government’s focus after 2012 was on political prisoners, 
but not on victims of torture. There has also not been any compensation for individuals whose 
rights to a fair trial were violated (Khoshtaria 2020). Individuals who lost their property 
started getting politically partly rehabilitated once they received the status of victims, which 
was the case starting from 2015. However, as mentioned, a high number of cases remain 
uninvestigated (Chanturia 2020, Nanuashvili 2020). When it comes to workers and victims’ 
successors, there has not been any attempt at reconciliation since 2012. Rehabilitation of those 
whose labour rights were violated was “not […] part of transitional justice, which was 
discussed and debated […] in Georgia. It was not at all part of the discussion. […] And even 
now, it’s not acknowledged, that it was part of political agenda of the previous government” 
(Ghvinianidze 2020). Labour rights violations from 2003 to 2012 “were not something, that 
should de described, assessed or deserves to have restoration of justice and fairness” (ibid.). 




of Justice set up the rehabilitation and resocialization programme as part of the Legal Entity 
Under Public Law (LEPL) Center for Crime Prevention. Its programme has focused “[…] on 
former prisoner’s physical and mental health problems, promotion of vocational education 
and employment support in the appropriate direction” (Crime Prevention Center 2020). 
During the current research process it was not possible to collect exact results on the outcome 
of the programme. However, a 2020 report states that the programme involved “16 mediators, 
13 social workers and 1 psychologist […]” (Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and medical 
rehabilitation of Torture Victims 2020: 15), which suggests that the programme was small. 
Jishkariani has stated that Empathy, an NGO focusing on psychological rehabilitation of 
victims of state violence, cooperated with the Crime Prevention Center. Until 2015 financial 
support for establishing a rehabilitation programme was provided by the EU, UN Volunteer 
Fund and USAID, but not by the Georgian government. 
In Armenia, financial compensation since 1 March 2008 has focused on victims and victims’ 
successors. In June 2019, a respective bill came into force. The successors of all ten 
individuals killed received around 63,000 US dollars, and each victim who was severely 
injured (63 in total) received more than 31,500 US dollars (Caucasian Knot 2019b). Artur 
Sakunts (2020) said: “Let me tell you one thing, as long as we do not have the fact-finding 
commission to say what will be done or how it would be, we cannot […] [speak about 
reconciliation]”. Therefore, all forms of compensation are planned to be designed as a 
consequence of the results of a planned fact-finding commission (which is discussed further in 
Chapter 4.4). Political prisoners, survivors of torture and victims of economic violence have 
so far not been part of the small-scale compensation process. As in Georgia, efforts of social 
rehabilitation of victims of torture and ill-treatment have been led by civil society. Since 
December 2018, the newly established Armenian Survivors’ Rehabilitation Center, which is 
run by the Armenian Scientific Association of Psychologists, has provided medical, 
psychological and social support to survivors of torture or ill-treatment (Helsinki Citizens’ 
Assembly Vanadzor 2019).
40
 Within the first 10 months, 150 individuals were supported 
(ibid. 2018). Furthermore, the NGO Peace Dialogue has provided social services to victims’ 
relatives (Khachataryan 2020). 
4.3 Socio-economic dimension: From partial return of illegal financial assets and 
property to lack of societal redistribution 
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The empirical results concerning the socio-economic dimension (box 3a and 3b) have differed 
in two qualitative aspects. First, addressing authoritarian economic injustice has been a higher 
priority for the Armenian government after 2018 than for the Georgian government after 
2012. The latter has excluded redistributive justice from TJ in general and has paid little 
attention to the human rights violations committed under Saakashvili because of its economic 
policy. In Armenia, where the post-transition debates have focused on anti-corruption 
solutions, measures to return illegally obtained property and financial assets have been 
formally introduced. Second, 149 individuals have received their property back in Georgia, 
while no property has been returned in Armenia. In terms of basic social security, basic rights 
have still not been fulfilled despite the fact that the general labour legislation has improved in 
Georgia since 2012. The situation has been similar in Armenia, where broad labour reforms 
are still awaited and social security has only slightly improved since 2018.  
Redistribution as a ‘no go’ in Georgia and as a possibility in Armenia 
Ghvinianidze (2020) has underlined that since 2012 no “[…] changes in [terms of the] 
economic development course of the country” have taken place in Georgia, “[…] we [only] 
see some changes on basic legal frameworks in terms of legislation, policies and practices”. 
This correlates with the fact that there has not been a governmental assessment of (or reaction 
to) past elite corruption or deprivation of financial assets. GD has not – apart from a few 
investigations and prosecutions on economic crime (e.g., in the cases of Dzimtseishvili, 
Saakashvili and Ugulava) – taken any meaningful measures to make perpetrators return past 
corrupted financial assets and illegally obtained property (Appendix II). An independent anti-
corruption agency, which would not, unlike now be part of prosecutorial units or ministries,
41
 
has not been established. In 2015, GD released its first anti-corruption strategy and action 
plan (Stöber 2020: 69); the task of combating corruption was transferred from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs to the newly established State Security Service. However, the latter does not 
investigate corruption crimes that happened before 2015. This forward-looking approach did 
not function as a TJ tool. The Inter-Agency Coordination Council to Combat Corruption, 
which was established in 2008 under Saakashvili, does not have any retrospective function; 
thus, it does not look into economic crimes committed between 2003 and 2012. Despite proof 
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of ongoing high-level corruption manifested in embezzlement of financial assets, a 
monitoring and control mechanism (related to imposing fines) was only established in 2017 
(Tutberidze 2017). Again, this did not have a restorative effect. 
The Armenian government has been more active in initiating socio-economic TJ measures; 
however, they have lacked concrete outcomes. In May 2020, the Law on Confiscation of 
Illegal Property was passed in the National Assembly along with 14 related laws. Based on 
this legislation, law enforcement agencies can petition the courts if they suspect that property 
was acquired through illegal means (e.g., abuse of power, money laundering or extortion) in 
or after 1991 (Dovich 2020). Prosecutorial units can confiscate the property if a difference of 
52,400 USD or more is found between the declared income over time and the total value of 
the property (Nalbandian 2019a). This is only the case if the prosecutorial agencies can prove 
evidence for these rights violations within six months and defendants cannot prove legality of 
acquisition to the courts. Afterwards, the courts are tasked to return the property to the state 
without prosecuting the respective individuals. If a person has unknowingly purchased 
property that was illegally obtained, the property itself does not have to be returned. Instead 
“the value of that property will be confiscated” (OC Media 2020b). In September 2020, a 
Department for Confiscation of Illegal Property was formed by the Prosecutor’s Office. So 
far, it has not been publicly stated how the unit will work. One central problem concerning the 
implementation of the law is that owners need to deliver documentation to justify their 
property ownership; however, it has remained unclear how the government will act if owners 
are not able to show evidence (Poghosyan 2020). Official property registration in post-Soviet 
Armenia only began in 1998–99 (Nazaretyan 2020). 
Along with anti-corruption laws, the Armenian government has undertaken steps to facilitate 
the return of illegal financial assets. In May 2020, a Law on the Confiscation of Illegally 
Acquired Assets (Armenian Legal Information System 2020) came into force, which “aims to 
confiscate and nationalize the illicit assets of former officials accused of corruption” 
(Nazaretyan 2020). A special unit within the General Prosecutor’s Office has been tasked to 
investigate illegally acquired assets. Cases can go back until 21 September 1991. Prosecutions 
can only be initiated once a criminal case has already been opened before and shows 
“sufficient ground to suspect” (Armenian Legal Information System 2020) that the convicted 
individual, a family member, relative or close business associate possesses illegally acquired 
assets. Only assets, which are valued of over 100.000 USD more than their lawful income, 




by judges from the Supreme Judicial Council until a special anti-corruption court is set up in 
spring 2021 (Nazaretyan 2020). In November 2020, the Armenian Justice Minister Rustam 
Badasyan announced that first criminal cases would be finalised in 2021 (Arka 2020a). 
Small-scale restitution of property and lack of social security 
The collected data indicates that the Georgian government has started returning property to 
Georgians on a very low scale after 2015. Social security has slightly improved, however 
even formally still does not fulfil basic human rights standards. The Armenian government 
has not yet returned victims’ properties; it widened basic social and labour rights, which 
however still are not sufficient to guarantee basic security.   
In 2015, GD set up a unit on the return of extorted property in the Prosecutor’s Office, which 
Chanturia (2020) regards as “[…] relatively more successful than other transitional justice 
instruments”. The entity is part of the Department for the Investigation of Offences 
Committed in the Course of Legal Proceedings in the Prosecutor’s Office, which was added 
as a structural unit in 2015. It applies to cases where the owner is the Georgian state. The 
value of returned property encompassed approximately 13.9 million USD according to the 
Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure. Properties included 80 cars, 21 agricultural plots, six 
flats, two resort houses, office and commercial spaces, a Gori-based hotel and swimming 
pools, a boarding house in Shovi (Svaneti), two aeroplanes and 13 helicopters (Human Rights 
Center 2018: 23). While exact statements on the relative success of these measures are not 
possible (Ghvinianidze 2020), the actual success rate has to be considered as low 
(Nanuashvili 2020): Until 2018, only 149 out of thousands of reported cases were resolved 
successfully (Human Rights Center 2018). Furthermore, the methodology was considered as 
incoherent and non-transparent (Gvilava 2020) and the selection principles and prioritization 
remain unclear. In Armenia, victims’ restitution of property has been assigned to the truth 
commission, which will be set up in spring 2021. So far no reconciliation has been achieved 
in this regard and victims have not yet regained their property (Sakunts 2020). 
In terms of social security, it can be stated that Armenians’ basic social security has slightly 
improved since 2018. Mechanisms of redistributive justice have, unlike those of post-2012 
Georgia, been discussed in Armenia as part of TJ. However, they remain vague and without a 
strategy for how returned illegal financial assets will be distributed to citizens (Mazmanyan 
2020). In November 2019, a law on the increase of the minimum wage of 23% (from around 




is a small improvement in terms of socio-economic rights, it is still below the European 
standard. According to this standard, the net minimum wage should be at least 60% of the net 
national average wage, which would be at least 220 USD (Avetisyan 2019b). Furthermore, 
there is no unemployment insurance, which could “fuel longer periods of unemployment for 
benefit recipients” (International Monetary Fund 2019: 56). Nor are there any unemployment 
benefits, and thus protection against unemployment is not guaranteed. The Georgian 
government has not yet introduced a minimum wage. A law on minimum wage, which dates 
back to 1999, directs a legal monthly standard of nine USD. In 2016, former Public Defender 
Ucha Nanuashvili and GTUC recommended that the Georgian government set a minimum 
wage of at least 30% of the average salary (Messenger 2016); this proposal was ignored by 
the government. A proposal on the introduction of a minimum wage in November 2019 by 
GTUC and Solidarity Network was vetoed in the Georgian parliament, and in February 2020, 
a similar suggestion by seven members of parliament was rejected by the Economy and 
Economic Policy Committee on the basis that the introduction of a minimum wage would 
force companies to cut jobs (Kincha 2020). According to GTUC Vice President Raisa 
Liparteliani and MP Beka Natshvlishvili, the bill was not supported by any political group in 
the Georgian parliament (ibid.). The post-2012 government has continued Saakashvili’s social 
policies, which still do not guarantee basic security (Darsavelidze 2019: 36). So far, neither 
unemployment insurance nor any unemployment benefits have been introduced. 
Consequently, if a person becomes unemployed, no monetary security is provided. 
In both post-2012 Georgia and post-2018 Armenia, past labour rights violations were not 
recognised as serious human rights violations, which undermined people’s right to life and 
rights of economic and social security. In Georgia, there has been gradual (but limited) 
progress in terms of labour rights protections, which are still not exhaustive enough to 
guarantee workers’ physical safety. While the number of deaths in the workplace has 
decreased since 2012, at least 211 individuals still died in the workplace between 2012 and 
2018 (Tchanturidze 2018). In 2015, three years after the transition, the Labour Conditions 
Inspection Department (abolished under Saakashvili) was re-established as an agency under 
the Labour and Health Ministry. While its original mandate was limited to monitoring 
occupational safety after permission by a court and warning the working place, its remit was 
extended in 2019 to allow inspection of all work places without permission or prior warning 
(OC Media 2020d). Attempts to extend the inspector’s mandate, brought forward by seven 
members of parliament, failed in 2020. The situation on labour safety has not notably 




newly set up in April 2018, has remained without legal ability to enforcing workers’ safety or 
employment relations (European Commission 2020a: 13). A law on a reformed inspection 
system will be developed by October 2021. 
4.4 Symbolic-representative dimension: From apology to lack of truth telling 
Symbolic and representative TJ measures have been implemented on different scales in post-
2012 Georgia and in post-2018 Armenia. While the Georgian government has frequently 
condemned human rights violations committed by UNM, it has not implemented non-judicial 
measures to examine past abuses and has neither apologised to nor commemorated the 
individuals and groups who became victims of Saakashvili’s regime. The Armenian 
government has condemned the politics of the past regimes and started working on a draft law 
aimed at establishing a fact-finding commission to examine past systemic abuse. Pashinyan 
apologised to victims of political repression and commemorated them. To date, a much-
demanded official legal examination of the past regime has not been finalised. 
Since 2012, various GD members such as Ivanishvili and former PM Irakli Garibashvili 
(2013–2015) have heavily condemned UNM’s eight years of authoritarian governance and 
rhetorically fully distanced themselves from UNM as a political party (Agenda.ge 2014b, 
Netgazeti 2014a). Furthermore, several high-level political officials have criticised the 
political and civil (not economic and social) rights violations committed by Saakashvili’s 
UNM. In 2014, Garibashvili called Saakashvili a “dictator” (Netgazeti 2014b), described the 
time of UNM’s governance a “dark past” and referred to GD’s new governance as “bright” 
(ibid.). He stated that GD would “[…] never allow [the old times] […] again” (ibid.). 
Ivanishvili named the party forces “that shamefully ruled […] [the] country […]” (Netgazeti 
2018). Radical criticism towards UNM, which has been GD’s main political opponent since 
2012, has become part of GD’s past and present political agenda. Under GD, several leading 
UNM officials were publicly shamed. Examples include the exposure of Bacho Akhalaia’s 
apartments, vehicles and private property by the Committee of Defence and Security of the 
Parliament of Georgia to contrast them to the poor living conditions of ordinary soldiers in 
2012 (Georgian Journal 2013a). In 2014, when Saakashvili was charged with embezzling 
state funds, the Prosecutor’s Office published copies of some of Saakashvili’s invoices 
exposing his expensive private lifestyle (Agenda.ge 2014c).
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 While the Georgian government 
                                                          
42
 Additionally, in October 2012, the print newspaper Asaval Dasavali published the names, dates of births and 
addresses of employees of the Gldani Prison No. 8. It is unknown who forwarded the names to the newspaper; 





has condemned perpetrators and publicly shamed them, systemic non-judicial measures as a 
form of real manifestation of this rhetorical criticism and an end to a past regime of abuse 
have not been introduced. This became evident when the suggested Temporary State 
Commission on the Miscarriage of Justice (TSCMJ) was not brought into practice 
(Anonymous A1). Despite the fact that the Georgian parliament could not agree on the 
TSCMJ’s topics, conceptualisation and methodology (Imnadze G. 2020), lawyers developed a 
draft law on the TSCMJ until May 2013. It was planned for a span of three years and would 
have been an explicitly non-judicial examination mechanism that was focused on formulating 
resolutions based on citizens’ reports on miscarriage of justice from 1 January 2004 to 1 
November 2012. If the TSCMJ found cases of miscarriage of justice, these would have been 
transferred to the courts for review. While the Georgian government asked for the Venice 
Commission’s opinion on the commission in spring 2013, by November 2013 Justice Minister 
Tsulukiani announced that the idea would be put on hold due to financial reasons 
(Tsikarishvili 2020), stating that the country was “[…] financially [not] ready” (Civil.ge 
2013). Former Public Defender Nanuashvili criticised the government for this decision and 
argued that a monetary justification was not a “valid argument” (ibd.)
43
. Other alternative 
forms of revealing abuse, such as political or historic documents, were neither discussed nor 
brought into practice (Gvilava 2020, Muskhelishvili 2020). 
Unlike GD’s rhetoric of condemnation, the Armenian government’s referred to authoritarian 
practices and the political system instead of individual perpetrators, which underlined its 
willingness to achieve a normative shift from the past system. In 2019, Pashinyan stated:  
“[…] I would like to clearly record that there cannot be a return to the morals and relationships of the 
past. Armenia will not return to the times of corruption, political persecutions, political violence, 
violation of rights, impunity and obscenity” (Armenpress 2019a).  
This profound rhetorical distancing has so far not been followed by a legal or political 
assessment of the previous regime; a form of “political commitment to transitional justice” 
(Sakunts 2020) that Pashinyan promised to issue in March 2020 (ibid.). Such a measure could 
have helped to formulate and create a new narrative as an alternative to the past mono 
narrative, which was acclaimed under HHK (Liakhov 2020). One non-judicial measure 
(which, according to the government’s TJ strategy, is at the heart of the TJ process) is a fact-
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 which was tasked to study and review specific cases of corruption and 
human rights violations from 1991–2018 (Carranza 2020: 2). Reportedly, it will encompasses 
investigations into schemes of corruption, electoral rights and property rights violations, cases 
of non-combatant deaths and “cases of expropriation for public interest” (Ministry of Justice 
of the Republic of Armenia 2019b). The commission could help TJ to outlast Pashinyan and 
disconnect it from him ideologically (Liakhov 2020). Based on the results of the commission, 
victim groups could be identified, strategies for compensations developed and further 
prosecution initiated. According to the judicial strategy, rights would be restored “based on 
the summary of the [r]eport of the [f]act-[f]inding [c]ommission and institutional reforms” 
(Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia 2019a). The commission is planned to be set 
up in spring 2021. The exact working mechanisms, the weight of victims’ voices and 
information on measures of compensation have not been made public. Maria Karapetyan, an 
MP and a member of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Human Rights 
Protection and Public Affairs, stated her belief that “a multi-volume archive” would be 
formed and that “[…] the final result, the analysis of the document conclusion prepared by the 
Commission” would be ratified by “the National Assembly as an assessment of that past” 
(Aravot 2020). 
Similar as in Georgia, law enforcement agencies publicly shamed former officials or 
businessmen related to HHK by exposing their wealthy lifestyle. The most notable cases have 
included the NSS’s 2018 raid of Manvel Grigorian’s residence exposing weapons, food, field 
rations for soldiers (RFE/RL 2018c) and the 2020 raid of Tsarukyan’s residential palace, after 
which the former posted a video showing alleged evidence of voter bribery (NSS 2020). 
The most significant differences between the Georgian post-2012 government and the 
Armenian post-2018 government lie in the attempts at symbolic-representative TJ measures 
towards victims. This is particular true of measures related to official truth-seeking and 
apologies. In Georgia, there have been several attempts to motivate the Georgian government 
to establish mechanisms of truth-seeking; however, these were abolished by GD. The idea of 
establishing a truth commission after 2012 was formulated by Georgian human rights lawyer 
Ana Dolidze and promoted together with political science researcher Thomas de Waal 
(Dolidze/de Waal 2012). The purpose of a ‘Georgian Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission’ would have been to achieve “a definite break with the past by confronting the 
root causes of an abusive system and providing a historically grounded narrative about it” 
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(ibid.). Dolidze envisioned that the commission could have contributed to a larger narrative; 
something which has not happened in Georgia since the end of the Soviet Union until today 
(appendix IV, p. 118).
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 According to Gvilava (2020), a memory culture of Georgia’s 
authoritarian past does not really exist in Georgia as there has been no legal or systematic 
evaluation of the past. This point was reiterated by a number of other interviewees (e.g., 
Jishkariani 2020, Khoshtaria 2020, Nanuashvili 2020), who underlined that Georgia lacked a 
culture of truth and justice with reference to the Soviet past and the post-independence period 
(including Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze). Due to the fact that the Georgian government 
hasn’t established truth measures that could have illustrated past violence, civil society actors 
themselves became active. This is particularly relevant to understanding the scale of torture 
and mistreatment in prisons. In 2014, OSF Georgia (together with the Public Defender and 
several researchers) launched a study in which more than 1,200 inmates were interviewed 
regarding practices of torture and ill-treatment in prison. The report concluded that torture 
was a state policy between 2003 and 2012 (Slade et al. 2014). So far, this has been the only 
truth-finding measure focused on victims of Saakashvili’s regime. Furthermore, GD has not 
yet delivered any apology to the members of the Georgian population who were affected by 
UNM’s governance. Audits from the Supreme Council confirm that current judges, who 
served under Saakashvili, don’t see any necessity for an apology towards victims of human 
rights violations (Internal Document 2019
46
). Chanturia (2020) stated that “there hasn’t been 
any […] formal contemplation about what measures to be emplaced in order to prevent such 
things [torture] from reoccurring again […]”. While human rights violations committed under 
Saakashvili are today widely known to the public, GD has not publicly commemorated 
victims.
47
 Events related to abuse of perpetrators, such as the crackdown on the protests on 7 
November 2007 and 26 May 2011, were remembered in political speeches and in social media 
by GD officials (Kvirikashvili 2017, Garibashvili, in: Georgian Journal 2013b). While the 
political violence was mentioned, the victims were not. Furthermore, there have been 
occasions where governmental members have instrumentalised past abuses (Khoshtaria 
2020): In March 2015, theatres and venues in Poti, Zugdidi, Senaki and Khobi municipalities 
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(GYLA 2015) held screenings of a documentary called The Bloody Chronicle of the 
Saakashvili Regime. According to TI Georgia, it depicted “[…] stories of murder, people 
dying in suspicious circumstances, protest rallies dispersed using force by the police, unlawful 
imprisonments, video footage discovered in secret hideouts, and inhumane treatment, rape 
and torture of inmates in prisons during the […] [UNM] government” (TI Georgia 2015). The 
screenings were supported by local government representatives, local educational resource 
centres and local public schools. 
Unlike the Georgian PM(s), Pashinyan strived for reconciliation with the Armenian 
population, issuing an official apology on the 11
th
 anniversary of the March 2008 events. 
Pashinyan apologised to “all victims of March 1, 2008, all victims of political murders that 
took place in Armenia since independence, all citizens and political powers that were 
subjected to political persecutions”, which were, as he stated, an “eruption of unlawfulness, 
electoral fraud, political murders, persecutions and impunity that has depressed Armenia and 
its people for many years”. He also expressed regret for “all election riggings, unlawfulness 
coordinated and organised by the government elite, corruption, political murders”. This 
apology, which he issued “on behalf of the [s]tate”, not only included the victims of the 
March 1
st 
2008 protest, but also “[…] the victims of all political killings that have occurred in 
Armenia since independence, as well as […] to all those citizens and political forces subjected 
to political persecution” (Armenpress 2019a). Thus, Pashinyan did not explicitly mention the 
different societal groups who were concerned by the Sargsyan administration’s 
authoritarianism, such as family members of soldiers, who died in non-combatant death or 
collectives, who lost their property. Instead, Pashinyan’s apology was targeted towards “[…] 
the fraud fostered and coordinated by the ruling elites, […] illegalities, corruption and 
political murders”. Simultaneously, he declared “[…] the page of violence […] in Armenia” 
as closed (Massispost 2019a). This apology was followed by a commemoration march from 
Liberty Square to Myasnikyan Statue in Yerevan, which was dedicated “to the victory of 
Armenian citizens, directed against violence, vote rigging, corruption, illegalities and 
persecutions” (Armenpress 2019a). 
4.5 Summary  
A summary of the research results, based on the theoretical framework, is presented here:  

















-No independent investigatory 
mechanism  
-Prosecutions with procedural rights 
violations and long prison sentences 
for former high-level officials  
-No legal rehabilitation 





-Purges in the prosecutorial services 
and among civil servants  
-No vetting among judges 
-No financial compensation  
-No governmental social compensation 
(only by civil society)  
Socio-economic  
(3a/b) 
-No return of illegal state property or 
financial assets    
 
-No restitution of property   
-No changes in terms of provision of 




-Frequent condemnation and public 
shaming of old elites 
-Lack of non-judicial measures  
-No governmental victim 
commemoration   
-No apology  
Table 6: Overview of transitional justice measures from 2012 to 2014 in Georgia; white: no TJ measure; grey:  
TJ measure (Source: own image). 
 Accountability  Reconciliation  
Legal-judicial (1a/b) -No independent investigation 
mechanism  
-Prosecutions into political crimes and 
schemes of economic crimes   
-No legal rehabilitation, victim status 
only for 1
 
March 2008 cases  
-Release of political prisoners  
Political-
administrative (2a/b) 
-No office bans  
-Small-scale dismissal in the 
prosecutorial services  
-Soft vetting among judges  
-Financial compensation to victims and 
victims’ successors of 1
 
March 2008  
-Social compensation by civil society 
Socio-economic 
(3a/b) 
-Law on return of financial assets  
-Law on return of illegal property  
 
-No restitution of property (mandate to 
truth commission)   
-Changes in terms of social security, 
weak labour rights  
Symbolic-
representative (4a/b) 
-Condemnations of old elites during 
major events and public shaming  
-Draft law on fact-finding commission  
-Major commemoration event   
-Apology to victims of political violence 
and 1 March 2008  
Table 7: Overview of transitional justice measures from 2018 to 2020 in Armenia; white: no TJ measure; grey: 










 Accountability Reconciliation 
Legal-judicial (1a/b) -State Inspector’s Service as 
investigatory tool   
-Prosecutions and long prison 
sentences of former high-level officials  
-No legal rehabilitation  
Political-
administrative (2a/b) 
-Selective office bans on low scale  
-No vetting among judges 
-No financial compensation 
-Social compensation by civil society 
Socio-economic 
(3a/b) 
-No return of state property or 
financial assets    
 
-Restitution of property on low scale  
-Little changes on provision of social 
security and labour rights  
Symbolic-
representative (4a/b) 
-Frequent condemnation and public 
shaming  
-Lack of non-judicial measures  
-No victim commemoration   
-No apology to victims 
Table 8: Overview of transitional justice measures from 2015 to 2020 in Georgia; white: no TJ measure; grey: TJ 
measure (Source: own image).   
The analysed data leads to two core conclusions: (1) the post-2012 Georgian and post-2018 
Armenian governments’ TJ implementation has remained low in both countries; (2) the 
Armenian government has implemented more measures in all four dimensions than the 
Georgian government in the compared period of time. The Georgian government’s perception 
of “restoration of justice” was, apart from the release of political prisoners immediately after 
the transition, almost completely reduced to retributive justice measures (Ramishvili 2020) by 
simultaneously frequently failing to meet human rights standards for fair and impartial trials 
(Anonymous G1 2020, Imnadze G. 2020). The leading staff in the prosecutorial units and 
ministries were purged; the courts, however, have remained without vetting and transitional 
integrity checks. Since 2015, GD has implemented redistributive measures on a very low 
scale and has returned property in only 149 cases out of thousands. Violations of labour and 
social rights were not perceived as serious rights violations and have remained without 
governmental attention. The collective situation of social security in Georgia has only slightly 
improved since the end of Saakashvili’s rule. The Georgian government has not yet 
implemented any symbolic-representative measures, such as commemorations of victims or 
apologies, which would technically be of less material cost than measures in the other three 
dimensions. 
The TJ situation has been rather different in Armenia. The Armenian government’s TJ 




forms of justice. While prosecutions of former high–ranking officials and related 
businesspeople have been of high priority, they have remained on a low scale. Unlike in 
Georgia, the data cannot prove any executorial influence on the investigations and 
prosecutions. Prosecutorial and judicial units have remained in dissonance. As with the 
Georgian government, the Armenian government has not established independent 
investigatory mechanisms but has continued to operate within the “old” investigatory 
structures. Redistributive justice has generally been of much higher priority; this has been 
reflected in new legal frameworks on the return of illegal property and financial assets. The 
social security situation has slightly improved since 2018. The main difference between the 
TJ approaches of both governments consists in the usage of symbolic-representative 
measures. Pashinyan has, unlike any other Georgian head of state after 2012, apologised to 
victims of human rights violations and thus has attempted to achieve reconciliation between 
the people and the state.  
Chapter 5: Understanding two different paths of post-
authoritarian transitional justice in Georgia and Armenia 
This last chapter tries to understand the patterns of TJ that were found in Chapter 4. A 
combination of structural factors has led to different patterns of and a relatively higher 
implementation of TJ within the first two years after the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. The 
three hypotheses are as follows: ‘the more prevalent the legacy of the authoritarian ancien 
régime, the less likely that transitional justice will be implemented’ (H1); ‘the more directly 
civil society is involved in governments’ TJ process, the more likely it is that TJ will be 
implemented’ (H2); and ‘the higher the external pro-TJ pressure on a transitory government, 
the more likely it is that TJ will be implemented’ (H3/1) or ‘the higher the external anti-TJ 
pressure on a transitory government, the less likely it is that TJ will be implemented’ (H3/2). 
These hypotheses were used as exploratory tools to trace a logic of analysis.    
5.1 Continuation of authoritarian neoliberal legacy vs. resistance to authoritarian past  
The data indicates that the two post-transitory governments reacted to the authoritarian 
legacies in different ways: while the post-2012 Georgian government continued and 
maintained structures of authoritarianism, the post-2018 Armenian government initially 
showed more resistance. The research identified two central factors of Saakashvili’s 
governance which correlate with the low level of TJ implementation in Georgia: (1) the 




ideas and institutions (Ghvinianidze 2020); and (2) Ivanishvili’s continuation of practices of 
informal governance, in particular in courts as a heritage of UNM’s authoritarian 
institutionalism (Anonymous G1 2020, Tsikarishvili 2020). In Armenia, the slightly higher TJ 
scale seems to be impacted by (1) a lack of prevalent political ideology during Sargsyan’s 
regime (Iskandaryan 2020) with the 2018 revolution as an ultimate starting point to embed 
new ideological foundations and (2) the new government’s initial resistance to old practices of 
structural informal governance. The latter has in fact contributed to the set-up of a row of 
formal TJ measures.  
One factor that differentiated Saakashvili’s governance from Sargsyan’s was the strong 
institutional enforcement of the guiding political ideology of neoliberalism as central to state-
building, rhetorically equalized with the ‘liberalization’ of the market and crackdown on petty 
corruption, which were the two core principles of UNM’s authoritarian governance. These 
principles, broadly encouraged by the liberal parts of civil society which initially supported 
UNM’s governance after 2003, enabled the institutionalization of state capitalism 
(Muskhelishvili 2020) which made economic violence in the eyes of the elites invisible. Lina 
Ghvinianidze (2020) stated:  
“[…] Saakashvili's government, they were neoliberals. They were believers in this ideology. It 
was not just that they read something and they just follow[ed], or it was like the guide from […] 
Western […] economic intellectuals, as it happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They 
[Saakashvili’s government] were really believers of this economic policy”.    
UNM’s basic neoliberal principle to avoid state intervention into the market economy and the 
assumption of a trickle-down effect has, despite increased social discourses and significant 
changes in terms of social and labour policy, been maintained in GD’s governance from 2012 
until today (Gabitsinashvili 2019). This has been evident in a row of policy decisions, for 
example, the continuation of the Liberty Act in the Georgian Constitution., the most 
prominent symbol of Saakashvili’s anti-social economic policy, “which outlawed progressive 
taxation and tightly capped social spending” (Japaridze 2020), the privatisation of public 
assets stock (Gugushvili 2016: 4) and rejection of laws on the introduction of a minimum 
wage (Kincha 2020). The latter, itself a continuation of economic violence, directly relates to 
the absence of socio-economic TJ in the analysed period of time. Shortly before the 2012 
transition in 2011, Ivanishvili, who later was elected as Georgia’s PM and has remained the 
party’s informal leader until today, stated that while he wanted to strengthen democratic 
institutions, his political goal was that the state would stay away from the economy (Stöber 




police violence and torture (political violence), the logic of UNM’s economic policy, which 
caused profound social and economic rights violations, has not been questioned:   
“[…] It was not even part of the idea of transitional justice, which was discussed and debated 
[…] in Georgia. It was not at all a part of the discussion. And even now, it's not acknowledged, that it 
was a part of political agenda of the previous government or it was something that should be 
described, something that should be assessed or something that deserves to have restoration of justice 
and fairness. […]” (Ghvinianidze 2020).  
Furthermore, there has been no understanding among GD’s elite that there was an inherent 
functional connection between political and economic violence during Saakashvili’s 
governance, and that the former was essentially a consequence of the latter. This is reflected 
in GD’s narrow TJ concept, which solely encompassed the release of political prisoners, the 
prosecution of perpetrators and judicial reform that was mainly focused on technical changes, 
and less on political-administrative reforms (Tsikarishvili 2020). Going after single criminal 
individuals, which was GD’s most chosen TJ tool, certainly does not eliminate the full legacy 
of an authoritarian system, as indicated in Chapter 4. The ideological structures of 
Saakashvili’s state-building project were kept after 2012, and have been only gradually 
ameliorated. The continuation of neoliberal ideology explains why GD has reduced TJ to 
solely tackling political violence (still in a very fragmented way and mostly on the perpetrator 
side), but has made such low-level reforms in the socio-economic dimension. As 
demonstrated, the restitution of property was carried out only on small-scale level, which 
benefited only a few of those whose property was confiscated. These observations prove that 
UNM’s continued influence in the form of actors active after 2012, in particular through 
Saakashvili’s presidency, suggested as one explanation for the low TJ implementation, did not 
prevent GD’s TJ implementation to the extent that its predecessors’ ideology did. 
Furthermore, this indicates that balance of power approaches or claims that UNM tried to 
effectively sabotage
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 GD’s TJ cannot explain the patterns analysed in Chapter 4.  
Another structural trait of UNM’s authoritarian legacy which has prevailed under GD is the 
government’s partial informal governance with members of the judiciary and law enforcement 
agencies (Anonymous G4, Kapanadze 2020). Actors from the old regime in the judiciary have 
continued to influence the post-2012 government’s TJ policies (Tsikarishvili 2020). In 2012 
and 2013, the Georgian government repeatedly announced its plan to achieve an overhaul of 
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 In 2012, Saakashvili strongly opposed Georgian Dream’s TJ concept, which impacted the de facto TJ 
implementation in the legal-judicial dimension. He vetoed the 2012 law draft on the release of political prisoners 
and related amnesty, which was, in his eyes, illegal. His decision was overruled by parliamentary speaker David 
Usupashvili. He, unsurprisingly, called prosecutions against former UNM officials politically motivated and 




the judiciary based on the explanation that it was still in the hands of Saakashvili (Popjanevski 
2015). Tsulukiani promised the set-up of the TSCMJ. Interestingly, in November 2013, the 
Ministry of Justice had already decided not to send the draft on the commission to the 
parliament, allegedly because of proclaimed financial difficulties. However, it did not yet 
fully abolish the idea publicly (Civil.ge 2013). The interlocutors agreed that after 2012, judges 
were strongly opposing TJ measures, in particular the vetting and set-up of the TSCMJ. They 
assessed that GD’s decisions on the implementation of TJ were influenced by this resistance 
from judges, who were powerful under Saakashvili and maintained their positions after 2012 
(Anonymous G1, Khoshtaria 2020, Gvilava 2020, Tsikarishvili 2020) and acquitted UNM 
officials who were put on trial. One interviewee underlined:  
“Now, when they [the judges] started acquittal, they started to show them [the government] 
their power. And of course, Georgia Dream […] became more and more frightened, because if they 
would have [acquitted] all former officials […] this […] [would have been] absolutely damaging for 
their political agenda” (Anonymous G1). 
Furthermore, Guram Imnadze (2020) stated:  
“[…] The restoration of fairness also meant that extremely quite active reforms should be 
implemented in [the] judiciary and those judges who were taking unlawful […] or unfair decisions 
should be dismissed. This clan inside this system sensed this kind of situation and they started dealing 
with GD [Georgian Dream]. At the beginning of the Georgian Dream's government, they started with 
acquittals in very sensitive cases […] against former high officials [who] […] have conducted some 
serious crimes. But this clan started acquitting them. So […] [GD] had double interest to control the 
judiciary for further interest, but also to control the judiciary to make decisions, proper decision on 
these cases. […] With [these] negotiation[s], this clan gained the power within the whole system. […] 
[I]n 2013, there […] [were] lots of judges, who were protesting these former procedures, Saakashvili's 
regime, and they had an alternative union of judges [and] they were trying to gain [real] […] 
independence [from] both parties. But then, this alternative union weakened because they had no 
power on these political proceedings, and individual judges saw that if they were not with [the] clan, 
there would be high risks of dismissal”.   
Judges in the Georgian Judicial Supreme Council and in the High Council of Justice who had 
served under Saakashvili – and thus were in the majority used to practices of direct 
negotiation with the executive branch – subsequently formed, as confirmed by a number of 
interviewees (Gvilava 2020, Imnadze G. 2020, Khoshtaria 2020, Tsikarishvili 2020), a so-
called ‘clan’, or a group of “interconnected people occupying high administrative or judicial 
positions in judiciary and controlling the judges through various formal or informal tools” 
(Tsikarishvili 2019). Most notable was probably Levan Murusidze, a “holdover of 
Saakashvili’s regime” and a “pillar of Saakashvili’s regime within the judiciary” 
(Khatiashvili, in Civil.ge 2015a) who presided over Girgvliani’s death case in 2006, and 




served as the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court from 2007 to 2017 (TI 2019a). Kakha 
Tsikarishvili elaborated:  
“[…] [One of the reasons] for not creating the commission for the miscarriages of justice, but 
it was an unofficial reason, was that the judiciary was against it, because the judges, they were afraid 
that their sentences would be revised, and the judges would be found in violation of [the] European 
Convention and Georgian law, and the judges would be guilty of miscarriages of justice. Judges, they 
were very afraid of that. […] So, the judges, they were categorically against it, and simultaneously 
there was ongoing negotiation with the leadership of judiciary and the government about, you know, 
negotiating about who is going to get what. […] The judges could have united themselves towards 
different angles, like restoring the trust of the judiciary, like recognizing the past. They could have 
made a statement to say, “We apologize to the public. We were not […] [independent] under 
Saakashvili. We apologize,” like judges in Chile. But, no, they reunited to survive, and their only way 
of survival was to make a deal with the government. So, they made a deal with the government and 
they survived. Not a deal with the public, but with the government” (Tsikarishvili 2020). 
While these developments will not be further analysed in detail, they correlate with the fact 
that the Georgian government after 2012 gradually rejected important TJ measures such as the 
TSCMJ, which had profound consequences on the lack of legal rehabilitation (box 1b) and 
financial and social compensation for victims (box 2b).  
Sargsyan’s authoritarian legacy on Armenia’s TJ process was very different from 
Saakashvili’s. The absence of a prevalent governmental political ideology, which was one of 
the factors that enabled the 2018 revolution (Zolyan 2019), seems to have contributed to a 
relatively broader scale of TJ implementation as a mechanism to resist the authoritarian past. 
As Morlino elaborated, authoritarian legacy does not just flow into new political orders in a 
linear away, but can cause a reverse effect. Asked about HKK’s political ideology, 
Iskandaryan (2020) stated  “[…] the political mission of Mr. Sargsyan was to survive […] for 
himself […] and for the state as well […]”.  He further elaborated, “What is the ideology of 
the Republican Party? Nothing. You do not have it. […]”. Kopalyan underlined that “[…] 
their [Kocharyan’s and Sargsyan’s] policies were not shaped by ideology, but rather, by a 
drive to consolidate illegitimate power through patronalistic politics” (Kopalyan 2018). In a 
2019 article, Zolyan pointed out that since 2016 the HKK had proclaimed a quasi-ideology, 
the so-called nation-army concept, which was introduced in the political discourse in 2016 
and in particular promoted by Vigen Sargsyan, the former head of Sargsyan’s administration. 
This concept, a combination of elements of defence and security, and the consolidation of the 
Armenian nation and army seemed to aim at “mitigating fallout from the April war […]” 
(Zolyan 2019: 5). However, it did not get institutionalized as a form of common belief. 
Sargsyan’s administration has, similar as Saakashvili, certainly introduced neoliberal policies 
(such as deregulation and privatization for the creation of a free market). The modern 




Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994 (Iskandaryan 2020) and the idea of national unity. Sargsyan 
was, unlike Saakashvili in Georgia, not Armenia’s state builder. While the face of 
neoliberalism in Georgia was the deregulation of the market related to the lack of social 
security, improvement of macroeconomic conditions and the aggressive dismissal of trade 
unions, neoliberalism in Armenia meant pervasive corruption and an oligarchic nexus 
between politics and economics as a principle of governance until 2018. In this year, the 
proclaimed ideological concept obviously failed, when Sargsyan’s government and 
governance were overthrown by mass protests that had developed counter-narratives to the 
old governmental practices. According to Iskandaryan, what followed afterwards was the new 
government’s mission to construct and build their own ideology ad hoc (ibid.). The absence of 
an innovative governmental ideology seems in fact to have initially positively contributed to 
Armenia’s relatively stronger TJ implementation.  
Famously, in May 2018, Pashinyan stated that his party Civil Contract would not follow any -
isms and consequently was “[…] not liberal, […] not centrist, […] not social democrat”, but a 
“civil party”. This lack of proclaimed ideology, however, certainly does not equalize with its 
de facto absence. According to Kopalyan (2018), Civil Contract’s ideology qualified as 
“aggressive centrism”. He described this as based on eight factors, with three of them being 
connected to Armenia’s TJ path: 1) reform of existing institutions and institutionalization of 
institutions, or “transitioning the country from patronalistic politics that [have] been highly 
personalized and corrupt to one of legitimate, legally-mandated institutions”; 2) a broad anti-
corruption campaign with economic and legal implications and the goal of recovering funds 
for the national budget that were previously embezzled; and 3) alleviating the culture of 
immunity for entrenched political or political-criminal actors and dismantling extra-legal 
structures (ibid.). Consequently, Armenia’s post-2018 TJ has been part of the government’s 
political ideology. It directly overlaps with several implemented measures, such as the 
prosecution of perpetrators, mostly members of HKK and related oligarchs; re-vitalization 
instead of overhaul of investigative and administrative structures; and the return of illegal 
financial assets and property. Symbolic-representative measures also fit with the logic of the 
government’s new ideological orientation, which acknowledges the past violence and 
demands a normative shift away from it.   
A second aspect that distinguishes Armenia’s from Georgia’s authoritarian legacy, is the 
aspect of informal governance as a structural heritage. Unlike in post-2012 Georgia, informal 




the new Armenian elites as something which has to be overcome to end the past culture of 
impunity. Unlike in post-2012 Georgia, where the government upheld informal practices to 
control political procedures, there has thus far not been evidence that the post-2012 
government would make use of such practices. While some critiques have interpreted 
Armenia’s rather low rate of sentenced perpetrators as a result of personal continuities in 
investigatory and prosecutorial services, it could also be seen as an ideological shift towards 
establishing a separation of institutional competences, where the executive branch can no 
longer influence prosecutorial and legal-criminal spheres as in the past. The fact that former 
very influential elites of the ancien régime, such as Sargsyan, Kocharyan and Tsarukyan, have 
not (yet) been sentenced, but faced fair and impartial trials, indicates that the post-2018 
government has functionally upheld what we might want to call formal governance. 
Pashinyan’s government’s belief in practices of the rule of law furthermore correlates with the 
setup of new TJ institutions, such as the anti-corruption office related to the recovery of 
financial assets and the planned fact-finding commission. Thus, the proclaimed and de-facto 
beliefs in formal and institutional governance are part of the counter-hegemony that the post-
2018 government has initiated as a contrast to HKK’s structural informal governance.  
5.2 Confrontational vs. corrective relations with civil society  
One factor which contributes to understanding the identified TJ patterns is the government’s 
responsiveness to and interaction with civil society. Whilst the observation that Georgian civil 
society was underdeveloped after 2012 (Kopalyan 2018) can ‘t be verified, this thesis states 
that it was more crucial that the post-2012 Georgian government gradually decreased its 
responsiveness to and cooperation with civil society actors who were proposing concrete TJ 
measures and demands. In Armenia, governmental response has been, particularly in the first 
one and a half years after the transition, rather cooperative. Nevertheless, civil society’s 
influence on governmental decision-making has stayed limited, and decreased during the 
second year after the revolution (Hovsepyan 2020).  
Civil society’s influence on the TJ process in Georgia was mostly channelled through the 
Coalition for an Independent and Transparent Judiciary, a coalition which united 31 local 
NGOs and OSF Georgia, a liberal network. It is crucial that civil society groups, in particular 
OSF and UNDP Georgia (Tsikarishvili 2020), prepared concrete draft laws on specific TJ 
mechanisms, precisely on the TSCMJ (GYLA 2013, Human Rights Center 2013) and the 
independent investigatory mechanism (OSF Georgia 2015). These, however, were ignored by 




seem not to have impacted the government’s TJ decisions since 2015. Guram Imnadze (2020) 
stated: “[…] there is [not] even a single active working process which give[s] us some […] 
realistic hope that […] the […] [TJ] process will be finalized with some tangible effects”. A 
lack of effective cooperation between government and civil society was already visible in 
2012: leading human rights NGOs, such as Article 42, GYLA, the Tbilisi Helsinki Group and 
the Human Rights Center (HRC) consulted the “working group on the deliberation of issues 
relating to the persons politically imprisoned or politically persecuted” in the Human Rights 
and Civil Integration Committee of Parliament, which was led by GD’s MP Eka Beselia, and 
developed a list of political prisoners – approximately 69 individuals (Elbakidze 2020). The 
final list was however unilaterally agreed on by the parliamentary working group. Because of 
these irregularities, two NGOs (Article 42 and GYLA) left the group (Jomarjidze 2012). In 
May 2014, when the TSCMJ was already formally abandoned, the Human Rights House 
Georgia, an umbrella human rights organization, organized a conference to advocate for the 
TSCMJ. Reportedly, Deputy Minister of Justice Sandro Baramidze first planned to attend, but 
then decided not to join (Human Rights Center 2014). Thus, not a single governmental 
representative showed up to hear civil society’s appeals. When in 2015 the Georgian 
government abolished the idea of the TSCMJ, GYLA called on the government to review its 
decision to analyse possible financial resources necessary for the initiation of TSCMJ, and “to 
work out the action plan with a view to issue compensations within reasonable terms and to 
direct its efforts for implementation of the plan” (GYLA 2013). This also remained without 
response.
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 The only TJ measure which was implemented due to civil society’s persistent 
advocacy was the SIS Georgia in 2018, which was designed without retrospective effect 
(Imnadze G. 2020). The Georgian government not only ignored most of civil society’s 
advocacy, but in some cases actively undermined alternative models. Mariam Jishkariani 
explained how GD actively discouraged international donors from financially prioritizing 
measures of TJ:    
“[…] And, again, our government, contacted our donor agencies and declared that they did not 
need any support on health care on rehabilitation because it is covered by the community healthcare 
system and many donors stopped [their] support to Georgia, like […] medical rehabilitation and 
psycho-social rehabilitation, not only […] [for] former prisoners […]” (Jishkariani 2020). 
Finally, the government did not make use of international consultancy, despite civil society’s 
efforts to connect the international non-profit organization International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) to the Georgian government. In 2015, ICTJ representatives were 
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 In addition, after announcements of abolishing the TSCMJ, at least 1032 prisoners went on hunger strike with 
some sewing their mouth as a form of protest, which again remained un-responded by the government and 




invited to Georgia by the OSF Georgia (Anonymous G1) and analysed the TJ situation with 
civil society and governmental representatives (Mshvenieradze 2020). In 2017, a final 
advisory report was published that assessed perspectives of TJ in Georgia (Varney 2017). 
However, the ICTJ did not advise the Georgian government on the development of a TJ 
strategy or related instruments (Anonymous G1 2020, Chugosvhili 2020). The ICTJ 
recommended avoiding “politicized vetting programs that exclude persons on the basis of 
membership or association in favor of competency-based and sector-driven vetting” (Varney 
2017: 29). It warned that flawed lustration and vetting processes could “destroy public 
confidence in institutions of the state, in addition to constituting serious violations of human 
rights”. Finally, by drawing on OSCE and UN recommendations, Varney and his team 
advised the Georgian government to assess staff competency case by case and to check 
“records for any history of human rights violations” (ibid.). None of these recommendations 
were put into practice. Thus, ICTJ’s policy recommendations did not impact governmental 
decision-making because of GD’s lack of responsiveness and reaction.  
The Armenian government has, in comparison to the Georgian one, so far reacted more 
cooperatively towards civil society actors. It has formed an alliance of more direct 
cooperation between local civil society and the ICTJ. In spring 2020, Liakhov (2020) stated,  
“[…] In general, the Pashinyan government is very receptive in engaging with NGOs because, 
let’s be real, many of the revolutionaries also come from that sector. Not only sort of, do they have the 
habitus that they care about what’s happening in civil society. […] They got personal connections to it. 
[…]” 
Zolyan (2020) stated that the government’s integration of specific forms of human rights 
violations (property rights violations and non-combatant deaths in the fact-finding 
commission) into the TJ agenda was influenced by civil society groups. The cooperation 
between civil society and the Armenian government has mainly been formed through OSF 
Armenia in Yerevan (Khachataryan 2020) and the Constructive Dialogue Network of 
Armenian CSOs, which unites 251 NGOs. A public hearing in May 2019 in the Armenian 
National Assembly signalized the cooperation between local NGOs (represented by the 
Armenian Lawyers’ Association), the government and the ICTJ. It was in fact one local NGO, 
the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, which enabled the partnership between the ICTJ and the 
Armenian government (Sakunts 2020). This is different from the Georgian case, where even if 
the ICTJ proposed a TJ strategy to the Georgian government, it did not supervise its TJ 
process (Chugoshvili 2020). In summer 2019, the Armenian government, precisely the MoJ, 




consultations on asset recovery and judicial reform, among other issues (ICTJ 2020a: 13). 
Moreover, based on ICTJ’s and local civil society’s recommendations, an inter-ministerial 
committee exploring TJ strategy and a parliamentary committee tasked to develop a strategy 
were set up (ibid.: 25). In March 2020, Armenian governmental officials and anti-corruption 
experts participated in a two-day conference called ‘Truth, Accountability and Asset 
Recovery: How Transitional Justice Can Fight Corruption’. This conference was organized by 
ICTJ with the support of Tunisia’s National Anti-Corruption Commission and the government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Carranza 2020). The ICTJ also formed more visible 
partnerships with local NGOs, assembled mostly by OSF Armenia, which conducted 
discussion events on vetting, anti-corruption and state capture. These were open to the general 
public and attended by governmental officials (Open Society Foundation Armenia 2019). 
Furthermore, NGO representatives have been part of working groups on specific TJ measures, 
for example, “On the Fact-Finding Commission” (Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Armenia 2019c). However, the government has not reacted responsively to certain civil 
society demands (Hovsepyan 2020). Investigations into non-combatant cases have, despite 
recommendations by civil society, remained selective, and sent materials which could foster 
the efficiency of investigations were reportedly ignored. As a consequence, Peace Dialogue, 
one of the member NGOs, which supports victims’ successors for years, announced its 
suspension from the group in June 2019 (Peace Dialogue NGO 2019b). Peace Dialogue 
argued that the IC “did not take any steps to detect numerous instances of illegality, 
omissions, fraud and official inaction that were uncovered” (ibid.). As a consequence, 
suspected perpetrators were not brought to justice. Finally, Artur Sakunts underlined that 
some NGOs wanted to include torture as part of Armenia’s TJ strategy, which led to a “[…] 
main disagreement with the government” (Sakunts 2020). 
5.3 Lack of international pressure vs. active response to external elites’ demands     
The external influence (pro- and anti-TJ pressure) on both countries varied in terms of TJ 
implementation and was lower in post-2012 Georgia than in post-2018 Armenia. External 
elites that visibly attempted to impact TJ in Georgia were the EU and the US; in Armenia, it 
had been the EU and Russia. Data collected indicates that none of the actors had coherent 
understandings of TJ in either of the two countries and none of the external actors directly 
opposed or enforced TJ. Unlike in Georgia, where the EU exercised little TJ pressure until 
2016 and the US had no impact, the Armenian government has from the beginning of the 




to the prohibition of some criminal-judicial TJ measures, the former vaguely fostered the 
implementation of TJ as a concept. Binary statements such as, Georgia was pro-EU and pro-
US and thus ‘more democratic’ and so more drawn to TJ, and Armenia was pro-Russian and 
critical towards the EU and thus ‘less democratic’ and not drawn to TJ, are, as data proves, 
factually wrong and can’t help explaining the TJ patterns.   
The research could not find any evidence that the EU impacted Georgia’s TJ path until 2016. 
Shortly after the 2012 transition and in 2013 and 2014, EU officials exercised rhetorical 
pressure on the Georgian government concerning the criminal-judicial dimension and warned 
that selective and retributive justice would endanger domestic democratic stability. However, 
the EU only finalized its own comprehensive framework on TJ in 2015 (European Union 
External Service 2015), two years after its first announcement by then High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (Council of the European 
Union 2012: 21). During and shortly after the transition, the Georgian government was 
consulted on further development of “[…] how  to  remedy  problems  of  the  past and  to  lay  
the  ground  for  a  future  genuine  human  rights  culture” (Hammarberg 2013: 2) by the EU 
Special Adviser on Constitutional and Legal Reform and Human Rights in Georgia Thomas 
Hammarberg, whom the EU sent to Georgia in 2013 for one and a half years (Chugoshvili 
2020). In Hammarberg’s final report, he stressed the importance of a “comprehensive 
description of what really happened in the past which is factually correct […]” (Hammarberg 
2013: 7). He recommended investigations into violations of freedom of expression in 2007, 
2009 and 2011, which had contributed to “[…] a climate of impunity” (ibid.: 22) and warned 
the government not to implement politically motivated prosecutions or “selective justice” 
(ibid.: 7). While detailed recommendations for the future development of human rights culture 
(in particular on social and economic rights) have, as interlocutors stated (Anonymous A1, 
Chugoshvili 2020) positively impacted human rights policy development in Georgia, there is 
no evidence that the EU’s consultancy influenced the government’s TJ trajectory.  
The lack of efficient impetus for TJ also holds true for the Venice Commission (European 
Commission for Democracy through Law), an advisory body of the Council of Europe. After 
2012, the Georgian government requested the opinion of the commission on two specific TJ 
measures: the release of political prisoners (Venice Commission 2013a) and the set-up of the 
TSCMJ (ibid. 2013b). The Venice Commission underlined that “any decision on the 
determination of the criminal charges against plaintiffs having suffered a miscarriage of 




examination of cases should be accompanied by a wider reform of the judiciary to strengthen 
its independence and impartiality. One interviewee, who was closely working with the 
government in 2012, stated  
“Actually it [the law on the TSCMJ] was criticized by the Venice Commission, but […] the 
government did not care very much about the Venice Commission, but then […] suddenly, the 
Minister of Justice, she came out on TV and she said, “No, actually, I care about the Venice 
commission. I think that they are not in favour of dismissing the active court presidents, so I changed 
my mind” (Anonymous 2020).  
As mentioned, TJ as a foreign policy concept became part of the EU’s reality only four years 
after the beginning of Georgia’s transition. Until then, TJ as an idea had already been rejected 
among the Georgian elite. Furthermore, TJ implementation was not part of the EU-Georgia 
Association Agreement (AA), including the Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA), which was signed in 2014 and has been in force since July 2016. Consequently, the 
EU lacked leverage to pressure the Georgian elite to initiate TJ. While the AA does not 
contain any note on TJ or the restoration of justice, it still underlines the commitment towards 
the UDHR as a guiding principle, and that the “respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedom […] [would] guide all cooperation on freedom, security and justice” (Eur-Lex 2020, 
Article 13, 3). Moreover, the AA explicitly references the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) principles, which guarantee the right to work (Article 229; see also articles 235, 239, 
349). Ghvinianidze stated that,  
“Now, we have th[e] agreement with the EU, which […] includes some labour […] rights and 
[labour] policies and also some social economic rights, but mainly it's focused on labour issues, and 
especially its biggest part which is the DCFTA is trade relations between EU and Georgia. This 
chapter, which is quite crucial in the EU-Georgia association agenda, […] includes labour issues and 
improvement of labour rights legislations and policies. So Ivanishvili and his government were 
responsible for implementing some policies. So, [the] EU agenda was the main source to trigger some 
reforms in labour legislation and they did some changes. They established labour inspections and 
changed labour code and so on. […] as I said, one of the main source of their political will, it was not 
their leftist ideology or their understanding of basic human rights, but […] it was the EU Association 
Agenda and quite concrete messages from the EU officials and you have to deliver something because 
as I said, the labour issues are part of the trade agreement. This is the big basic difference between […] 
[the old and] this new government […]”. 
Another actor, the US, has, despite considerable leverage, not exercised meaningful impact on 
the post-2012 TJ implementation. Apart from single statements, such as by then U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon, who visited 
Georgia in November 2012 shortly after the transition and underlined that the new 
government should avoid selective justice and politically motivated prosecutions (Antidze 




government in fact exercised pressure so that Saakashvili would not get prosecuted 
immediately. She stated,   
“[…] So they didn’t want him [Ivanishvili] to go too far. So he had to make compromise with 
international pressure on him and […] keep National Movement as the oppositional party. This is the 
most widespread social public opinion about the issue […]”.  
Unlike in the Georgian case, where the EU only had very limited influence on the TJ process 
and back in 2012 did not even have a TJ framework, the EU has, despite having 
comparatively less broad leverage than in Georgia, been more involved in the post-2018 
Armenian TJ process. The EU has formed partnerships with local NGOs such as the 
Armenian Lawyers’ Association (ALA) and hosted civil society-governmental public debates 
on TJ implementation (ALA 2019b), which have been attended by governmental members. 
As part of its Commitment to Constructive Dialogue program, which offers financial and 
technical assistance, the EU has funded the ALA’s research programs enhancing strategies for 
implementing TJ in Armenia (ALA 2019c). The EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced 
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed in November 2017 before the revolution, went 
into force in June 2018 and has, unlike in Georgia, contributed to bringing certain 
governmentally proposed TJ actions into reality. The EU has financially supported the 
development of the Armenian government’s TJ strategy (European Commission 2020a) and 
Armenia’s anti-corruption efforts, such as the establishment of the anti-corruption court and 
Armenia’s vetting process in the judiciary (European Commission 2020b).    
Finally, Russia’s influence on Armenia’s TJ strategy has been quite prominently discussed in 
the framework of Russia’s foreign policy goals and its mission to prevent democratization in 
its so-called ‘near abroad’. Accessible data shows that there have in fact been Russian 
attempts to limit TJ implementation, but its de facto influence stayed limited until September 
2020. Sakunts underlined that the Kremlin was “very concerned with the realization of 
transitional justice in Armenia” (Sakunts 2020) and that it had “a restrictive meaning” on the 
process. Some prosecutions have been complicated or neglected because of Russia’s 
uncooperative actions. For example, Moscow refused to extradite a row of prosecuted 
individuals, including the former Minister of Defence and former Chief Military Inspector 
Mikael Harutyunyan, former president of the Football Federation of Armenia Ruben 
Hayrapetyan and Chief Compulsory Enforcement Officer of Judicial Acts Mihran Poghosyan 
(Appendix I). However, while it is certainly true that the Russian government tried to prohibit 
prosecutions of individuals and dislikes that former Armenian president Kocharyan, Russian 




Khachaturov was dismissed from his position as CSTO Secretary General, prosecutions 
against these individuals have been ongoing, and TJ as a concept has continued to be 
implemented. In summer 2020, Iskandaryan stated that,   
“[…] sure you had ties between Kocharyan and Russia, he is an important person, but a lot of 
people in the media say that this is the core of the problem and I do not think so. I am not a supporter 
of such a level of personalization of politicians, not like that. It does not work like that. I do not think 
that for Russia it really interested in what type of regime you have in Armenia. […]”.  
This estimation was also shared by Mazmanyan, who underlined that Russia did not have an 
institutional interest in Armenia’s TJ as long as changes did not trigger essential interests 
(Mazmanyan 2020), which are first and foremost trade and geopolitical relations. Russia’s 
comparatively higher leverage and linkage in Armenia than that of the EU has become 
frequently visible: the Armenian government showed multiple times after 2018 that it did 
consider Russia’s interests in Armenia. In 2018, Armenia’s State Revenue Committee raided 
the offices of the Russian state-owned South Caucasus Railway (SCR), which had become a 
major investment for Armenia in 2008, as part of a tax evasion and started investigations into 
the company’s investments within the last 10 years. In 2019, it became public that Russian 
Railways, which owns SCR, considered terminating the contract, as it has, according to 
Russia’s Deputy Minister of Transport Vladimir Tokarev, created unfound accusations and 
conditions in which the SCR could not work. At the beginning of September 2020, both 
governments announced that they had settled the disagreement (Caucasus Watch 2020a). The 
investigations have not led to any charges. While the thesis cannot assess the investigations, it 
at least can be observed that there is a correlation between Russian pressure and developments 
in the legal-judicial dimension. However, as shown, it has not influenced the TJ process in 
other dimensions.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion  
This thesis aimed to illustrate and understand the different patterns of transitional justice 
observed in post-2012 Georgia and post-2018 Armenia.  
Derived from a combination of Pettai/Pettai (2015) and Sharp’s (2014) work, its theoretical 
framework proved to be useful in drawing on measures from the four dimensions of legal-
judicial, political-administrative, socio-economic and symbolic-representative TJ. The 
analysis showed that, since 2018, Armenia has implemented more TJ measures in all four 
dimensions than Georgia has since 2012. Major differences in implementation fell within the 




The Georgian government did not implement any redistributive measures after 2012. It has 
not ensured meaningful restitution of property, examined processes of corruption under 
UNM’s governance or established measures that can profoundly secure the people’s social 
rights. Furthermore, GD has not apologized to the Georgian population for its past crimes to 
signal a meaningful shift away from a violent past and build the foundations for societal 
healing. Victims of human rights violations have not found any role in the TJ process. This 
correlates with the fact that a fact-finding commission, which could have served as an 
important institution to collect information about past rights violations, was never established, 
which led to a failure of legal and political rehabilitation. Consequently, it is not fully clear to 
this day whose human rights were violated and to what extent. Post-2012, TJ measures 
initiated by GD focused on retribution and the prosecution of perpetrators – which is a crucial 
element of TJ – but this was associated with many new procedural rights violations, which 
didn’t rebuild trust in the judiciary. The persistence of certain powerful judges who served 
under Saakashvili and were linked to grave human rights violations further strained the TJ 
process.  
Whilst the Armenian government has implemented more TJ measures than its Georgian 
counterpart, the scale of implementation has remained low. Only victims and victims’ 
successors in cases related to 1 March 2008 obtained legal rehabilitation and compensation. 
Multiple investigations and prosecutions have been conducted on main cases and addressed 
central actors; however, they have remained without result. TJ measures remain weak with 
regard to the political-administrative dimension: old prosecutors continue to serve, and vetting 
has been introduced in a soft form. Most implemented measures fall into in the symbolic-
representative dimension: the head of state has apologized to the Armenian people for old 
political and economic crimes and commemorated those who suffered or died as a result of 
this violence. Furthermore, a clear normative shift away from the ancién regime has taken 
place.   
Based on an own theoretical model (p. 19), the thesis attempted to understand the different 
patterns of TJ implementation by taking into account the following factors: the influence of 
civil society, external incentives and the prevalence of an authoritarian legacy. Due to its 
relative simplicity, the model is limited since it can only explain a comparatively relatively 
larger TJ scale; thus, it operates on an ordinal scale, not an interval scale. The research shows 
that the implementation of TJ cannot be traced to a single factor; rather, it is the result of a 




argument developed by the thesis is that Georgia’s prevailing authoritarian neoliberal legacy, 
which was not abolished in a popular uprising but survived through electoral change, 
persisted after the 2012 transition. Due to GD’s lack of cooperation with civil society – which 
elaborated clear TJ measures – and the absence of positive external pressure, very few TJ 
measures were implemented. Despite the relatively high number of selective prosecutions that 
took place (which by itself is not an indicator of TJ), the ideological and institutional legacy 
of the ancién regime has endured until the present day. One central reason for today’s 
dysfunctionality of Georgia’s judicial system can be found in the lack of vetting and 
investigation of old legal elites. The Georgian government considers engaging in negotiations 
and compromising with judges who belong to an old authoritarian system to be more 
beneficial than holding them accountable. Despite the fact that civil society actors, in 
particular NGOs such as GYLA, Human Rights Center and Transparency International 
Georgia, have repeatedly called on these judges to resign and on the government to initiate 
transparency and accountability measures, the government has remained inactive. As reported 
in the research, the government has even discredited some civil society actors and undermined 
their access to monetary resources or compensation. Thus, Georgia’s post-2012 approach can 
best be described as ‘non-transitional’ TJ; a ‘transition’ in the sense of establishing a human 
rights regime has not yet been achieved. Single measures, such as the unit in the Prosecutor’s 
Office on the return of illegally confiscated property and the slight improvements of labour 
rights since 2015, resulted from continued pressure from civil society and external incentives 
through an Association Agreement with the European Union.  
Compared to the post-2012 Georgian government, the post-2018 Armenian government has 
implemented more TJ measures, though at a low scale. The differences between Georgia's and 
Armenia’s TJ implementation can be traced to the lack of a prevailing innovative 
authoritarian legacy, relatively greater state-civil society cooperation and positive external 
influences in Armenia. Although it has not been explicitly named, the new government has 
started to formulate a new dominant ideology, state centrism, that aims to develop strong 
political institutions and end the alienation between the government and the population, which 
was made possible by state capture under the country’s former elites. This logic might explain 
the implementation of symbolic-representative and socio-economic measures and the less 
retributive measures taken so far. The implementation of TJ had, in fact, become central to 
institutionalizing revolutionary politics and completing the transition in Armenia. However, 
these attempts were halted after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. Additionally, the initially 




functioned as a transmission belt between the Armenian government and the international 
community. Unlike its Georgian counterpart, the Armenian government was consulted by the 
ICTJ due to an initiative from a local NGO. The ICTJ seems to have influenced the 
government’s strategic thinking and provided direct technical assistance to establish a law on 
asset recovery and the fact-finding commission. However, the government’s failure to 
fruitfully collaborate with civil society and consider information provided by the investigative 
commission on the case of non-combatant fatalities also demonstrates the limits of 
government-civil society cooperation. Moreover, the Armenian government’s comparatively 
greater TJ implementation was influenced by the EU’s initial more active involvement and TJ 
leverage within the analysed time period. Whilst the EU’s foreign policy strategy suffered a 
profound blow after the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the EU lost leverage in Armenia, there is 
still potential for the Armenian government to further implement planned reforms. Certainly, 
Russia’s leverage has increased, which could further negatively influence the TJ process, 
however doesn’t have to mean the end of TJ in Armenia. As shown, Russia’s de-facto 
influence on TJ in Armenia was one-dimensional.   
It remains crucial to establish the planned fact-finding commission in order to (1) provide a 
legal and political assessment of the past, (2) understand whose human rights were violated 
and to what extent, (3) compensate those whose rights were violated and (4) introduce 
additional structural changes to prevent past violations from recurring. The second Nagorno-
Karabakh War (which was not part of the present analysis but should be analysed in future 
research, particularly in relation to TJ) left thousands of Armenian dead or injured and created 
an existential crisis for Armenian state- and nationhood. The war decreased trust in the 2018 
administration, which came to power with the task of restoring truth and justice. However, it 
is not the dissertation’s task to make any assumptions about the future of TJ in Armenia. It 
should solely be reiterated that TJ is a process-oriented concept, which often lasts for decades, 
and can always be implemented as a form of ‘post-transitional justice’ (p. 9). Despite the 
current political crisis in Armenia, the potential to introduce basic social security, continue 
endeavours to return financial assets that were illegally obtained by old elites, prosecute those 
who committed crimes and compensate and remember those whose rights were violated 
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going (suspended in 
September 2020), 
resumed in January 
2021  
2018: Violent overthrow of the 




Not sentenced, on trial since 
2019   
Kharatyan (2019), 
Reuters (2020), OC 
Media (2021)  
2 Serzh Sargsyan  
 
Former President (2008-
2018) and PM (2018) of 
Armenia, HHK   
2019-today, trial on-
going    
2019: Embezzlement of one 
million USD  (‘Diesel affair’) 
Not sentenced, on trial since 
January 2020 
Hetq (2020a) 
3 Aleksandr (Sashik) 
Sargsyan  
S. Sargsyan’s brother, 
MP (2003-2012), HHK  
2018-today, prosecution 
on-going    
2019: Fraud on large scale  
 
Not sentenced, released on 
bail    
OC Media (2018)  
4 Narek A. Sargsyan 
 
S. Sargsyan’s nephew 
(extradited from Czech 
Republic to Armenia in 
2019) 
2018-today, trial on-
going    
2018:  Illegal acquisition and 
possession of weapons, arms, 
explosives and illicit drug 
trafficking 
Not sentenced, plead guilty 
(1 December 2020) 
Azatutyun (2020) 




on-going   
2019: Attempted murder (in 
2007) and illegal arms possession 
Not sentenced, prosecutor 
asked courts for seven years 
of prison  
Caucasian Knot 
(2020a) 
6 Levon (Lyova) 
Sargsyan 
 
S. Sargsyan’s brother, 
MP, HHK  
2018-today, prosecution 
on-going (wanted since 
August 2018, extradited 
from Russia to Armenia 
in August 2020)   
2018: Embezzlement, illicit 
enrichment, false asset declaration 
2019: Abuse of authority during 
construction of North-South 
highway  
Not sentenced  Armenpress (2019b),  




2018: Illegal enrichment and tax 
evasion 
Not sentenced Special Investigation 
Service of the 
Republic of Armenia 
(2018a) 




2018: Illegal enrichment and tax 
evasion 
Not sentenced  Special Investigation 
Service of the 
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9 Vladimir Gasparyan Former head of the 
Military Police 
Department (1997-
2011), former chief of 
Police (2011 to 2018) 
2019-today, prosecution 
on-going  
2018: Embezzlement on an 
especially large scale from state 
funds   
2019: Abuse of power by tasking 
three servicemen as L. and A. 
Sargsyan’s drivers  
Not sentenced, April 2020: 
Court ruled on the payment 
of approx. 1,7 million USD 
to former owner of his house   
Hetq (2019b), 
News.am (2020)   
10 Mikael Minasyan Sargsyan’s son-in-law, 
former Armenian 
ambassador to the Holy 
See, to Sovereign 







2020: Illegal enrichment, money 
laundering  and the inclusion of 
false data in the income tax return 
Not sentenced, court has 
ruled arrest in 2020 
Arminfo (2020)  
11 Ara Minasyan  M. Minasyan’s father, 
former head of a 





2019: Embezzlement of hospital 
funds of around 1,8 million USD  
Not sentenced, court has 
ruled arrest in 2019 
Massispost (2019b) 
12 Vachagan Ghazaryan 
  
Former head of the NSS 
(2013-2017),  
Sargsyan’s former 
bodyguard   
2018-today, prosecution 
on-going  
2018: Illegal enrichment and tax 
evasion 
2020: Embezzlement of large sum 
 
June 2018: Arrested, released 
on bail of around two million 
USD 
February 2020: All charges 
dropped  
August 2020: not sentenced, 
investigation on-going  
 
Mamulyan (2020),  
Arka (2020b)  
13 Mikael Harutyunyan 
 




former Minister of 
Defense (2007-2008) 
July 2018-today, wanted 
in Armenia (currently in 
Russia, extradition 
refused by Russia)  
2018: Violent overthrow of the 






Not sentenced Caucasian Knot 
(2018), Armenpress 
(2019d)  
14 Yuri Khachaturov 
 
Former Chief of the 
General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of 
Armenia (2008-2016), 
July 2018-today, trial 
on-going    
2018: Violent overthrow of the 




Not sentenced, on trial 
(August 2020) 
Special Investigation 
Service of the 
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former secretary of 
CSTO (2017-2018) 
(2020a) 
15 Seyran Ohanyan Former Minister of 
Defense  (2008-2016)  
2018-today, banned 
from leaving Armenia, 
trial awaited  
2018: Violent overthrow of the 




2020: Embezzlement of more 
than two million USD  
Not sentenced  RFE/RL (2020) 
16 Armen Gevorgyan Former Secretary of the 
NSS (2016-2018), 
former deputy PM 
(2018), HHK  
2018-today, trial 
awaited  
2018: Violent overthrow of the 
constitutional order (March 1
st
 
2008), large scale money 
laundering and bribery   
Not sentenced  Special Investigation 
Service of the 
Republic of Armenia 
(2019) 








(currently probably in 
Moscow) 
2019: Abuse of official power, 
inciting fraud and the 
concealment of a grave crime 
Not sentenced, arrest warrant 
issued by SIS in 2019  
Hetq (2019a)  
18 Manvel Grigoryan  
(† November 2020) 
Former Chairman of the 
Yerkrapah Volunteer 
Union (1999-2020), 
former MP (2012-2018) 
June 2018-November 
2020 
2018: Illegal possession of 
weapons and ammunition, tax 
evasion, waste of state funds and 
embezzlement of property 
2019-2020: in detention until 
January 2020 (released on 
medical grounds), 
prosecution on-going until 
his death  
OC Media (2018c), 
Caucasian Knot 
(2020b)  
19 Gagik Khachatryan  Former head of 
Armenia’s Revenue 
Committee (2008-2014), 
former Minister of 
Finance (2014-2016) 
2019-today, in detention 
until October 2020  
2019: Abuse of power, 
embezzlement or squandering, 
taking the bribe of 22.4 million 
USD (with son Gu. Khachatryan)  
In detention from August 
2019-October 2020, released 
on bail in October 2020 
Aysor (2020b),  
Mejlumyan (2020)  
20 Gurgen Khachatryan G. Khachatryan’s son, 
Chairman of Ucom LLC 
(2012-today), co-
founder of Galaxy 
Group of Companies 
(2006-today)  
2020-today, wanted, 
location unknown  
2020: Money laundering and 
embezzlement of three million 
USD, receiving bribe of 22.4 
million USD (with father Ga. 
Khachatryan) 
Arrest ruled by court in May 
2020 
Jam News (2020) 
21 Gagik Tsarukyan  
 
Founder and former 
leader of PAP (2006-
2020), business tycoon, 
founder and owner of 
June 2020-today, 
prosecution on-going  
2020: Vote buying during 2017 
parliamentary elections, illegal 
gambling business, organising a 
fraudulent land transfer scheme 
In detention from September 
to November 2020   
Al Jazeera (2020), 
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Multi Group holding 
22 Sedrak Arustamyan 
 
CEO of Multi Group 
holding 
April 2020-today 2020: Giving 22.4 million USD 
bribe to the former Armenian 
finance minister Ga. Khachatryan 
In detention since April 2020 Caucasus Watch 
(2020b) 
23 Ruben Hayrapetyan  
 
Former president of the 
Football Federation of 
Armenia (2002-2018), 
former MP (2003-2012), 
HHK 
December 2019-today, 
wanted (currently in 
Russia, extradition 
refused)  
2019: Official negligence, large-
scale appropriation, falsification 
of documents, and abuse of power  
Arrest demanded by 
Armenian courts, rejected by 
Russia in July 2020  
Aysor (2020c)  




mayor of Yerevan 
(2001-2003) 
August 2020-today, in 
detention   
No former charges yet, suspected 
for giving corruption and giving 
privileged treatment to companies 
In detention since August 
2020 
Massispost (2020b) 
25 Mihran Poghosyan 
 
Chief Compulsory 




(currently probably in 
Russia, extradition 
refused) 
2019: Money laundering of 
around 1,2 million USD and 
abuse of official authority 
Arrest demanded by 
Armenian law enforcement 
agencies, extradition refused 
by Russian authorities  
Armenpress (2019d), 
Hetq (2020b) 
26 Vigen Sargsyan Former Minister of 
Defense (2016-2018),  





(currently in the United 
States of America) 
No charges, solely investigations 
and criminal proceedings 
launched, without result  
- Nalbandian (2019b), 
Sargsyan (2020)  
27 Vahagn Harutyunyan 
 




(currently probably in 
Russia)  
2018: Abuse of power, resulting 
in negligent grave consequences 
and abuse of power, accompanied 
by violence, the use of weapons 
or special equipment related to 
events of 1
st
 March 2008 
Arrested in Moscow in 
March 2019, released the 
next day, no extradition  
Armenpress (2020b), 
Lragir (2020)  
28 Gagik Beglaryan 
 
Former mayor of 
Yerevan (2009-2011), 




might be hiding in the 
Netherlands) 
2019: Illegal privatization of a 
kindergarten, property rights 
violations, abuse of power  
Arrest demanded by 
Armenian law enforcement 
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2019-today 2019: Fraud/legitimizing illegally 
obtained income in the North-
South Road Corridor project 
Since October 2019: In 
detention  
Hetq (2019c)  
30 Hovik Abrahamyan Former Prime Minister 
(2014-2016) 
2018-today, prosecution 
on-going   
2018: Illegal participation in 
entrepreneurial activity, threat to 
shut down a mine company and 
abuse of power  
Not sentenced Sargsyan (2020)  






2019: Abuse of power related to 
property rights violations  
Arrest demanded by 
Armenian law enforcement 
agencies  
Sargsyan (2020)  
32 Samvel Mayrapetyan Businessman  2018-today, prosecution 
on-going (location 
unknown, Germany 
until spring 2020)  
2018: Facilitation of bribery, 
money laundering of property by 
criminal means (in Northern 
Avenue, among others) 
2020: Tax evasion of 12 million 
USD  
2020: Arrest warrant issued 
by Armenian law 
enforcement agencies  
Sargsyan (2020), Arka 
(2020c)  
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No.  Name of person Position/Affiliation  Year/date of start of 
prosecution/Status of 
prosecution  
Criminal charge(s)  Criminal sentence(s)  Source  
1 Mikheil Saakashvili 
 
Former president 
(2003-2013), UNM  
July 2014 – today, 
wanted (currently in 
Ukraine) 
2014:  
July: Abuse of power/Violent dispersal of 
November 2007 protests, unlawful raiding of 
Imedi TV by riot police and illegal take-over 
of property owned by Badri (Arkadi) 
Patarkatsishvili, organizing attack on Valeri 
Gelashvili; August: Embezzlement of 8,8 
million GEL of state funds  
2018:  
January: Abuse of power/Cover up of 
evidence related to the 2006 murder case of 
Sandro Girgvliani; illegal pardoning of 
employees of the MoIA related to Girgvliani 
case; June: Abuse of power/Cover up of 
evidence related to the 2005 beating of  
Gelashvili 
January 2018: Three years 
of prison in absentia  
June 2018: Six years of 
prison in absentia  
Vartanyan/Herszenhorn 
(2014), Agenda.ge 
(2014c), OC Media 
(2018b), Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty 
(2018a,b)  
2 Ivane Merabishvili 
  





May 2013 – February 
2020 
2014:  
February: Abuse of power/Dispersal of  
protests on 26 May 2011; misspending 5,2 
million GEL from state employment 
program; bribing of voters   
October: Cover up of evidence of the murder 
case of Sandro Girgvliani and the physical 
abuse of Gelashvili 
February 2014: Four years 
and six months of prison; 
five years of prison 
October 2014:  Three years 
of prison 
Released from prison in 
February 2020 
Agenda.ge (2014d), 
Civil.ge (2014), OC 
Media (2020e) 
3 Bachana (Bacho) 
Akhalaia  
 
Former head of 
Penitentiary 
Department of 
Ministry of Justice of 
Georgia (2005-
November 2012 –
today, wanted (current 
location unknown) 
2013:  
Usage of excessive force in suppressing a 
2006 prison riot (with Chakua, M. Kardava, 
Charabadze) 
2014:  
2013: Four years of prison 
(pardoned by Saakashvili) 
October 2014: Seven years 
and six month of prison in 
absentia 
Agenda.ge (2014a, e, 
2018b) 
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Minister of Defense 
(2009-2012), former 
Minister of Internal 
Affairs (2012), UNM 
Torture and ill-treatment of prisoners  
2018:  
Abuse of power and organizing sexual 
violence and torture of Sergo Tetradze  
April 2018: Nine years of 
prison in absentia 
4 David (Dato) 
Akhalaia  
 
Former head of the 
Constitutional 
Security 
of the MoIA (CSD), 
former Minister of 
Defense, UNM  




Abuse of power, murder in three cases and 
fabrication of evidence  
2018:  
Murder of Sandro Girgvliani and kidnapping 
of individuals  
December 2016: Twelve 
years of prison in absentia  
October 2018: Seven and a 
half years of prison in 
absentia   
Agenda.ge (2016b) 
5 Giorgi Ugulava  
 




August 2013 – 2020  2015:  
Misspending public funds, embezzlement of 
more than 48 million GEL to create fictional 
jobs 
2020:  
Misusage of public funds  
September 2015: Four and 
a half years of prison, 
released in January 2017  
February 2020: Three years 
of prison (pardoned by 
president Zourabishvili in 
May 2020) 
Civil.ge (2015b), 
Agenda.ge (2020b)  









Illegal raid of Imedi TV in 2007 
2017:  
Illegal confiscation of Akura vinery in 
Kakheti  
Abuse of authority in Cartu Bank case 
2020:  
Illegal closure of Iberia TV  
May 2017: Two years of 
prison 
December 2019: Five years 
and three months of prison 
in absentia  










Embezzlement of coupons of a Georgian oil 
company  
2018:  
Murder of Sergo Tetradze  
June 2013: Six years and 
nine months of prison in 
absentia (pardoned by 
Saakashvili in October 
2013) 
April 2018: Four years of 
prison in absentia 
Trend.az (2013), 
Agenda.ge (2018b) 
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8 Shota Khizanishvili  
 
Former deputy  
Minister of Internal 
Affairs and deputy 
head of the 
Department of 
Constitutional 
Security (CSD) of 
MoIA  
2013-2017   2012: Illegal gain of private information  2016: Detention until 2017, 
then released  
Caucasian Knot (2017)  
9 Levan Kardava Former deputy head 
of the Constitutional 
Security department 
(CSD) of the MoIA  
2013-today, wanted  
(location unknown) 
2014:  
Murder in three cases (with D. Akhalaia, 
Dgebaduze, Mazmishvili) 
2020:  
Abuse of authority and illegal detention of a 
police officer in the case of Patarkatsishvili 
October 2014: Eleven years 
of prison 
July 2020: Seven years and 





10 Giorgi Dgebuadze Former official at the 
Constitutional 
Security department 
(CSD) of the MoIA 
2013-today 2016:  
Abuse of authority and murder in three cases 
(with D. Akhalaia, L. Kardava, Mazmishvili) 
2020:  
Abuse of authority and illegal detention of a 
police officer in the case of Patarkatsishvili 
2016: Nine years of prison 
July 2020:  Seven years and 
six months of prison  
Agenda.ge (2016c, 
2020c)  
11 David Kokiashvili Constitutional 
Security department 
(CSD) of the MoIA 
2020-today 2020:  
Abuse of authority and illegal detention of a 
police officer in the case of Patarkatsishvili 
July 2020: One year and six 
months of prison  
Agenda.ge (2020c) 
12 Ilia Gamgebeli Constitutional 
Security department 
(CSD) of the MoIA 
2020-today 2020:  
Abuse of authority and illegal detention of a 
police officer in the case of Patarkatsishvili 
July 2020: One year and six 
months of prison 
Agenda.ge (2020c) 






Abuse of power, torture of Sergo Tetradze, 
humiliation of a person, coercion and putting 
a person in an inhumane position, liability of 
perpetrator and accomplice in torture, 
liability of perpetrator and accomplice in 
sexual abuse under violence and illegal 
imprisonment, organization of prison riot 
2014: Nine years of prison  Civil.ge (2016)   
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(with B. Akhalaia, Chakua, Charbadze) 
14 Alexandre 
Mukhadze 
Former director of 




Torture and deprivation of liberty of Sergo 
Tetradze 
2016:  
Torture and deprivation of property of a 
businessman  
2014: Nine years of prison 
in absentia 
2016: No other criminal 
penalty, because of 2014 
sentence 
Agenda.ge (2014a), 
Georgia Today (2016), 
TV1  (2016) 
15 Giorgi Mazmishvili Former Minister of 




Murder of three individuals (with D. 
Akhalaia, L. Kardava, G. Dgebuadze, 
Chakua), abuse of power and falsifying 
evidence  





16 Giorgi Udesiani Former Deputy 





Torture and deprivation of property of a 
businessman  
October 2016: Two months 
of prison  
Georgia Today (2016), 
TV1 (2016)  
17 Oleg Patsatsia Former employee at 




Torture and deprivation of liberty of Sergo 
Tetradze 
2014: Nine years of prison Caucasian Knot (2014) 
18 Viktor Kacheishvili Former employee at 




Torture and deprivation of liberty of Sergo 
Tetradze  
2014: Nine years of prison Agenda.ge (2014a)  
19 Davit Kezerashvili Former Minister of 
Finance (2004-2006), 
former Minister of 
Defense (2006-2008) 
2012-today, wanted 
(extradition refused in 
France 2014 and in 
Great Britain in 2016) 
2014:  
Embezzlement of 12,3 million USD, 
smuggling of ethyl spirit from Ukraine to 
Georgia between 2007-2012, 
misappropriation of state funds and money 
laundering  





Minister of Internal 
Affairs 
2016-today, (currently 
probably in Ukraine)  
2016:  
Dispersal of 26 May 2011 protests 
2016: Pre-trial detention, 
no further information on 
prosecution   
Agenda.ge (2016d)  
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21 Davit Chakua  
 




from Germany to 
Georgia in July 2020  
2014:  
Organization of 2006 prison riot (with B. 
Akhalaia, M. Kardava, Charbadze),  
Torture of prisoners, abuse of office, 
kidnapping of an individual  




Former Minister of 
energy (2007-2012) 
and finance (2012) 
2012-2012  2012:  
Accepting bribes, falsifying documents, and 
engaging in illegal commercial activities 
2012: Released on bail, fine 
of approximately 18.000 
USD  




Former mayor of 
Tbilisi (2004-2005), 
former minister of 





2012-2014  2014:  
Misspending of public funds to the advantage 
of UNM 
2014: Released on bail, fine 
of approximately 30.000 
USD 
Matusiak (2014)  
24 Geronti Alania Former employee in 
the MoIA  
2014 – today 
(imprisoned) 
2014: Torture   2014: October: Four years 
and six months of prison 
Agenda.ge (2014d) 
25 Valerian Metreveli Former employee in 
the MoIA  
2014-2018 
(imprisoned) 
Murder of Sandro Girgvliani 2014: October: Four years 
and six months of prison 
Agenda.ge (2014d) 
26 Oleg Melnikov Former employee in 
the MoIA 
2013-2014 2013: Involvement in the murder of Sandro 
Girgvliani  
Plead guilty, 2013-2014: 
Prison sentence, plea 
bargaining agreement led to 
release  
Democracy & Freedom 
Watch (2014) 
27 Alexander Ninua  Former head of the 
Procurement 





2015: Embezzlement of state funds (with 
Kezerashvili)  
2014: Three years of prison Georgian Democracy 
Initiative (2015)  




2018: Abuse of power in the murder case of 
Buta Robakidze 
2018: Five years and three 
months  
OC Media (2020f) 
29 Zura Mikadze Former employee in 2012-today 2018: Abuse of power in the murder case of 2018: Five years and three OC Media (2020f) 
Appendix II - Post-2012 prosecutions in Georgia  
Dark red: Person is out of Georgia/location unknown; dark blue: Person has been imprisoned; light blue: Trial has been on-going; white: Prosecution has ended. 
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2018: Abuse of power in the murder case of 
Buta Robakidze 
2018: Four and a half years 
of prison  





Appendix III – Memo on field trip to Yerevan (28 to 30 October 2019)  
The following memo documents two major events during the field trip to Yerevan: a public 
discussion on TJ and a meeting with civil society stakeholders and victims of human rights 
violations. None of the statements that were issued by victims will be published due to the 
ethics commission’s restrictions and the sensitivity of the content.  
Transitional justice, corruption and state capture: Lessons for Armenia  
This section summarizes the most important discussion points made during the event entitled 
‘Transitional justice, corruption and state capture: Lessons for Armenia’. The discussion took 
place on 28 October 2019 at the DoubleTree by Hilton hotel (4/2 Grigor Lusavorich Street) in 
Yerevan, Armenia.  
Levon Baseghyan (Asparez Journalists Club) – No title specified for short presentation  
Basegehyan stated that there should be a public discussion about TJ on television to enable 
Armenian society to elaborate on the concept and its meaning. He underlined that 
Kocharyan’s and Sargsyan’s state capture could only be overcome through a revolutionary 
process. Whilst it was important to hold perpetrators accountable in order to prevent state 
capture from recurring, he underlined that a public apology would be equally important. 
However, he assumed that former officials would not apologize for state capture.  
Hennie van Vuuren (human rights defender, Open Secrets, South Africa) – “What made 
state capture possible in South Africa after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?” 
Van Vuuren underlined that it was up to each country to find its own TJ path and that the 
outcome depended on the new regime’s ability to challenge old structures. He illustrated the 
TJ process in South Africa. After the transition in 2018, more than 50% of South Africans still 
lived in poverty, and the level of inequality was extremely high. This was mainly attributable 
to endemic corruption, which was a result of 300 years of colonial and racist rule, a system 
which was designed to enrich the few and the civil war in the 1980s. The state was militarized 
due to all five members of the Security Council delivering weapons with a total value of 50 
billion euros to the apartheid regime. Foreign companies were involved in corruption and 
central to maintaining corrupt structures. They continued to influence the South African 
government after the 2018 transition, which destabilized political institutions. Although South 
Africa underwent an official truth and reconciliation process and had a truth commission in 




addressed economic crimes, and there was never an attempt to understand them. The post-
2018 government has not been able to tackle the network of human rights abusers. Despite the 
fact that civil society groups people’s hearings and tribunals, which were focused on 
economic crime, the state lacked political will to prosecute powerful interests and intelligence 
groups. The government’s truth commission only examined state capture from a political 
point of view, not an economic one. This also led to bilateral state relations (e.g., between 
Russia and South Africa) largely remaining unknown. However, according to van Vuuren, 
there was still opportunity to hold accountable individuals in South Africa and abroad.  
Artur Sakunts (human rights defender, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Armenia) – “What 
does state capture mean in Armenia?” 
According to Sakunts, TJ meant to examine the past in order to gain knowledge about the 
future. In Armenia, TJ was not yet public knowledge; however, TJ implementation was 
necessary in order to avoid repeating the past. A first positive step was that PM Pashinyan 
apologized for violence that he himself didn’t commit. Sakunts further elaborated on 
Armenia’s violent past, underlining that the country hasn’t yet experienced an election beyond 
the latest one in 2018, which would have been democratic. Until 2018, corruption was 
endemic in Armenia; 30% of Armenians lived in poverty, and access to resources was strictly 
limited to political and economic elites. In order to overcome the conditions of state capture, 
an overhaul of the political system was necessary. Sakunts highlighted the central role of a 
truth commission, which was not the same as a fact-finding commission. He didn’t point out 
which model he considered to be more suitable for the Armenian TJ process but stressed that 
property rights violations, non-combatant death cases, electoral rights violations and privacy 
rights violations in particular should be examined. The commission should explicitly not be 
an investigation body but collect information that would allow them to derive human rights-
related conclusions.  
Ruben Carranza (lawyer and policy advisor, ICTJ) – “What can we learn from post-
authoritarian transitional justice experiences addressing economic crimes?” 
Carranza explained that TJ is often confused with legal reforms, under the assumption that TJ 
can be achieved from a distance. However, this is not the case. TJ is not about changing laws 
but about changing policies; it is about examining the past in that provides broader context 
about how these laws could be used in order so to protect human rights. It was certainly 
possible to have different state institutions; however there were always still political forces 




important to regard economic violence, including corruption, as a human rights violation. TJ 
should not only address violations of physical integrity, such as torture, sexual violence, 
enforced disappearances and killings, but also violations of economic and social rights. It is 
important to unpack an authoritarian period of conflict, but conflict can be defined as 
structural violence, not only war. Carranza drew on TJ processes in Kenya and Tunisia to 
present some positive results. In Kenya, for instance, there were public hearings held on 
corruption; they demonstrated that corruption went beyond the direct involvement of 
individuals and included its structural impact. In Tunisia, the post-transitory government 
established a truth and dignity commission in 2013 whose mandate covered human rights 
violations that took place between 1956 and 2011. They launched investigations into 
corruption, embezzlement and bribery. Furthermore, an arbitration and reconciliation 
committee was created within the truth commission, which conducted negotiations with 
individuals who had committed large-scale corruption. The commission’s value extended 
beyond the law, and the process showed that commissions could directly engage with the 
public in a way that courts were unable to. Carranza stressed the importance of the 
commission’s name; translated from Arabic, it meant ‘decent means of livelihood’. Similarly 
to Sakunts, Carranza underscored that state capture was an undemocratic way for 
governments and elites to gain private benefits. There is a mutual relationship between 
corruption and human rights violations in which the corrupt use resources without being held 
accountable. TJ could deliver solutions to state capture; however, these would not necessarily 
lead to a perfect society. It would not be able to hold everyone accountable, but it could 
prevent levels of impunity and human rights violations if applied broadly and wisely. A truth 
commission is an element of TJ that could attempt to publicly extract information. However, 
commissions were not designed to be investigatory in nature and were implemented in 
particular in states after revolutions. Finally, Carranza underlined the central role of victims of 
human rights violations, as they know part of the truth and could contribute to public truth-
telling.  
Edik Baghdasaryan (HETQ investigative journalist) – “What can activists do to end state 
capture in Armenia?” 
Baghdasaryan underlined negatively that officials, who committed crimes, would not have 
been held accountable until today. He stated that law enforcement was not overly interested in 
facts and would put up defences. He elaborated on the important role of journalists during the 




stressed that Armenia would need to find its own TJ path and could not copy Kenya’s or 
Tunisia’s approaches. However, implementing TJ in Armenia would be challenging since the 
government was not in an adequate state, as the banking sector and companies were still 
controlled by old elites.  
Varuzhan Hoktanyan (TI Anti-Corruption Center) – No title specified for short 
presentation   
In order for TJ to be meaningful to societies, Hoktanyan stated that it was necessary to begin 
documenting facts from the very beginning of the TJ process; this was particularly important 
from an efficiency perspective. There was still a high risk of systemic corruption in Armenia, 
since the ancien régime could not have survived without it in Armenia. He elaborated on 
Armenia’s past state capture: business elites that belonged to ministries also became members 
of parliament. Thus, politics and economics were completely intertwined. The judiciary was 
not independent, and power would have been highly concentrated and shared by a few 
individuals in Armenia. They dictated economic and political interests, abused administrative 
resources and engaged in state capture.  
Consultation of civil society stakeholders on key aspects of transitional justice  
The following segments summarize the content of a consultation meeting that took place 
between local civil society groups and the ICTJ on 29 October 2019. The meeting was 
followed by a consultation with victims of human rights violations, which is only partly 
documented for data protection reasons.   
Ruben Carranza (lawyer and policy advisor, ICTJ) 
Carranza explained that a fact-finding commission would examine the human rights violations 
that have been committed since 1991. The commission’s mandate would last two years, with 
a possible one-year extension. It would examine electoral fraud, political prosecutions, non-
combatant death cases, corruption schemes and domestic abuse. Carranza underlined that the 
ICTJ had a meeting with the ministry of justice and would draw up proposals on what would 
be called a fact-finding commission in the future. The ICTJ would have been asked by the 
government for technical assistance. He further elaborated that the ICTJ would have 
supported the government with assistance on vetting and on asset recovery. Carranza 




would cover many issues, not only those related to corruption. Consultations should be held 
with citizens and in an inclusive environment.  
The current TJ strategy would not define human rights violations but list events. Descriptions 
based on events could exclude events that were not covered by newspapers or not considered 
to be political. For instance, certain political detentions that were not significant in number 
would not appear as a thematic issue. However, such issues could be covered by the truth 
commission. Civil society would have a crucial role in overcoming the public’s mistrust. TJ 
should not become a discussion between government and experts but rather between and 
within society. Carranza also broadly commented on the Tunisian case, which is not 
documented here since it was outside the purview of the thesis.  
Hennie van Vuuren (human rights defender, Open Secrets, South Africa) 
Van Vuuren underlined the significant negative consequences of the failure to address the past 
in South Africa. According to him, one of the most important TJ principles is to not only 
punish the previous government but to prevent human rights violations from happening again. 
Van Vuuren provided an overview of the mechanism of state capture in South Africa and the 
role of the Gupta family, which is not discussed here since it isn’t particularly relevant for the 
present research. Van Vuuren presented lessons learnt for the Armenian case: a fact-finding 
commission would need to communicate with the public and should serve as a briefing room. 
An action plan should be pre-developed and, unlike in South Africa, not be ignored.  
Meetings with Mothers in Black and victims of property rights violations  
On 29 October 2019, the ICTJ representatives and some civil society actors met with 
members of the Mothers in Black, a collective of mothers, whose sons were murdered in non-
combatant circumstances, and representatives from the NGO Victims of State Needs.  The 
victims’ statements are not documented in this thesis.  
Ruben Carranza  
Carranza briefly elaborated on the circumstances of the non-combatant deaths. Many cases 
have not been investigated. Mothers were regularly detained whilst protesting. Carranza 
underlined that the Armenian state would owe them and the killed soldiers the truth. Learning 
the truth could lead to a sense of justice, which could come not only from the courts but also 
from recognition and apology. He further reflected on the role of the truth commission. The 




information collected as part of the commission’s process could lead to decisions whether or 
not accused parties should face punishment; however, information and facts were different 
from how truth is being perceived.   
Lawyer of victims of property rights violations  
Despite the fact that the Armenian constitution prohibits the government from taking property 
from citizens, around 5,000 Yerevan residents experienced property rights violations, 
particularly under Kocharyan. To develop Central Avenue, the government forced out citizens 
who lived on Northern Avenue. Victims usually went to the European Court of Human Rights 
to have their rights restored; usually, they would not want money but the restitution of their 
property. Property rights violations have imposed psychological violence on affected families. 
However, a truth commission is not a court and could not determine the value of the lost real 
estate; it could only examine how state capture functioned and corruption in Armenia. 

















Appendix IV – Memo on online debate ‘Transitional Justice in Central Asia and 
Georgia’ (14 July 2020) 
The current appendix documents parts of a discussion entitled ‘Transitional Justice in Central 
Asia and Georgia’ held by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights on 14 July 2020. The participants were Anna Dolidze, a Georgian lawyer, Ilya 
Nuzov, head of Eastern Europe and Central Asia Desk for the International Federation for 
Human Rights and Alexei Trochev, associate professor of political science at Nazarbayev 
University in Nur-Sultan. Only Dolidze’s discussion points on Georgia are documented here, 
as they are directly relevant to the research topic.  
A source for the debate recording cannot be provided here, but it can be obtained by directly 
contacting the Geneva Academy. A short summary can be found on the following webpage: 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2020) ‘Students 
organized a panel discussion on transitional justice in Central Asia and Georgia’, 
https://www.geneva-academy.ch/news/detail/356-students-organized-a-panel-discussion-on-
transitional-justice-in-central-asia-and-georgia, checked on 30 December 2020.  
Firstly, Dolidze elaborated on the Soviet repression in the former Georgian SSR and its 
impact on post-1990 Georgia, which is not documented here. She continued by describing the 
country’s political circumstances and repression under former presidents Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili. According to Dolidze, 
Saakashvili’s tenure in Georgia was often referred to as ‘nine bloody years’. Despite these 
long episodes of repression, however, there has never been a truth and reconciliation process 
in Georgia. There has not been a truth commission, a public commemoration or a narration 
about the violent past. All governments have refused to take a clear stance on the 
predecessors’ governance. There have been individual cases of property restitution and the 
release of political prisoners, but the latter have not been reconciled with or compensated.  
Dolidze elaborated on why there has never been a truth and reconciliation process in Georgia. 
She presented two hypotheses. The first concerns the country’s cultural context and social 
fabric. She stated that if governments had initiated large-scale prosecutions and truth 
processes, they might have discovered that perpetrators and victims belonged to the same 
families. The social fabric of Georgia is very insular and arranged around the latter. 
Consequently, the process could have been very painful and thus may have been avoided. The 




Currently, transitional justice is not a popular or oft-discussed topic in Georgia. It was in 2012 
that TJ was the focus of attention. Dolidze recounted that she had co-authored a piece with 
Tom de Waal on the topic that asked the government to initiate a truth process. She wrote hat 
Georgia was now paying the price for a lack of TJ implementation; this was visible in, for 
example, the country’s polarized political climate. Georgia was haunted by past human rights 
violations. However, there was no specific interest in TJ from scholars or NGOs. Dolidze 
mentioned that there was a minor discussion on TJ when the ICTJ came to Georgia, but not 
much has been done beyond that.  
Appendix V – Memo on online discussion ‘The Recovery of the Judiciary in the Context 
of Constitutional Amendments’ (8 May 2020) 
The documented event was organized by the ICTJ and the Armenian Media Center and 
supported by OSF Armenia. The participants were Anna Myriam Roccatello (deputy 
executive director and director of programmes at the ICTJ), Palmina Tanzarella (professor of 
Italian and European constitutional law and state-building and constitutional law researcher at 
the University of Milano Bicocca’s School of Law), Grigor Bekmezyan (member of the 
Supreme Judicial Council) and Artur Sakunts (head of Helsinki Citizens' Assembly in 
Vanadzor).  
The discussion, which was held in English and Armenian, can be accessed on the following 
webpage: Media Center (2020) ‘The Recovery of the Judiciary in the Context of 
Constitutional Amendments’, http://www.media-center.am/en/1588972028, checked on 30 
December 2020.  
Grigor Bekmezyan (member of Supreme Judicial Council)  
Bekmezyan stated that judicial independence would need to be upheld during the TJ process 
and that courts would have to operate within the law. The Supreme Council could not carry 
out vetting of judges, as it was primarily tasked with guaranteeing the independence of the 
police. Domestic legal acts, adapted under the constitution, would prove that the judiciary 
functioned efficiently. To date, the Corruption Prevention Commission had been tasked with 
publishing income and assets of judges. The de facto implementation of TJ (Bekmezyan 
referred to the prosecution of judges) wouldn’t be possible under the current domestic 
legislation. Furthermore, the members of the Supreme Council would not be able to vet 




Artur Sakunts (head of Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly)  
Sakunts briefly reflected on the meaning of the 2018 Velvet Revolution. He called it a 
revolution in the strictest sense of the word, which happened because of a deficit of social 
justice. The courts in Armenia operated as the political elite wished and were in fact 
instructed by them. In general, it cannot be said that fair decisions are impossible; however, 
once political and economic interests are involved, such decisions cannot withstand these 
interests. Similarly, legislative and court practice were not always necessarily bad, but judges 
were vulnerable; they could be fired or disciplined for their judgements. Consequently, the 
judiciary lacked public trust. The new procedure to assess judges’ incomes would be 
insufficient for verifying their integrity since it only covered the period from 2017 to the 
present. After 2018, civil society demanded deep and comprehensive vetting for the legal 
system. This would mean the initiation of political-administrative measures against all judges 
who violated Article 6 (right to fair trial) of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Armenia would require a TJ toolkit, which it did not have. Without TJ, the only avenue was 
punitive. However, vetting would be more civilized, as it was the only way that remained to 
regain trust in the judiciary. According Sakunts, Armenia would not have a crisis of 
constitutional court but a crisis of constitution. The current constitution was at a deadlock, 
because it could not secure democracy. However, no amendments to the constitution have 
been published yet. The PM would have announced to publish a new draft of the constitution 
until the end of the year 2020; however, no concept paper or materials have been made 
available to make the process observable. Sakunts identified a certain reluctance to engage 
civil society in the wording of the constitution. Furthermore, he did not see any progress with 
regard to the truth commission. Finally, he expressed his regret in stating that the Armenian 
authorities have failed in all reforms that expected by civil society after the revolution.  
Grigor Bekmezyan (Supreme Judicial Council)  
Behmezyan responded that it was easier to criticize actions than to deliver them. If vetting 
was conducted as Sakunts described it, all judges would have to be eliminated. This would 
cause a heavy blow to the judiciary, as 30-40% of judges would have to be fired and the 
judiciary would collapse as a result. There was no legal ground in Armenia to do so and 
would trigger many cases in the European Court of Human Rights. Currently, the Supreme 
Council was working hard to elect new judges. Finally, Behmezyan asked whether it was 
more important to punish former judges or to work in a healthy manner within the existing 




Palmina Tanzarella (professor of Italian and European constitutional law and state-
building and constitutional law researcher at University of Milano Bicocca’s School of 
Law) 
Tanzarella underlined the importance of speaking the same language when discussing vetting. 
Vetting was not a disciplinary reform procedure but a tool for sending a clear message that 
Armenia wanted to break with the past in order to ensure the sound functioning of justice. The 
purpose of a constitution was to rebuild power and trust in the political system. A new 
constitution needed to be both a starting point and a pillar and to express the culture of a 
society. It would have to operate as a matter of fact in the sense of a material constitution. In 
societies where this was not the case, it was necessary to purge the system that was in place in 
the past in order to initiate a new constitutional era. Therefore, dialogue and compromise were 
necessary.  
Anna Myriam Roccatello (deputy executive director and director of programmes at the 
ICTJ) 
Roccattello stressed that the vetting debate was a historic moment for Armenia. She outlined 
the process in detail. Vetting is a process that can and should take place in specific 
circumstances, when a country emerges from a historically problematic period that 
undermined critical state institutions and their credibility. Vetting was a response to a 
systemic issue which needed to be addressed to reform the state. It helps to assess the 
suitability of serving judges and the judicial personnel to perform the judiciary’s function. 
Thus, the criteria for such an assessment were much broader than strict disciplinary processes. 
Vetting was intended as a holistic assessment that does not focus on singular cases but rather 
the cultural element of independence of behaviour and attitude. Transitional vetting was 
meant to be a one-time process that took place at a particular moment in time and attempted to 
re-create a judicial body that was credible, healthy, professional and independent. It 
demanded the involvement of civil society, which was not involved in the system of discipline 
but tackled the issue of the perception of the process. According to Roccatello, it may not be 
necessary to dismiss all serving judges, only 20-28%. Vetting usually started with higher 
placed and more senior decision-makers. The process of rewriting the constitution should 
involve all sectors in society; civil society had a key role to play. Normally, the constitution 
would come out of the Constitutional Assembly. It should include fundamental principles of 




Annex VI Interlocutors for interviews  
In the following, you find an overview of all individuals I interviewed for the thesis. As mentioned, I conducted 19 interviews on Georgia (G) and 
15 on Armenia (A). Two participants answered the questions in written form. They are marked.  
No. Name  Date Profession/occupation at the 
time of the interview (Position 
might have changed afterwards) 
Affiliation at the time of the interview 
(Affiliation might have changed 
afterwards)  
1 Ruben Carranza  (A)  29.10.2019 Lawyer, policy advisor   International Center for Transitional 
Justice (ICTJ) 
2 Peter Liakhov (A)   24.02.2020 Journalist, documentary filmmaker  OC Media 
3 Tsira Chanturia (G)   02.03.2020 Lawyer  Penal Reform International  
4 Natia Imnadze (G) 04.03.2020 Lawyer Institute for Democracy and Safe 
Development (IDSD) 
5 Helene Khoshtaria (G) 10.03.2020 Politician  European Georgia (EG) 
6 Mariam Jishkariani (G) 10.03.2020 Psychologist  Empathy  
7 Anonymous G1 (G) 11.03.2020 Not disclosed  Not disclosed  
8 Anonymous G2 (G) 11.03.2020 Not disclosed  Not disclosed  
9 Guram Imnadze (G) 12.03.2020 Lawyer Human Rights Education and 
Monitoring Center (EMC)  
10 Lina Ghvinianidze (G) 12.03.2020 Lawyer Human Rights Education and 
Monitoring Center (EMC) 
11 Levan Ramishvili (G) 12.03.2020 Activist   Liberty Institute  
12 Marina Muskhelishvili (G) 13.03.2020 Political scientist  Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State 
University (TSU) 
13 Anonymous A1 (A) 18.03.2020 Not disclosed  Not disclosed  
14 Anonymous G3 (G) 24.03.2020 Not disclosed Not disclosed  
15 Edgar Khachatryan (A) 25.03.2020 Lawyer  Peace Dialogue  
16 Giorgi Gvilava (G) 01.04.2020 Lawyer   Transparency International (TI) Georgia 
17 Varser Karapetyan (A)  10.04.2020 Lawyer   Human Rights House Yerevan  




19 Gohar Simonyan (A) 17.04.2020 Lawyer  Head of the Department for the 
Prevention of Torture and Ill-treatment 
of the Human Rights Defender’s Office 
of Armenia 
20 Alexander Iskandaryan (A) 17.04.2020 Sociologist  Caucasus Institute  
21 Giorgi Mshvenieradze (G) 17.04.2020 Human rights defender  Georgian Democracy Initiative (GDI) 
22 Sergi Kapanadze (G) 28.04.2020 Politician  European Georgian (EG) 
23 Artak Kirakosyan (A) 06.05.2020 Human rights defender  Civil Society Institute 
24 Armen Mazmanyan (A) 07.05.2020 Lawyer  Apella Institute for Policy Analysis and 
Dialogue and its Center for 
Constitutional Studies Yerevan 
25 Anonymous A2 (A) 26.05.2020 Not disclosed   Not disclosed  
26 Karena Avedissian (A) 27.05.2020 Political scientist American University of Armenia (AUA) 
27 Mikayel Zolyan (A) 29.05.2020 Politician  My Step 
28 Ucha Nanuashvili (G) 21.07.2020 Human rights defender, former 
Ombudsman of Georgia 
Democracy Research Institute (DRI) 
29 Tamar Chugoshvili (G) 22.07.2020 Politician  Independent, no party affiliation  (former 
Georgian Dream) 
30 Kakha Tsikarishvili (G) 21.07.2020 
23.07.2020 
Lawyer, former Assistant of 
Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Article 42 
31 Nino Elbakidze (G) 27.07.2020 Lawyer Human Rights Advocacy and 
Democracy Fund 
32 Anonymous G4 (G) 29.07.2020 Not disclosed Not disclosed  
33 Mamikon Hovsepyan (A) 29.08.2020 Human rights defender Pink Armenia  
34 Syuzanna Soghomonyan (A) 30.09.2020 Lawyer  Armenian Lawyers’ Association (ALA) 
  
 
